Andhra Pradesh High Court Quashes Estates Settlement Order Passed Against Deceased Persons, Bars Same Officer From Hearing Own Appeal

The Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside a 2026 settlement order because it was passed against dead parties without substituting legal heirs, and barred the same officer from acting as appellate authority over his own decision.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati, in a speaking and reportable order dated 19 June 2026, has quashed a common order passed on 26 March 2026 by the Commissioner and Director of Settlements in two revision petitions—R.P.No.15/2016/E and R.P.No.3/2020/E—arising under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. Justice Sumathi Jagadam, sitting singly under Article 226 of the Constitution, found that the impugned order was passed against parties who were already dead, without first deciding pending applications for substitution of legal representatives. The court went further and held that the same officer who passed that order could not, in law, hear the appeal against it as an appellate authority, because doing so would violate the maxim Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa. The matter has been remitted for fresh disposal within six months.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, N.S. Kirana Kumari, daughter of the late Jade Suseelamma, aged 54 years and resident of Shimoga District, Karnataka, approached the High Court claiming to be the legal heir of the original first petitioner in R.P.No.15/2016/E, which was pending before the Commissioner and Director of Settlements, the third respondent.

The revision petition had originally been filed by six petitioners. During its pendency, petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 died. Applications seeking to bring their legal representatives on record, along with supporting documents, were filed before the third respondent on 4 March 2026. Those applications were admittedly pending when the authority proceeded to reserve the matters for orders on 19 March 2026 and passed the common order on 26 March 2026.

Compounding the position, the learned counsel who had represented some of the respondents in those proceedings, Sri P. Ganga Rami Reddy, died on 29 December 2025. Newly engaged counsel, Ms. C. Jhansi Rani and Sri R.R.G. Krishna Rao, filed a memo dated 13 March 2026 seeking time to study the record and address arguments. Despite this, the matters were reserved without issuing notice and without deciding the substitution applications.

The petitioner further pointed out that the very same officer who passed the impugned order on 26 March 2026 in his capacity as Commissioner and Director of Settlements had, by G.O.Rt.No.1628 (GA) dated 3 September 2025, been appointed as Commissioner of Appeals in the office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (CCLA) on Full Additional Charge (FAC) basis. This meant that any appeal against the order of 26 March 2026 would land before the same individual.

An appeal in the matter was already pending before the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, the second respondent. The petitioner apprehended that while that authority was away on election duty in Tamil Nadu, the Joint Collector-cum-Settlement Officer, Tirupati (the fourth respondent) might proceed to implement the impugned order, causing irreparable loss. The petitioner also filed a memo dated 7 May 2026 before the second respondent seeking withdrawal of the appeal with liberty to pursue remedies in the writ petition.

The State's Government Pleader for Revenue resisted the petition on three grounds: that the FAC arrangement caused no prejudice; that the petitioner had already availed the statutory remedy of appeal and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable; and that the petitioner had not impleaded all affected parties.

The Two Legal Questions Framed

Justice Sumathi Jagadam identified two interrelated questions of law. First, whether an authority could dispose of main proceedings without first deciding an application to bring legal representatives on record, and if not, whether an order passed against a party who was already dead is void and a nullity. Second, whether the same officer who passed the original order could thereafter sit as an appellate authority over that very order, in violation of the principle against bias.

Both parties addressed elaborate submissions and consented to final disposal at the admission stage itself, since the questions were pure questions of law not requiring affidavits in reply.

Order Against Dead Persons: The Court's Reasoning

On the first question, the court found that the facts were not materially in dispute. The substitution applications had been filed on 4 March 2026 and were admittedly undecided when the order was passed on 26 March 2026. No notice was issued to the respondents before the matters were reserved.

The court traced the applicable procedure through the Act itself. Section 67 of the Estates Abolition Act empowers the Government to frame rules for carrying out the Act's purposes. Under Section 67(2)(e), the Government is specifically empowered to apply the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act, 1963 to applications, appeals and proceedings under the Act. The rules framed under Section 67, specifically Rule 7 as substituted by G.O.Ms.No.3118, Rev., dated 5 December 1950, provide that every Tribunal constituted under Section 8(1) and every Special Tribunal constituted under Section 51(1) shall have all the powers exercisable by a civil court in the trial of suits and in appeals. The effect, the court held, is that Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure necessarily governs these proceedings.

Order XXII deals with the procedure to be followed upon death, marriage and insolvency of parties. The court characterised the provisions relating to substitution of legal representatives as mandatory in nature. It placed reliance on Gurnam Singh (Dead) through LRs. and others v. Gurbachan Kaur (Dead) through LRs. (AIR (2017) SC 2419), where the Supreme Court held that a decision rendered for or against persons who had died during the pendency of proceedings, without bringing their legal representatives on record, is a nullity in the eye of law. The Supreme Court had also held in that case that once no steps are taken for substitution within the prescribed time, the proceedings abate automatically and the court ceases to have jurisdiction.

The rationale, the court observed, is that a dead person cannot be subjected to adjudication and proceedings conducted without impleading legal representatives, where necessary, offend the principles of natural justice and due process. The action of the third respondent in reserving the matters and passing the impugned order despite pending substitution applications, and despite newly engaged counsel seeking an opportunity to address arguments, demonstrated “gross non-application of mind” and rendered the order legally unsustainable.

The Bias Question: Same Officer Cannot Hear His Own Appeal

On the second question, the court noted that a memo had already been filed before the second respondent seeking withdrawal of the appeal. Strictly, an answer was unnecessary. Yet because the question carried general importance and might arise in similar matters, the court decided to address it.

The court held the issue to be settled law. It drew on the principle reiterated by the Orissa High Court in Khira Swain v. State of Orissa and Others (O.J.C. No.15209 of 1998, decided 16 November 1998, (1998) 11 OHC CK 0010), where the Orissa High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in State of West Bengal and others v. Shivananda Pathak and others (AIR 1998 SC 2050) and Baidyanath Mohapatra v. State of Orissa (AIR 1989 SC 2215), held that the principle of natural justice prohibiting bias applies with full force where the same authority functions as both the original adjudicator and the appellate authority. In Khira Swain, the Orissa High Court quashed an appellate order passed by a Sub-Collector who had earlier rejected the mutation application as the Mutation Officer-cum-Tahasildar.

The court also relied on Mohd. Chand and Another v. State of U.P. and Others (Writ C No.24629/2012, decided 22 May 2012, 2012 AHC 70139), where the Allahabad High Court quashed an appellate order passed by a Commissioner who had passed the original order as Collector. The Allahabad High Court had observed that an appeal is conceptually different from a review: an appeal requires a superior authority to test the correctness of a lower authority's decision, whereas “hearing an appeal against one's own order reduces the appellate jurisdiction to that of a review.” Both courts invoked the dictum that justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

Justice Sumathi Jagadam emphasised that the prohibition is absolute and does not depend on the presence of malicious intent. Even the absence of mala fides cannot cure the inherent lack of impartiality when an authority reviews its own decision. The appellate authority is duty-bound to recuse itself or refer the matter to a higher authority. In the present case, the court had factually verified the copy of G.O.Rt.No.1628 dated 3 September 2025, confirming that the same officer who passed the order of 26 March 2026 had been placed in FAC charge of the post of Commissioner of Appeals under the CCLA.

The court held that allowing such an arrangement to continue would be in flagrant violation of Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa and would render any appellate order void ab initio. The fact that the original order was itself passed against deceased persons did not diminish the bias concern; if anything, it heightened the need for a fair and independent appellate forum.

Order

The High Court allowed the writ petition. The common order dated 26 March 2026 passed by the third respondent in R.P.No.15/2016/E and R.P.No.3/2020/E was quashed. The matters were remitted to the third respondent for fresh disposal in accordance with law, strictly adhering to the principles of natural justice. The third respondent was directed to hear and decide the matter, un-influenced by any observations made in this order, within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. No order as to costs was made. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were directed to stand closed.