Bombay HC: Contempt Jurisdiction Cannot Be Used to Enforce Arrest Guidelines Without a Prior Court Finding

A Division Bench dismissed a contempt petition alleging illegal arrest, holding that no court had previously recorded any finding of wrongdoing by the police.

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justice Suman Shyam and Justice Advait M. Sethna, on 28 July 2026 dismissed Contempt Petition No. 529 of 2019 filed by Binod Agarwal, appearing in person, against the State of Maharashtra and others. Agarwal had alleged that the police violated Supreme Court directions on arrest procedure — particularly those in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., and Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh — when they arrested him in October 2018 in connection with an FIR under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The bench held that contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce general arrest guidelines unless a prior court order in the same matter has specifically found, or recorded satisfaction about, a violation. No such order existed here.

The Arrest, the FIR, and What Followed

FIR No. 93 of 2018 was registered against Agarwal on 11 September 2018 at Santacruz Police Station for offences punishable under Section 43 read with Section 66C of the IT Act. A report was subsequently submitted before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 24 October 2018, under which the Respondents also sought to invoke Section 70 of the IT Act against Agarwal. A charge-sheet was filed before the Trial Court on 14 December 2018.

Agarwal was arrested on 24 October 2018 and remained in custody for approximately 65 days. He was enlarged on bail on 21 December 2018 by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Bail Application No. 3027 of 2018.

He then moved Criminal Writ Petition No. 5182 of 2018 seeking quashing of the FIR. During the pendency of that writ petition, the parties executed Consent Terms on 19 June 2019, recording that all disputes between them had been amicably resolved and that complaints lodged by each side against the other would stand withdrawn. A Division Bench of the High Court took those Consent Terms on record on 20 June 2019 and quashed Criminal Case No. PW/2203356/2018 arising out of FIR No. 93 of 2018.

Agarwal filed the present Contempt Petition on 4 November 2019, alleging that the arrest had been in deliberate defiance of binding judicial directions.

What Agarwal Argued

Appearing in person, Agarwal pressed several distinct grievances. He contended that his arrest was made without following Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which requires a notice to be served before arresting a person in cases where arrest is not mandatory. He relied on Arnesh Kumar for the proposition that failure to comply with Section 41A renders the arresting officers liable not only to departmental action but also to contempt proceedings before the concerned High Court.

He further submitted that he was arrested on 23 August 2018 without being informed of the reasons for his arrest, in violation of the directions in Joginder Kumar. He added that an RTI reply dated 23 January 2019, sought in connection with CCTV footage from the MIDC Police Station, was refused on grounds that data storage was unavailable — which he argued flouted this Court's order in Leonard Xavier Valdaris & Ors. v. Officer-In-Charge, Wadala Railway Police Station & Ors.

Agarwal also contended that the FIR was registered in the names of unknown persons without conducting a preliminary inquiry, contrary to directions in Lalita Kumari. He argued that Section 66C of the IT Act is a bailable offence and that his detention for approximately 65 days was wholly illegal. He further placed reliance on a Telangana High Court decision in Ramadugu Omkar Varma v. Sri Ashok Naik (decided 24 January 2020) to support his position on the procedure required before an arrest under Section 41A of the CrPC. He urged the court to initiate suo motu contempt action under Rule 9 read with Rule 8 of the Contempt of Courts (Bombay High Court) Rules, 1994.

The State's Defence

Mr. J.P. Yagnik, Additional Government Pleader, refuted all allegations. He invited the bench's attention to the Affidavit-in-Reply dated 3 February 2023 filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3, Kedari Krishna Pawar, and submitted that all legally mandated procedures were duly followed throughout the investigation and before the arrest.

He pointed to Section 41(1)(a) of the CrPC — which governs arrest for cognizable offences — to argue that no prior notice is required in such situations. He submitted that the offence under Section 70 of the IT Act, a cognizable offence, was incorporated into the proceedings with the permission of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate after registration of the FIR.

On the question of maintainability, Mr. Yagnik pressed the Consent Terms of 19 June 2019 and the consequent quashing order of 20 June 2019 as decisive. He argued that the Petitioner had voluntarily settled all disputes, and that pursuing contempt action thereafter amounted to an abuse of process.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Advait M. Sethna, writing for the bench, began by identifying the foundational requirement for civil contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a Court, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. The bench held that this ingredient was absent on the facts.

The bench found that no court had ever determined, recorded findings on, or adjudicated the Petitioner's allegations of illegal arrest in any judicial proceeding. The grievances about the arrest had not been translated into any order of a court. Without such a prior judicial determination, the bench reasoned, there was nothing whose disobedience could be characterised as wilful. The question of invoking Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act — which provides for punishment for contempt — did not arise, and the threshold under Section 14 was not met.

Turning to criminal contempt, the bench set out the definition under Section 2(c) of the Act — covering publication or acts that scandalise, prejudice judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice — and found none of those ingredients satisfied against the Respondents.

The bench addressed Agarwal's core argument directly: that contempt jurisdiction operates independently of the fate of the FIR, and that the Supreme Court's directions in Arnesh Kumar, Joginder Kumar, and Lalita Kumari should be directly applied to the facts of his case. The bench accepted that those directions ought to be scrupulously followed, but held that applying them requires a factual finding first. The court observed that there is no prescription in law to apply such guidelines without a prior finding or satisfaction recorded by the court in regard to the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. A contempt court, the bench said, ordinarily confines itself to examining whether a specific operative direction in a specific order has been wilfully defied.

The bench also drew attention to the Consent Terms executed on 19 June 2019, whereby the parties agreed to withdraw all complaints and litigations against each other. The subsequent quashing of the criminal case by consent — including FIR No. 93 of 2018 — meant that no court had ever returned a finding adverse to the Respondents in any contested proceeding.

On the procedural posture of the petition, the bench was pointed in its observations. The attempt to use civil and criminal contempt interchangeably, the bench held, was not in conformity with the statutory scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act. The two are distinctly different categories. Mere allegations questioning the arrest of the Petitioner, the bench said, would not make out a case of civil or criminal contempt of court unless the yardstick to initiate such action was established to the court's satisfaction.

The bench clarified expressly that it had not examined the merits of Agarwal's allegations against the Respondents. Those grievances, it noted, may be agitated in appropriate proceedings, in accordance with law.

Outcome

The bench found that no case of contempt of court was made out — neither civil nor criminal. Contempt Petition No. 529 of 2019 was disposed of on 28 July 2026. The bench left open, without adjudicating, the substantive question of whether the Respondents' conduct in arresting Agarwal was lawful.