Bombay HC: Co-operative Court Can Implead a Developer Under Section 94(3)(c) Even if Not Listed in Section 91 of MCS Act

Justice Sandeep Marne holds that Section 94(3)(c) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act gives Co-operative Courts wider power to add parties beyond those enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e), provided the impleadment does not displace the court's jurisdiction.

The Bombay High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by members of Bramha Suncity Co-operative Housing Society Limited, who had challenged the impleadment of their promoter—Bramha Corporation Ltd.—as a party opponent in a dispute pending before the Co-operative Court, Pune. Justice Sandeep V. Marne, sitting singly, held on 8 July 2026 that Section 94(3)(c) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (MCS Act) empowers a Co-operative Court to add to a dispute any person whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication, even if that person does not fall within the categories enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e). The judgment resolves a contested question about the jurisdictional interplay between Section 91 and Section 94(3)(c) that had not been directly addressed by prior decisions of the Supreme Court or the Bombay High Court.

The Dispute Before the Co-operative Court

Bramha Suncity is a complex of 26 buildings housing 1,277 members, situated on land at Wadgaonsheri, Pune. The society was formed by purchasers of flats built by the promoter, Bramha Corporation Ltd. A deemed conveyance application filed by the society under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 was rejected on 12 August 2017 for non-completion of layout development. The society challenged that rejection in this court by writ petition and separately filed Regular Civil Suit No. 69 of 2018 against the promoter seeking injunctions against revision of sanctioned plans and alteration of amenities.

Against this backdrop, compromise talks took place between the society and the promoter. The General Body of the society, at a Special General Body Meeting held on 14 October 2018, adopted a resolution accepting the promoter's settlement proposal. The Managing Committee separately adopted a resolution to the same effect on 20 October 2018. According to the petitioners, those resolutions reduced the society's land entitlement from about 96,196 sq. mtrs. to only 69,222 sq. mtrs.

A group of members, described in the judgment as minority members who could not convince the General Body to reject the compromise, filed Dispute No. 106 of 2021 before the Co-operative Court, Pune, challenging both resolutions. They arrayed only the society through its Chairman and Secretary, and two former office bearers, as opponents. They did not implead Bramha Corporation Ltd.

Bramha Corporation Ltd. (Respondent No. 4) then filed Application at Exh. 15 seeking its own impleadment as a party opponent. The petitioners resisted the application. By order dated 14 March 2023, the Co-operative Court allowed the application and directed impleadment of Bramha Corporation Ltd. as Opponent No. 4. The Co-operative Appellate Court, Pune dismissed Revision Application No. 27 of 2023 on 19 August 2023, confirming that order. The petitioners thereupon filed Writ Petition No. 15261 of 2023 in the Bombay High Court. On 6 February 2024, this court directed that no coercive steps be taken against the petitioners for non-compliance with the 14 March 2023 order.

The Legal Issue: Does Section 94(3)(c) Extend Beyond Section 91(1)?

The central question was whether the power of a Co-operative Court to implead parties under Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act is confined to persons enumerated in Section 91(1)(a) to (e) and pendente-lite purchasers under Section 94(3)(a), or whether it extends to any other person whose presence is considered necessary.

For the petitioners, Mr. Sitesh Sharma with Mr. Vijay Upadhyay and Ms. Sakshi Upadhyay argued that the Co-operative Court is a creature of statute, its jurisdiction is strictly governed by Section 91 to Section 97, and Respondent No. 4 plainly does not answer any of the five categories in Section 91(1)(a) to (e). He submitted that Section 94(3)(c) is an enabling provision only to facilitate the joining of persons who otherwise qualify under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) or, at most, a pendente-lite purchaser under Section 94(3)(a). He invoked the maxim dura lex sed lex and argued that even if the statutory provision causes hardship, it is not for the court to rewrite it.

Mr. Sharma also pressed the Supreme Court decision in Margret Almeida & Ors. v. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 642, contending that it recognised the permissibility of segregating causes of action relating to resolutions from those relating to conveyance, and that a challenge to the resolutions alone could be maintained before the Co-operative Court without impleading the promoter.

For Respondent No. 4, Mr. Shailendra S. Kanetkar with Mr. Pranay Kothari argued that Section 94(3)(c) is akin to Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and confers wide, independent discretion on the Co-operative Court. He submitted that the petitioners had themselves levelled serious allegations of collusion against Respondent No. 4 in the dispute, and that the dispute could not be decided without affording Respondent No. 4 an opportunity to defend itself.

How Justice Marne Reasoned

Justice Marne began by setting out the architecture of Section 91. He observed that the provision is peculiar in that it controls both the subject matter of disputes and the persons over whom jurisdiction may be exercised. Both the parties conceded—and the court confirmed—that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within any of the clauses (a) to (e) of Section 91(1). The question was then whether Section 94(3)(c) could independently authorise its impleadment.

The court analysed the three clauses of Section 94(3) in sequence. Section 94(3)(a) applies to a person who has acquired interest in the property of a party pendente-lite. Section 94(3)(b) applies where the dispute was filed in the name of a wrong person or where defendants enumerated under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) were omitted by bona fide mistake. Section 94(3)(c) uses the expression “the name of any person… whose presence before the Co-operative Court may be necessary.”

The court held that Section 94(3)(c) encompasses two distinct categories: first, persons who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant (necessarily those falling under Section 91(1)(a) to (e)); and second, persons whose presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of all questions in the dispute. That second category, the court concluded, need not answer the description under Section 91(1)(a) to (e). The word “or” connecting the two limbs of Section 94(3)(c) was decisive.

Justice Marne also rejected the argument that Section 94(3)(c) is merely a restatement of the power already in Section 94(3)(a). If the legislature had intended Section 94(3)(c) to be restricted to pendente-lite purchasers, there would have been no need to enact it separately from Section 94(3)(a). The use of “any person” in Section 94(3)(c) was therefore necessarily referable to persons other than pendente-lite purchasers.

On the distinction between Section 91(1) and Section 94(3)(c), the court held that Section 91(1) restricts adjudicatory power, while Section 94(3)(c) serves a different purpose. A person impleaded under Section 94(3)(c) need not have their rights adjudicated by the Co-operative Court; their presence may be required only to assist in effective adjudication of the dispute between the original parties. The court gave the examples of a municipal corporation, a statutory authority, or a lessor of land as entities that might be impleaded under Section 94(3)(c) even though they would not answer Section 91(1)(a) to (e).

The court, however, added a clear qualification: the power under Section 94(3)(c), though wide, is not unbridled. It must be exercised sparingly. Impleadment must be refused where it would result in throwing the dispute out of jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. The court put the point directly: the provision is not a window for persons to enter a dispute who would ultimately open the exit door by ensuring the dispute is thrown out of jurisdiction.

Treatment of the Prior Judgments

The court examined each of the decisions relied upon by both sides and found that none of them directly addressed the Co-operative Court's power to implead parties under Section 94(3)(c).

Margret Almeida was decided on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction—whether a civil court could entertain a composite challenge to a General Body resolution and a conveyance. The observations in paragraphs 46 and 47 of that judgment were made in a hypothetical context and did not lay down any proposition about who may be impleaded to a dispute before the Co-operative Court. The court held that Margret Almeida is an authority for what it decides, not for what can be logically deduced from it, citing Commissioner of Customs (Port), Chennai v. Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 371 and Secunderabad Club and Others v. CIT-V and Another (2024) 18 SCC 310.

Similarly, the judgment in Parimal H. Solanki and the judgment in Komal Arvind Vesavkar & Ors. v. Vesawa Koli Sarvoday Sahakari Society Ltd. & Ors. (WP No. 8254 of 2022, decided 15 January 2023) both dealt with jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court or civil court over particular subject matters. Neither addressed the scope of Section 94(3)(c) for the purpose of impleadment. Eknath Namdev Lashkare & Ors. v. Pancharatna Properties & Ors. (2025 SCC Online Bom 4345) likewise turned on whether the developer answered the description of “agent” under Section 91(1)(a), not on impleadment powers under Section 94(3)(c).

Application to the Facts

Turning to the present case, Justice Marne found that the petitioners themselves had levelled serious allegations that the impugned resolutions were adopted at the behest of Respondent No. 4 and that the Society had colluded with the developer. In that circumstance, the Co-operative Court and the Co-operative Appellate Court had properly concluded that Respondent No. 4's presence was necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute.

The court also rejected the petitioners' apprehension that impleadment of Respondent No. 4 would oust the Co-operative Court's jurisdiction. The dispute remained a challenge to the two resolutions; impleadment of Respondent No. 4 was not aimed at and would not result in any adjudication of rights relating to the validity of the conveyance. The nature of the dispute, the court observed, would continue to be a plain challenge to the resolutions even after impleadment. Respondent No. 4 had not sought impleadment in order to take the dispute outside the Co-operative Court's jurisdiction.

Outcome

Justice Marne found no infirmity in the orders of the Co-operative Court dated 14 March 2023 or the Co-operative Appellate Court dated 19 August 2023. Writ Petition No. 15261 of 2023 was dismissed with no order as to costs.