Andhra Pradesh High Court Dismisses Second Appeal at Admission Stage, Upholds Partition Decree in Kakinada Ancestral Property Dispute

Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao found no substantial question of law in a defendant's challenge to a partition decree covering two ancestral properties in Kakinada, dismissing the second appeal at the admission stage.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati dismissed a second appeal at the stage of admission on 15 June 2026, confirming a first appellate court's decree directing partition of two ancestral properties in Kakinada. Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao, sitting singly, held that the questions raised by the defendant — concerning the legitimacy of six co-plaintiffs, the validity of an unproduced relinquishment deed, and the entitlement of a legatee who came on record during the first appeal — did not constitute substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment traces a dispute that began with O.S. No. 171 of 1998 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, and travelled through a first appeal before the III Additional District Judge, Kakinada, before reaching this Court.

The Partition Suit and Its Procedural Journey

Plaintiff No. 1, Turangi Somaraju, along with plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 — his six daughters through his second wife Raghava — filed O.S. No. 171 of 1998 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada. They sought partition of two properties: plaint ‘A’ schedule, a vacant site of 780 sq. yards, and plaint ‘B’ schedule, a house bearing D.No. 69-6-125 on a site of 300 sq. yards in Gaigolupadu Village, Ramanayyapeta, Kakinada Rural Mandal. The plaintiffs sought division into eight equal shares, one share each to plaintiff Nos. 1 to 7 and one to the defendant, T. Satyanarayana, who is the son of plaintiff No. 1 through his first wife.

The plaintiffs pleaded that both properties were ancestral, having been purchased by the grandfather of the defendant and plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7. They also pleaded that the defendant had fraudulently obtained a relinquishment deed from plaintiff No. 1 by misrepresenting that papers bearing his signatures were required for a pending case before the II Class Magistrate Court, Kakinada. Plaintiff No. 1 subsequently executed a registered cancellation deed setting out these facts. Despite a legal notice dated 27 April 1998 demanding partition, the defendant did not respond.

The defendant denied that plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were legitimate children of plaintiff No. 1, contending that Raghava was kept as a concubine and not married to plaintiff No. 1. He also asserted that plaintiff No. 1 had validly relinquished his share in plaint ‘A’ schedule property on 16 March 1998 in exchange for Rs. 80,000, and that the defendant had been in exclusive possession since that date.

The trial court, the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, dismissed the suit after framing four issues, including whether plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were legitimate children of plaintiff No. 1 and whether the registered cancellation deed dated 4 April 1998 was valid. The plaintiffs appealed. The III Additional District Judge, Kakinada, in A.S. No. 47 of 2005, reversed the trial court's decree and allowed the appeal. During the pendency of the first appeal, plaintiff No. 1 died. His second wife, respondent No. 8, was brought on record as his legal representative on the basis of a registered Will dated 18 March 2008 executed in her favour, by an order in I.A. No. 2033 of 2011 dated 30 September 2011. A further daughter of plaintiff No. 1, respondent No. 9, was also added. The defendant then filed Second Appeal No. 817 of 2012 before this Court.

The Threshold Under Section 100 CPC

Justice Gopala Krishna Rao opened his analysis by restating the jurisdictional threshold for a second appeal. The right of appeal is neither natural nor inherent; it is regulated by law. Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a second appeal can be admitted only when the appellant satisfies the Court that a substantial question of law arises between the parties. A question qualifies as substantial if it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is either an open question not finally settled by superior courts, or one not free from difficulty, or one that calls for discussion of alternative views.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, for the proposition that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at by the last court of fact, namely the first appellate court. Where two inferences of fact are possible from a given set of circumstances, the inference drawn by the lower appellate court will not be disturbed in a second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence, and the contents of documents cannot constitute a substantial question of law.

Legitimacy of Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7

The defendant's primary contention was that plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were not legitimate children of plaintiff No. 1 because Raghava was never his wife. The Court examined the evidence on record and found this contention unsustainable.

Plaintiff No. 1 had specifically pleaded in the plaint that after the death of his first wife — when the defendant was about seven or eight years old — he married Raghava as his second wife and that plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were born to him through Raghava. This was reiterated in the legal notice, Ex. A-1, dated 27 April 1998. The defendant acknowledged receipt of that notice under Ex. A-2, a postal acknowledgment card bearing his admitted signature. He sent no reply denying the paternity of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 or the marriage of Raghava with plaintiff No. 1.

In cross-examination before the trial court, the defendant failed to identify Raghava, who was present in the court hall. The Court found this circumstance telling. P.W. 1 (plaintiff No. 1) and P.W. 2 both gave evidence affirming the marriage and the birth of the six daughters. The defendant produced no evidence to show that plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were illegitimate. The defendant's own admission was that his natural mother died when he was about eight years old, and that he was now 42 years old.

The Court distinguished the case laws placed by the appellant. The Madras High Court decision in Balakrishnan and Others v. Selvi and Others, S.A. No. 725 of 2001, which discussed the rights of illegitimate children under Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was held inapplicable because plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 were found to be legitimate children of plaintiff No. 1. The Bombay High Court decision in Vasant Ramchandra Alias Chander v. Gurudas Vasantrao Yelvande and Others, Civil Revision Application No. 861 of 2014, which restricted children of a void marriage to claims in the separate property of their father, was similarly distinguished on the same basis.

The Supreme Court decision in Rathnamma & Ors. v. Sujathamma and Ors., (2019) 19 SCC 714, which placed the burden of proving marriage on the plaintiff, was also addressed. The Court noted that in the present case, plaintiff No. 1 had pleaded the second marriage in the plaint itself and had given evidence to that effect, supported by P.W. 2. The case in Ram @ Ramdas Sheshrao Neharkar v. Sheshrao Babura Neharkar and Others was distinguished on facts, as that case involved large-scale discrepancies in evidence and a failure by the lower courts to consider the factum of marriage, neither of which was present here.

The Unproduced Relinquishment Deed

The defendant's second line of attack was that plaintiff No. 1 had relinquished his share in plaint ‘A’ schedule property by a deed dated 16 March 1998, having received Rs. 80,000 as consideration, and that the plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to seek partition.

The Court found a fundamental evidentiary problem with this contention: the relinquishment deed was never produced before the trial court and was never exhibited. Plaintiff No. 1 disputed the deed from the outset, pleading that the defendant obtained it fraudulently and that no consideration of Rs. 80,000 was ever paid. The burden to prove the deed and its recitals lay on the defendant, who failed to discharge it.

The Court further held that even if the relinquishment deed were assumed to be genuine, plaintiff No. 1 could only relinquish his own undivided share in the ancestral property. The shares of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 7 in the ancestral property — which the defendant himself admitted was purchased by his grandfather — could not be extinguished by any act of plaintiff No. 1 alone. The defendant's admission that both properties were purchased by his grandfather and that the grandfather had died intestate settled the ancestral character of the properties.

The appellant relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randir Singh & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2807, for the proposition that a sale deed cannot be cancelled except by a court order. The Court found this ratio inapplicable because the plaintiffs had not sought cancellation of the relinquishment deed; the very execution of the deed was disputed, and the deed was not even produced.

The case laws in Thota Ganga Lakshmi & Another v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Others, Ananthula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs & Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 594, and Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. S.P. Velayutham & Ors., 2022 SC 397, were also placed by the appellant in the context of the relinquishment deed. The Court found them inapplicable for the same reasons: the deed was unproduced, its execution was disputed, and the burden of proof lay on the defendant.

Entitlement of Respondent No. 8 Under the Will

The appellant raised a further contention at the stage of oral arguments that respondent No. 8, the second wife of plaintiff No. 1, had come on record as his legal representative on the basis of a registered Will dated 18 March 2008 without the Will being proved in accordance with Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that she was therefore not entitled to any share.

The Court declined to entertain this argument. The First Appellate Court had allowed I.A. No. 2033 of 2011 by its order dated 30 September 2011, permitting respondent No. 8 to come on record after hearing both sides. The appellant had not challenged that order. Having accepted the finding of the First Appellate Court on this point, the appellant could not raise the same objection for the first time at the stage of arguments in the second appeal. The ground had also not been pleaded in the grounds of appeal before this Court.

Outcome

Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao held that the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record, and that there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings. The questions raised by the appellant were, strictly speaking, not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The second appeal was dismissed at the stage of admission, confirming the judgment and decree of the III Additional District Judge, Kakinada in A.S. No. 47 of 2005. Pending applications, if any, were closed. No costs were awarded.