Bombay HC Aurangabad Bench Reverses Acquittal, Convicts Man for Rape of Six-Year-Old; Sentences Him to Seven Years
The Bombay High Court's Aurangabad Bench held the trial court's acquittal perverse, finding the child victim's testimony trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence and a discovery panchanama.
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Aurangabad, comprising Justice Sandipkumar C. More and Justice Vaishali Patil-Jadhav, on 10 August 2026 set aside the acquittal of Anil Shridhar Gaikwad and convicted him for kidnapping and rape of a six-year-old girl, offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The bench, with the judgment authored by Justice Vaishali Patil-Jadhav, sentenced Gaikwad to seven years' rigorous imprisonment for the rape offence. The State of Maharashtra had challenged the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad's acquittal order dated 19 April 2017 through Criminal Appeal No. 993 of 2019. The bench found the trial court's approach “perverse” and its findings contrary to evidence on record, particularly in how it had discarded the child victim's testimony and the medical certificate.
The Incident and Trial Court Proceedings
The incident took place on 3 May 2012, a bazaar day in village Aurala, Taluka Kannad, District Aurangabad. The informant, Gayabai Subhash Pawar (PW-1), had gone to the bazaar, leaving her younger daughter — aged about six years — watching television at the house of a sister-in-law, Kantabai Pawar. When the informant returned between 3.00 and 3.30 p.m., the child was missing. A search followed. At around 5.00 p.m., Chandrabhagabai Raosaheb Pawar (PW-2), the child's grandmother, found her lying unconscious under a tamarind tree in a field channel, with bleeding from her private part.
On regaining consciousness, the child said the accused had come to the house where she was watching television, asked her to accompany him to a flour mill, tied her eyes, lifted her, took her towards a dam, removed her undergarment, sat on her person and slapped her. A complaint was lodged and Crime No. I-24/2012 was registered with Deogaon Rangari Police Station for offences under Sections 363, 376 and 323 IPC.
During investigation, the accused was arrested on 14 May 2012 from Lohara, Taluka Nandgaon. In police custody, he made a voluntary statement that led to the recovery of the victim's undergarment from grass near the river on 20 May 2012, recorded in memorandum and seizure panchanamas at Exhibits 48 and 49. The seized articles, including the garment bearing blood stains, were sent for chemical examination. After chargesheet was filed, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, which framed charges under Sections 363, 376 and 323 IPC.
The prosecution examined nine witnesses, including the victim (PW-8), her mother (PW-1), her grandmother (PW-2), two medical officers (PW-6 and PW-7), the investigating officer (PW-9), and pancha witnesses for the seizure and spot panchanamas. The accused pleaded not guilty and took a position of total denial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the accused on 19 April 2017, citing eight main grounds: the non-examination of Kantabai Pawar; failure to explain why the victim was not examined by the doctor at Aurala; the victim's silence about the precise sexual act; alleged self-contradiction in the medical evidence between "penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse" and "attempt to penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse"; inconsistencies in the spot descriptions given by PW-2, PW-8 and PW-9; a 16-day gap between the spot panchanama and the discovery panchanama; inconclusive chemical analysis reports; and a discrepancy in the accused's surname being recorded first as "More" and later as "Gaikwad."
The State's Appeal and the Legal Framework
The State, represented by Mrs. U.S. Bhosale, Additional Public Prosecutor, argued that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, if trustworthy, is sufficient for conviction in a rape case without corroboration. The State pressed that the victim was six years old and could not be expected to describe the act of rape with precision. It argued that the medical evidence — ruptured hymen, second-degree perennial tear with minimal bleeding, and blood stains on clothes and genitals — clearly corroborated the prosecution. The State also submitted that the accused had not denied his presence in the village and offered no explanation, and that minor discrepancies could not be treated as fatal to the prosecution case.
The respondent-accused, represented by Ms. Harsha R. Lomte (appointed counsel), supported the trial court's judgment and submitted that no perversity could be found in the acquittal, as the trial court had considered oral and documentary evidence before concluding the prosecution had not established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Before examining the evidence, the Division Bench set out the appellate court's powers in an appeal against acquittal, drawing on Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, Shingara Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 124, and Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415. The bench extracted the principle from Chandrappa that an appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, that statutory expressions like "substantial and compelling reasons" do not curtail that power, but that where two reasonable conclusions are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed. The bench also noted the principle from S. Govindaraju v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 15 SCC 315, that an appellate court, for compelling reasons, should not hesitate to reverse an acquittal where the trial court's conclusions are contrary to evidence, its approach is patently illegal, or its judgment reflects an erroneous understanding of law and facts.
How the Bench Assessed the Evidence
The bench held that a child of six years cannot be expected to narrate an act of rape with precision, and that a minor victim's inability to describe the sexual act in clear terms cannot be grounds to discard her testimony. The victim (PW-8) had, in her statement at Exhibit 64 recorded on 4 May 2012 and in her examination-in-chief at Exhibit 67 recorded on 24 February 2017, consistently described how the accused asked her to accompany him, tied her eyes, took her towards the dam, removed her undergarment, sat on her person, and slapped her. She identified the accused through video conference. She also stated that after the incident she felt pain in her uterus. Her cross-examination remained unshaken.
The bench observed that this testimony, consistent across four and a half years, could not be lightly brushed aside. It noted that a child of six years could have no motive to falsely implicate the accused, and that a child victim's testimony cannot be tested on the same parameters as an adult witness's evidence.
On the medical evidence, the bench found the trial court's characterisation of Dr. Sanjay Pagare's (PW-7) evidence as self-contradictory to be erroneous. The medical certificate at Exhibit 65 recorded blood stains on clothes, blood stains on genitals, ruptured hymen, and a second-degree perennial tear with minimal bleeding. The doctor's oral evidence used the words "penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse" while the certificate used "attempt to penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse." The bench read both formulations together with the clinical findings and held that they clearly indicated penetrative vaginal sexual intercourse. Medical evidence, it found, corroborated the victim's testimony.
The discovery of the victim's undergarment bearing blood stains from grass near the river — at the accused's instance, through the memorandum panchanama — was found to further corroborate the victim's account that the accused had removed her undergarment. It also supported PW-2's deposition that when she found the child unconscious, the undergarment was not on the child's person.
On the alleged inconsistency in the spot descriptions, the bench examined the spot panchanama at Exhibit 46 and found that all three descriptions — PW-8's "maize crop," PW-2's "under a tamarind tree in Panand," and PW-9's "in the land of Kailas Waghchaure under a Siras tree" — referred to the same general location. The panchanama itself described the spot as 50 feet from the field boundary of one Joshi, under a tamarind tree in a half-feet deep Panand. The bench concluded that only the wording of the description differed, not the place itself. It added that lapses in the spot panchanama were attributable to the investigating officer, not the victim, and could not be used to disbelieve her.
The bench also took note of the accused's defence of total denial. No suggestion was put to prosecution witnesses of any enmity or motive for false implication. The accused did not even deny his presence in village Aurala on the date of the incident. The bench held that in the absence of any defence, the prosecution case stood unrebutted.
Applying the principles from State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217, Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2022 SC 222, and Lok Mal @ Loku v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 344, the bench reiterated that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case carries the same evidentiary value as that of an injured witness, and conviction may safely rest on her sole testimony if it inspires confidence. It held that seeking corroboration as a rule amounts to adding insult to injury.
The bench concluded that the trial court had completely misread the evidence, failed to appreciate the credibility and trustworthiness of the victim's testimony, and gave undue weight to minor discrepancies that were not fatal to the prosecution case. The trial court's approach was described as perverse, with findings contrary to the evidence on record. The bench accordingly held Anil Shridhar Gaikwad guilty under Sections 363 and 376 IPC. He was acquitted of the charge under Section 323 IPC.
Sentence and Special Considerations
On sentence, the bench took note of several factors. Section 376 IPC as it stood in 2012 — before the 2018 amendment — provided a minimum sentence of seven years, extendable to life. The accused was arrested on 14 May 2012 and released on 19 April 2017 upon his acquittal by the trial court, meaning he had already undergone approximately five years of imprisonment as an undertrial. At the time of the incident, he was around 22 years old and would be approximately 36 years of age at the time of the High Court's judgment. Counsel informed the court on instructions that he had married during this period.
Taking these factors into account, the bench imposed the minimum prescribed sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment for the Section 376 IPC offence, along with a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default three months' additional imprisonment. For the Section 363 IPC offence, the accused was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000, in default one month's additional imprisonment. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
On compensation to the victim, the bench declined to award any, reasoning that the victim — who was six years old in 2012 — is now approximately 20 years old, married, and settled in life with two children. The bench expressed the view that requiring her to approach the court to claim compensation would compel her to revisit the traumatic incident of her childhood, disturbing her present settled life.
Order
Criminal Appeal No. 993 of 2019 was partly allowed. The judgment and order dated 19 April 2017 in Sessions Case No. 316 of 2012 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, acquitting Anil Shridhar Gaikwad of offences under Sections 363 and 376 IPC, was set aside. Gaikwad was convicted under Sections 363 and 376 IPC and acquitted under Section 323 IPC. He is entitled to set-off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period from 14 May 2012 to 19 April 2017. He was directed to surrender before the trial court within one month of the order, and his bail bonds were ordered to stand surrendered. The fees of the respondent's appointed counsel were quantified at Rs. 10,000, to be paid through the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Aurangabad.