No Transit Pass, No Relief: Bombay HC Upholds Vehicle Confiscation for Illegal Charcoal Transport

Bombay High Court dismisses writ petition challenging confiscation of a vehicle found carrying 60 bags of charcoal without a valid forest transit pass, rejecting all grounds including natural justice and conviction-as-prerequisite arguments.

The Bombay High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by Mahendra Dharmaji Papal, a Pune resident, challenging the confiscation of his TATA 909 vehicle and 60 bags of charcoal seized by forest officials in August 2022. Justice N.J. Jamadar, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 8 June 2026, affirming orders passed by the Authorised Officer and confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Baramati. The court held that transporting charcoal — a forest produce — without a valid transit pass constitutes a forest offence under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, and that no prior criminal conviction is required before the Authorised Officer can order confiscation under the Maharashtra-specific provisions inserted by Maharashtra Act 7 of 1985.

The Interception and Confiscation Proceedings

On 5 August 2022, the Range Forest Officer, Indapur, and forest officials were on patrolling duty when they intercepted a TATA 909 vehicle bearing registration number MH-12/EF-8956 moving in suspicious circumstances. The driver fled under cover of darkness, abandoning the vehicle. A search revealed 60 bags of charcoal inside.

A forest crime was registered at C.R. No. 1/22-2023 against an unidentified person for offences punishable under Section 42(2) read with Section 41(1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The vehicle and the charcoal were seized.

The Range Forest Officer submitted a report to the Authorised Officer and Assistant Conservator of Forest, Pune, who initiated confiscation proceedings under Section 61-A of the Act as applicable to Maharashtra. The Authorised Officer traced the registered owner through RTO records — Mahendra Papal — and also summoned one Shivaji Mete, to whom Papal claimed to have delivered the vehicle by executing a document a fortnight before the incident. Both were given opportunities to appear and did so through a legal practitioner.

The Authorised Officer was not persuaded by their submissions. He recorded that the forest produce was being transported without any valid permit and passed an order of confiscation of the vehicle and the charcoal under Section 61-A(3) and (4) of the Act.

Papal appealed to the Court of Session under Section 61-D of the Act. The Additional Sessions Judge, Baramati, dismissed the appeal on 15 September 2023, affirming the confiscation order. Papal then filed Writ Petition No. 16 of 2024 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court.

The Legal Framework: Transit Rules and Maharashtra's Confiscation Regime

Justice Jamadar set out the statutory architecture in detail before addressing the petitioner's challenges.

Charcoal is expressly included in the definition of “forest-produce” under Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Section 41(1) vests control of all timber and other forest produce in transit in the State Government and empowers it to make rules regulating such transit. Rule 31 of the Maharashtra Forest Rules, 2014 — framed under Sections 26, 32, 41, 42, 51 and 76 of the Act — prohibits movement of any forest produce into, from, or within any district of Maharashtra without a pass from an authorised officer. Rule 82 of those Rules prescribes punishment for breach of Rule 31: imprisonment up to one year, or fine up to two thousand rupees, or both.

The court noted that a “forest-offence” under Section 2(3) means any offence punishable under the Act or under any rule made thereunder. Transit of forest produce without a valid pass, being punishable under Rule 82, therefore qualifies as a forest offence.

By Maharashtra Act 7 of 1985, Sections 61-A to 61-G were inserted into the Indian Forest Act, 1927 in its application to Maharashtra. These provisions create a self-contained confiscation mechanism before an Authorised Officer, separate from the criminal trial process. Section 61-A(3) empowers the Authorised Officer, upon satisfaction that a forest offence has been committed in respect of forest produce produced before him, to order the produce taken charge of by a forest officer and to order confiscation of tools, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing the offence. Critically, Section 61-A begins with a non-obstante clause overriding Chapter IX of the Act (which contains Section 55) and any other law. Section 61-B(2) provides a defence: confiscation of a vehicle shall not be ordered if the owner proves that it was used without his knowledge or connivance and that all reasonable precautions were taken.

Four Challenges, Four Rejections

Counsel for Papal, Mr. Pranav H. Bhoite, raised four distinct grounds. Justice Jamadar addressed each in turn.

Natural justice: The petitioner argued that he was not given an efficacious opportunity of hearing before the confiscation order was passed. The court rejected this outright. The Authorised Officer had obtained the registered owner's details from the RTO, issued notice to Papal, and — upon Papal's claim that he had transferred the vehicle to Shivaji Mete — also gave Mete an opportunity to be heard. Both appeared through a legal practitioner and canvassed submissions. The court held that the petitioner could not be heard to say he was denied a fair hearing.

Conviction as a prerequisite: Mr. Bhoite argued that Section 55 of the Act requires a conviction for a forest offence before any vehicle used in that offence can be confiscated. The court held this submission was not well founded. Section 61-A(3), applicable in Maharashtra, specifically empowers the Authorised Officer to order confiscation “notwithstanding whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence.” The non-obstante clause in Section 61-A overrides Section 55. A judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court relied upon by the petitioner, which dealt with Section 55 of the central Act, was held to be inapposite.

Government property requirement: Mr. Bhoite contended that Section 55 applies only when the forest offence is committed on government property, and since the interception occurred elsewhere, the provision had no application. The court rejected this as not borne out by the plain text of Section 55, which contains no such geographical restriction. In any event, the court had already held that Section 61-A — not Section 55 — governed the confiscation.

Undue reliance on Section 69 presumption: The petitioner argued that the Sessions Judge was unduly swayed by the presumption under Section 69 of the Act, which presumes forest produce to be government property until the contrary is proved. The court did not find this ground to be of any independent merit given its findings on the other issues.

How the Court Reasoned on the Core Facts

Justice Jamadar observed that there was no real controversy over the seizure itself. The Range Forest Officer's report established that the vehicle was intercepted and found laden with charcoal. The suggestion, raised before the Authorised Officer, that forest officials had planted the produce in the vehicle was rejected by both the Authorised Officer and the Sessions Judge for want of any supporting material. No contemporaneous document showed that Papal or Mete had raised this allegation at the first available opportunity.

Neither Papal nor Mete claimed to have obtained a transit pass under Rule 31(1) of the Maharashtra Forest Rules, 2014. The court held that both the fact of transit and the absence of a valid pass were duly established.

The court drew on three Supreme Court decisions to frame its interpretive approach. In State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar Rana (AIR 2004 SC 1851), the Supreme Court held that statutes providing for forest protection to maintain ecological balance should receive liberal construction and that confiscation provisions serve as a deterrent against deforestation. In Mohd Ashique v. State of Maharashtra (2009 ALL MR (Cri) 251 (S.C.)), the Supreme Court reiterated that the purpose behind Sections 61-A to 61-G cannot be ignored or defeated. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Uday Singh (AIR 2019 SC 1597), the Supreme Court observed that by isolating confiscation from criminal trials, the legislature intended confiscation to be an effective deterrent, and that such provisions must receive a purposive interpretation.

Justice Jamadar also referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shyamrao Kewalram Kapgate v. State of Maharashtra, which held that once transport of forest produce without a transit pass is established, no fault can be found with an order passed under Section 61-A and confirmed under Section 61-D.

Applying these principles, the court held that the Authorised Officer had reason to believe a forest offence had been committed, that the foundational facts for confiscation were established, and that the Additional Sessions Judge was right to dismiss the appeal. The court found no ground for interference under Article 227.

Order

Justice N.J. Jamadar dismissed Writ Petition No. 16 of 2024 on 8 June 2026. Rule was discharged. No costs were awarded.

At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for the petitioner sought continuation of an interim order dated 2 January 2024 for six weeks. The court rejected the oral application for stay, holding that in light of the view taken, the prayer for further continuation of the interim order did not merit acceptance.