Shared Autorickshaw Is Not a Workplace Under POSH Act, Rules Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court quashed an Internal Committee order against an SBI employee, holding that a shared public autorickshaw cannot be a “workplace” under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justice Suman Shyam and Justice Firdosh P. Pooniwalla, on 16 June 2026 allowed a writ petition filed by a State Bank of India employee and set aside an order passed by the bank's Internal Complaints Committee on 29 August 2023. The Committee had found the employee guilty of sexual harassment and recommended action under the service rules. The High Court held that the alleged incident — which took place in a shared autorickshaw on a public road — did not occur at a “workplace” as defined under Section 2(o) of the Sexual Harassment Act, and that the Internal Committee therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint at all. The bench expressly left open the question of whether any harassment actually occurred, confining its ruling entirely to the jurisdictional point.
The Incident and the Complaint
Siddhesh Pradeep Satpute has been employed with State Bank of India for fourteen years. He was posted at the bank's office in Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai, and commuted daily from Navi Mumbai by local train to Kurla, from where he would take a shared autorickshaw to BKC.
On 24 March 2023, Satpute boarded a shared autorickshaw at Kurla railway station. The autorickshaw driver seated three passengers on the back seat: Satpute, Respondent No. 3 (a woman who worked as a Chef at a separate company), and a third passenger. Satpute sat between the two. His case was that the back seat was uncomfortable for three people, the road was in poor condition, and on some occasions his left hand may have touched the bag Respondent No. 3 was carrying on her right arm.
Respondent No. 3 stopped the autorickshaw near the American Embassy at BKC and accused Satpute of inappropriately touching her chest. She sprayed pepper spray in his eyes and called a crowd. The autorickshaw driver moved the vehicle to ONE BKC, where the confrontation continued. Satpute was eventually taken to BKC Police Station and a case was registered against him under Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Respondent No. 3 also filed a complaint with the Internal Committee of her own employer. That committee forwarded the complaint to State Bank of India, which referred it to its own Internal Complaints Committee — Respondent No. 2 in the petition. After an enquiry, the SBI Internal Committee found Satpute guilty and recommended service action by its order of 29 August 2023.
Satpute filed an appeal against that order on 28 November 2023. The appeal was heard but, by an interim order of 18 December 2023 passed in the present writ petition, this Court directed that no final order be passed in the appeal without its leave. The appeal therefore remained undecided when the writ petition was heard finally.
The Jurisdictional Question: What Counts as a “Workplace”?
The sole issue before the bench was whether the shared autorickshaw in which the alleged incident occurred could be treated as a “workplace” within the meaning of the Sexual Harassment Act, 2013.
Counsel for Satpute, Advocate Anand Pande, argued that Section 2(o) of the Act defines “workplace” and that Section 2(o)(v) — the sub-clause relied upon by the Internal Committee — covers “any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment including transportation by the employer for undertaking such journey.” The critical phrase, he submitted, is “transportation by the employer.” A shared public autorickshaw is not transport provided by the employer. The Internal Committee's finding that the incident fell within the wide definition of Section 2(o)(v) was, he argued, wholly erroneous and the order was without jurisdiction.
Advocate Abhijit Joshi, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (SBI and its Internal Committee), countered that Sections 2(a), 9, and 11 of the Act together conferred jurisdiction on the Internal Committee to entertain the complaint. He submitted that the Committee was entitled to first receive the complaint and then decide for itself whether the alleged incident had taken place at a workplace. The definition of “aggrieved woman” under Section 2(a)(i) covers any woman, whether employed or not, who alleges sexual harassment by a respondent “in relation to a workplace,” and Section 11 governs the inquiry procedure. On this reading, the Committee had jurisdiction to inquire and then determine the workplace question.
The bench also addressed why it was entertaining the writ petition despite the pending appeal. It noted that when a petitioner raises a pure question of jurisdiction, a court is not obliged to relegate the party to an alternate remedy. Since the challenge here went to the root of the Committee's authority to act, the bench proceeded to decide the matter on the merits of the jurisdictional point.
How the Bench Reasoned
The bench read Section 2(o)(v) carefully. The sub-clause extends the meaning of “workplace” to any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment, but the transportation limb of the clause is qualified: it covers only “transportation by the employer for undertaking such journey.”
On the facts, neither SBI nor Respondent No. 3's employer had provided the shared autorickshaw. It was a public conveyance. The bench held that such transportation does not fall within Section 2(o)(v), and therefore the alleged incident did not take place at a “workplace” as defined by the Act.
The bench then turned to the SBI Internal Committee's own reasoning. The Committee had concluded that even though the incident happened in public transport on the way to the workplace, it fell within the wide definition of Section 2(o)(v). The bench rejected this reading. Section 2(o)(v) does not extend to all travel to work; it extends only to employer-provided transport. A shared autorickshaw hired from a public stand is outside that boundary.
The bench also rejected the argument that the Internal Committee could first accept jurisdiction and then decide the workplace question. Section 9 of the Act provides that a complaint of sexual harassment at a workplace may be made to the Internal Committee. The bench read this as a condition precedent: the complaint must relate to sexual harassment at a workplace before the Internal Committee can act. If the alleged incident did not occur at a workplace, the Committee has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in the first place. The question of the Committee entertaining the complaint and then deciding whether the incident occurred at a workplace “does not arise at all.”
The bench went further and stated the correct sequence: an Internal Committee must first decide the jurisdictional question — whether the alleged sexual harassment took place at a workplace — and only if the answer is affirmative does it acquire jurisdiction to conduct a further enquiry.
What the Court Did Not Decide
The bench was explicit that it had not examined the merits of the underlying allegation. Whether Satpute sexually harassed Respondent No. 3 in the shared autorickshaw was left entirely open. The court stated that this aspect “is left open to be dealt with in accordance with law in an appropriate proceeding.” The ruling is confined to the jurisdictional competence of the SBI Internal Committee under the Sexual Harassment Act.
Order
The Division Bench allowed Writ Petition No. 1213 of 2024 and set aside and quashed the order dated 29 August 2023 passed by the SBI Internal Complaints Committee on the complaint of Respondent No. 3. Rule was made absolute. There was no order as to costs.