CMD of MOIL Does Not Hold a ‘Public Office’, Rules Bombay HC Nagpur Bench; Quo Warranto Petition Dismissed

The Nagpur Bench held that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of MOIL, a Companies Act entity, exercises no sovereign function and cannot be removed by a writ of quo warranto.

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur has dismissed a writ petition seeking a quo warranto against the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Manganese Ore India Limited (MOIL), holding that the post does not constitute a “public office” for the purposes of that writ. The bench, comprising Justice Anil S. Kilor and Justice Raj D. Wakode, found that MOIL is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013, and not a creature of statute, and that the CMD exercises no sovereign function of the Government. Because the foundational requirement for quo warranto — that the office in question be a public office created by law and vested with sovereign power — was not satisfied, the petition was rejected as not maintainable without any examination of the corruption allegations levelled against the respondent.

The Appointment and the Petition

The petitioner, MOIL Janshakti Mazdoor Sangh Balaghat, through its President Ramkripal Khurshel, describes itself as the largest union of workers and employees at MOIL. Its grievance concerned the appointment of Respondent No. 6, Shri Vishwanath Suresh, as CMD of MOIL Limited.

The appointment followed a standard board-level selection process for Central Public Sector Enterprises. The Government of India, through the Public Enterprises Selection Board (PESB), published an advertisement on 11 April 2025. Respondent No. 6 was selected through that process. On 6 January 2026, the Deputy Secretary of the Secretariat of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet issued a communication approving the Ministry of Steel's proposal for the appointment. On 7 January 2026, the President of India formally appointed Respondent No. 6 as CMD, MOIL, for the period from his assumption of charge until his date of superannuation on 31 August 2030, or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

The union's case was that three complaints involving alleged corruption by senior executives of the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), including Respondent No. 6, were pending. It was alleged that the Lokpal had directed the CBI to investigate all accused persons, including Respondent No. 6. The internal vigilance report of SAIL — from the CMD (Vigilance), ED (Vigilance), and the CVO — allegedly stated that senior SAIL officials had misused their official positions and favoured M/s Avon Steel Industries Pvt. Ltd., causing a loss to SAIL ranging from Rs. 263 crore to Rs. 370 crore.

On that basis, the petitioner argued that appointing Respondent No. 6 as CMD of MOIL violated settled service norms that prohibit appointments where there are corruption allegations. The petition also alleged violation of the Government of India Guidelines on Board Level Appointments in Central Public Sector Enterprises, 2017 (particularly Chapters III, VIII and IX, and Appendices I and II), the Consolidated Model Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules for CPSEs, the Whistle Blower Policy, the Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, the Fraud Prevention Policy, and orders of the Lokpal dated 10 January 2024 and 2 July 2025. The petitioner further contended that mandatory requirements of vigilance clearance, consideration of APARs, and approvals from the CVC, CVO, PESB and ACC were ignored.

The Threshold Question: Is the CMD's Post a Public Office?

Solicitor General of India Shri Tushar Mehta, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 (Union of India, PESB, CVC and CVO), raised a preliminary objection to maintainability at the outset. He argued that for a writ of quo warranto to be available, the petitioner must establish that the office in question is a “public office” held without legal authority, that the office is created by the Constitution, the legislature, or through authority conferred by the legislature, and that some sovereign power of the Government is delegated to it. The SGI submitted that there were no pleadings or material to show that MOIL is a public office or that any sovereign powers are conferred on Respondent No. 6 by virtue of the appointment. He relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Assn., (2006) 11 SCC 731, a judgment of the Principal Seat of the Bombay High Court in Pravin P. Wategaonkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3142, and the Nagpur Bench's own judgment in Manohar Maroti Sahare v. Dr. Gopal Dhavan and Ors., PIL No. 119 of 2015.

The petitioner's counsel, Shri A.K. Waghmare, replied that the appointment was made by the President of India for a fixed period, which itself indicated a public office. He also submitted that the Union of India holds 53% of MOIL's shares, making it a government entity. To support his argument that the office fell within the definition, he cited a series of Supreme Court decisions including University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 15; Centre for PIL v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 1; Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal, AIR 2013 SC 78; Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo, (2014) 1 SCC 161; and CBI v. Ramesh Gelli, (2016) 3 SCC 788.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Anil S. Kilor, writing for the Division Bench, began by consolidating the settled legal position on quo warranto from the judgments cited by both sides. The bench summarised the law in eight propositions.

Quo warranto confers jurisdiction on constitutional courts to ensure that a public office is not held by a usurper without legal authority. It calls upon a holder of an independent substantive public office to show by what right he holds it. If no title is found, the holder may be directed to be removed by judicial order. However, the scope of inquiry is strictly limited: the court examines only whether the appointment was made by a competent authority and whether statutory prescriptions were followed. The court does not investigate the qualifications or suitability of the appointee — that is the function of the appointing authority. It is the eligibility of the candidate, and not the merit, that falls within the court's inquiry. Equally, the Government is accountable to courts only for the lawfulness of its decisions, not for the wisdom of its choices.

With that framework in place, the bench turned to the definition of “public office.” It relied on the Allahabad High Court's analysis in Ravi Kant Tiwari v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 5, which in turn drew on Ferris's Extra-ordinary Legal Remedies, the Calcutta High Court's judgment in Shashi Bhushan Ray v. Pramatha Nath Bandopadhyay, and Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition). The distilled definition: a public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the Government to be exercised for the benefit of the public, for the term and by the tenure prescribed by law. It implies a delegation of a portion of sovereign power. The essential characteristics are authority conferred by law, a fixed tenure, and power to exercise some portion of the sovereign functions of Government. The position must be created by the Constitution, the legislature, or through authority conferred by the legislature; a portion of sovereign power must be delegated; and duties must be performed independently without control of a superior power other than law.

Applying those criteria to MOIL, the bench found the petitioner's case wanting on every count. The appointment of Respondent No. 6 was made by the President of India, but the bench held that this fact alone does not make the post a public office. The standard procedure for board-level appointments in Central Public Sector Enterprises — evaluation by PESB, clearance from the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, and formal appointment by the President — is a routine mechanism under the Articles of Association of the company, not a statutory conferral of sovereign power.

The petitioner failed to identify the statute under which the appointment of Respondent No. 6 was made. References to various statutes in the petition related to the corruption allegations or other collateral issues, not to the legal basis of the appointment itself. MOIL is a Government company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013, and is not a creature of statute in the sense required for quo warranto. The bench further found no material to show that MOIL discharges any sovereign function of the Government. The fact that the Union of India holds 53% of MOIL's shares and that MOIL operates under the Ministry of Steel's administrative control does not transform a Companies Act entity into a body exercising sovereign governmental power.

The bench was therefore clear that the post of CMD, MOIL, is not a “public office” for the purposes of quo warranto. Since that precondition was not met, the entire substratum of the petition collapsed. The court expressly declined to go into the corruption allegations against Respondent No. 6, the alleged violations of the CPSE guidelines, the Lokpal orders, the vigilance clearance requirements, or any other substantive ground — all of those were irrelevant once the threshold of maintainability was not crossed.

Order

The Writ Petition was dismissed as not maintainable. Rule was discharged. No order as to costs was made. Any civil applications filed in connection with the petition were disposed of consequently.