Andhra Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Appointment of District Consumer Commission President, Holds State Cannot Override Selection Committee’s Merit Order

Justice Balaji Medamalli set aside G.O.Rt.No.39 of 2022 appointing the second-ranked candidate as President of the Vijayawada District Consumer Commission, holding the State Government had no authority to depart from the merit panel forwarded by the Selection Committee.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati has set aside the appointment of Chiranjeevi Nelapudi as President, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, made under G.O.Rt.No.39 dated 28 July 2022. Justice Balaji Medamalli, sitting singly, held that the State Government had bypassed the petitioner, Rayala Kiran Kumar — who had secured the highest marks in the selection process and was placed first in the merit panel — and appointed the candidate placed second without placing any adverse material before the Selection Committee as required under Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020. The judgment, pronounced on 3 August 2026, follows a consistent line of decisions from both the single bench and the Division Bench of this court.

The Dispute Before the Court

Rayala Kiran Kumar, an advocate aged about 51 years and a resident of Khammam, Telangana, had served two consecutive terms as a Member of the Khammam District Consumer Forum from 3 March 2010 to 3 March 2021. After completing his tenure, he resumed legal practice.

Respondent No. 3 issued a notification on 9 January 2022 inviting applications for filling vacancies in the posts of Presidents of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions in four districts of Andhra Pradesh. Kiran Kumar applied on 20 January 2022 for the Vijayawada post and appeared before the Selection Committee on 28 February 2022.

The Selection Committee awarded him 21 out of 30 marks, placing him at Sl.No.1 in the merit panel. The candidate placed second, respondent No. 5, secured 18 out of 30. Despite this, the State Government issued G.O.Rt.No.39 on 28 July 2022 appointing respondent No. 5 as President with effect from 31 July 2022, without stating any reason for departing from the merit order.

Kiran Kumar came to know of his position in the merit list only after a friend sought the information under the Right to Information Act, 2005. He further learnt on 26 November 2024 that this court had, in proceedings arising out of the same notification, set aside similar appointments where the State had departed from the Selection Committee’s recommendations. He then filed W.P.No. 30995 of 2024, praying for the Government Order to be declared illegal and for a direction that he be appointed as President in accordance with his merit position.

The Legal Framework: Rules 6(9), 6(10) and 6(11)

The appointment of Presidents and Members of District Consumer Commissions is governed by the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020, issued by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. The Selection Committee under Rule 6(1) is chaired by the Chief Justice of the High Court or a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with the Secretary in-charge of Consumer Affairs and a nominee of the Chief Secretary as members.

Rule 6(9) empowers the Selection Committee to determine its own procedure, taking into account the suitability, past performance, integrity, and adjudicatory experience of candidates. Rule 6(10) requires the Selection Committee to recommend a panel of names in the order of merit for the consideration of the State Government. Rule 6(11) confines the State Government’s role to verifying or causing verification of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates.

Rule 5 prescribes disqualifications for appointment — including criminal conviction involving moral turpitude, insolvency, unsound mind, dismissal from government service, and financial or other interest likely to prejudicially affect functions. The court noted that sub-rules (i) to (iv) of Rule 5 are matters of fact going to eligibility, while sub-rule (v) — concerning financial or other interest — involves an element of suitability and opinion.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Medamalli found the legal position conclusively settled by two prior proceedings arising out of the very same January 2022 notification. In W.P.No.25348 of 2022, this court had allowed a challenge to a similar appointment made by the same G.O., directed the State to obtain fresh antecedent reports, and held that the Government’s role was confined to acting on the Selection Committee’s recommendations, not to substituting its own preference. That decision was affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.945 of 2024. When the matter was carried to the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.14661 of 2025, the Supreme Court declined to interfere and clarified that if the State Government finds material against a recommended candidate, “the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself.”

The Division Bench in W.A.No.945 of 2024 had analysed the grey area created by Rule 5(v), observing that the rule “gives scope for favouritism and allied allegations apart from tilt in the balance in favour of the State in making appointments to judicial posts.” To guard against this, the Division Bench held that if the State forms an adverse opinion about the first-ranked candidate after receiving the antecedent report, it must place that opinion and the material before the Selection Committee for reconsideration — it cannot unilaterally alter the merit order.

Justice Medamalli applied the same logic to the present case. The respondents had not contended that Kiran Kumar’s candidature was rejected for lack of qualification or that any adverse material was found during verification. The sole question was whether the State could pick respondent No. 5, placed second, over the first-ranked candidate purely on its own assessment. The court held it could not.

The court also addressed the age-bar argument raised by respondent No. 5. Rule 4 of the Rules prescribes that a President must be, or have been, or be qualified to be appointed as a District Judge. Respondent No. 5 contended that the petitioner, then about 51 years of age, could not be qualified to be a District Judge and therefore lacked locus to challenge the appointment. The court rejected this: the Selection Committee itself had considered the petitioner eligible, assessed his suitability, and placed him first in the merit panel. Once the Committee had done so, respondent No. 5 could not independently raise eligibility as a ground to deny the petitioner standing before the court.

On delay, the court accepted the petitioner’s explanation that no merit list was published by the respondents, that the petitioner had been under a bona fide impression that the process was conducted in accordance with rules, and that the cause of action arose only when the RTI response revealed the actual marks and the Government’s deviation from the merit panel. Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., reported at (2009) 1 SCC 768, the court noted that delay must be assessed on the facts of each case, and that delay is not an automatic bar where the petitioner was vigilant once the relevant information came to light.

On the argument that the petitioner could not claim parity with candidates in earlier cases where appointments were set aside, the court drew on the Supreme Court’s observations in State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh, (2009) 5 SCC 65, that Article 14 requires equal treatment among persons similarly situated where legal rights are involved — but courts cannot permit perpetuation of illegality. Here, the petitioner was not seeking to benefit from an illegality; he was seeking to enforce the statutory procedure that required the State to act on the merit panel.

The court also took note that the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Ashish Kumar Grover v. State of Punjab and Urvashi Agnihotri v. State of Punjab, had taken identical positions on the binding character of Selection Committee recommendations for the same type of post. The Punjab and Haryana judgment in Ashish Kumar Grover had been upheld by the Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.11196 of 2024, decided on 1 April 2024.

Respondent No. 5’s Tenure and Survival of the Claim

Respondent No. 5’s tenure as President was noted to be likely expiring shortly. Counsel for the State and for respondent No. 5 argued that the petition had therefore become infructuous. The court declined to accept this. It held that the State Government’s departure from the merit-based recommendations of the Selection Committee had already been declared impermissible, and the petitioner’s claim for consideration in accordance with the Selection Committee’s recommendations would survive for future appointments or any extension of respondent No. 5’s tenure. The cause therefore survived for adjudication.

Order

The writ petition was allowed. G.O.Rt.No.39, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies (CS-II) Department, dated 28 July 2022, was set aside.

The State Government was directed to place its opinion, along with the antecedent verification report and all other relevant material, before the Selection Committee within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, so as to enable the Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take appropriate further action in accordance with law.

Interim orders, if any, granted earlier were vacated. All pending miscellaneous petitions were closed.