OCI Cardholder Can Use Senior Citizens Act; But Daughter-in-Law Cannot Be Evicted Without DV Act Safeguards, Rules Bombay High Court
Justice N.J. Jamadar held that an OCI cardholder mother-in-law may invoke the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, but set aside the eviction order against a daughter-in-law residing in her matrimonial home, restoring the Maintenance Tribunal's balanced directions instead.
A single judge of the Bombay High Court on 30 June 2026 quashed an order of the Senior Citizen Appellate Tribunal that had directed a daughter-in-law to vacate a Juhu flat owned by her New Zealand-citizen mother-in-law. Justice N.J. Jamadar, sitting singly, resolved three distinct legal questions: whether an Overseas Citizen of India cardholder can invoke the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007; whether an eviction application is maintainable under that Act without any claim for maintenance; and whether a daughter-in-law's right to a shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 survives a senior citizen's eviction bid. On the first question the court ruled in favour of the mother-in-law. On the remaining two, it sided with the daughter-in-law, restoring the Maintenance Tribunal's original order and adding further directions to protect both parties' right of residence.
The Flat, the Families, and the Proceedings
Flat No. B-16, Clifton Birla Lane Corner, Juhu, Mumbai is at the centre of this dispute. Kiran Sanu, Respondent No. 2, purchased the flat in 1987 from her own earnings and resided there until she migrated to New Zealand with her husband in May 2005. She is presently living in Australia. Her son, Amit Sahu, and his wife, Mugdha Sahal (the Petitioner), were allowed to occupy the flat after the marriage, which was solemnised on 9 December 2004. The couple has a daughter.
In May 2024, Mugdha Sahal instituted proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 against her husband, Kiran Sanu, her husband's father, and her sister-in-law, alleging grave mental and physical cruelty. Following those proceedings, Amit Sahu voluntarily moved out of the flat. Kiran Sanu, characterising the DV proceedings as false and vexatious, then applied before the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, seeking a direction to the Petitioner to vacate the flat and hand over peaceful possession.
The Maintenance Tribunal, after examining the material, declined to pass an eviction order. It instead directed that Kiran Sanu and her family members not be obstructed from entering the flat, and that the Petitioner not commit any act impairing Kiran Sanu's physical and mental health, her standing in society, or the peace of her home.
Kiran Sanu appealed under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. It reasoned that Kiran Sanu, as absolute owner, had a right to a peaceful and dignified life in her own house, and that the strained relations caused by the DV proceedings made co-habitation impossible. The Petitioner was directed to vacate. Mugdha Sahal then filed Writ Petition No. 1532 of 2026 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court.
Three Questions the Court Framed
Justice Jamadar distilled three questions for determination. First, whether a person who is not a citizen of India — specifically an OCI cardholder who is a citizen of New Zealand — is entitled to invoke remedies under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. Second, whether an application for eviction of a child or relative, without any prayer for maintenance, is maintainable under the Act. Third, whether the Petitioner, as daughter-in-law and victim of alleged domestic violence, is entitled to protect her possession over the flat as a shared household.
Question 1: Can an OCI Cardholder Use the Senior Citizens Act?
Counsel for the Petitioner, Mrs. Taubon F. Irani, relied on the definition of “Senior Citizen” under Section 2(h) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which confines that term to any person being a citizen of India who has attained the age of sixty years or above. She also invoked the Notification dated 4 March 2021 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs under Section 7B of the Citizenship Act, 1955, arguing that the Notification does not specifically include the right to avail benefits under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. She placed reliance on the Karnataka High Court's decision in Dephny Gladys Lobo and Anr. v. Asstt. Commissioner, which had held that the Maintenance Tribunal lacked jurisdiction where the applicant was not an Indian citizen.
Senior Advocate Ms. Manjula Rao, for Kiran Sanu, drew the court's attention to Section 2(d) of the Act, which defines “parent” as father or mother, biological, adoptive, or step, “whether or not the father or the mother is a senior citizen.” That definition contains no citizenship requirement. She argued that the Act's protective scope is not confined to those who qualify as “senior citizens” under Section 2(h): a parent can seek protection regardless of age or nationality. She also relied on the Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision in Hamina Kang v. District Magistrate (U.T.), Chandigarh and the Madras High Court's ruling in Namassivayane v. The District Collector, both of which had held that OCI cardholders and foreign national parents are not excluded from the Act's benefits.
Justice Jamadar accepted the broader reading. He observed that the contrast between Section 2(h) (which requires Indian citizenship for a “senior citizen”) and Section 2(d) (which imposes no such requirement on a “parent”) is deliberately drawn. A parent is entitled to the Act's protections irrespective of age and citizenship. The court further reasoned that an OCI cardholder holds a right to acquire and hold immovable property in India, and that a right without a remedy is illusory. The court also noted that the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution is not confined to citizens. The Karnataka High Court's ruling in Dephny Gladys Lobo was declined as persuasive authority, since it had not engaged with the provisions of the Citizenship Act, 1955 or the Notification dated 4 March 2021. The court followed Hamina Kang and Namassivayane, citing the principle that consistent interpretation of a Central Act across High Courts serves uniformity. Question 1 was answered in favour of the OCI cardholder's right to invoke the Act.
Question 2: Eviction Without a Maintenance Claim
The Petitioner's counsel pressed the point that Kiran Sanu had not claimed any maintenance — whether because she was affluent or because, having other children, she could not claim maintenance from a daughter-in-law. An application directed solely at eviction, without a maintenance claim, was argued to be a device to oust the daughter-in-law from her matrimonial home and an abuse of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
Justice Jamadar examined the Act's scheme closely. The definition of “maintenance” under Section 2(b) includes provision for food, clothing, residence, and medical attendance. Section 4 entitles a senior citizen who is unable to maintain herself from her own earnings or property to apply for maintenance. Section 5 governs such applications. The court referred extensively to the Division Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in Jitendra Gorakh Megh v. Additional Collector, which had held that an eviction order cannot be passed where the senior citizen has made no claim for maintenance, and that eviction “would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection” requiring the competing claims of both parties to be balanced.
The Supreme Court's decision in Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh was also noted: the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 nowhere specifically provides for eviction proceedings, and eviction is only permissible where necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen, not as a matter of course.
The court found that the application before the Maintenance Tribunal was conspicuously silent about any neglect, cruelty or harassment by the Petitioner. There was no prima facie material to show that when Kiran Sanu had resided with the Petitioner in the flat, the Petitioner had made that stay impracticable. The court observed that the institution of DV proceedings against Kiran Sanu, while it may have strained relations, does not by itself establish the kind of harassment or ill-treatment that the Act addresses. This line of reasoning pointed firmly against the Appellate Tribunal's eviction order.
Question 3: The Shared Household and the DV Act Right
The Petitioner contended that the subject flat constitutes a shared household within the meaning of the DV Act, 2005, and that her right of residence under Section 17 of that Act cannot be extinguished by the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, invoked at the behest of a mother-in-law.
Senior Advocate Ms. Rao countered that the flat belongs absolutely to Kiran Sanu and that Amit Sahu holds no right, title, or interest in it. On that basis, she argued that the flat cannot be a shared household within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the DV Act, 2005, relying on the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra. She further cited the Supreme Court's decision in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja to argue that the right of residence under Section 19 of the DV Act is not indefeasible when a daughter-in-law is pitted against aged in-laws.
Justice Jamadar addressed the tension between these two statutes by reference to S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, in which the Supreme Court had overruled S.R. Batra and held that a shared household need not be owned by the husband or be a joint family household. The definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the DV Act, 2005 is wider: a household in which the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship — including one belonging to a relative of the husband — qualifies. The court held that there was strong factual foundation to treat the Juhu flat as a shared household: the Petitioner had resided there since 2004 as her matrimonial home.
The court acknowledged, drawing from Satish Chander Ahuja, that the right of residence under Section 19 of the DV Act is not indefeasible and that courts must balance the competing rights of the woman and the senior citizen. However, balance does not automatically mean eviction. The court identified four factors counselling against eviction at this stage. Kiran Sanu is a New Zealand citizen whose need to return to the flat as a permanent abode was not clearly established. The Petitioner had been residing in the flat since 2004. Her Section 17 right of residence in the shared household is a right of occupation, not ownership, but it cannot be extinguished without following the procedure established by law. The flat at Ghatkopar, acquired by the Petitioner, is not a substitute: the question of whether it constitutes “same level of alternate accommodation” under Section 19(f) of the DV Act, 2005 is a matter for the competent court in the pending DV proceedings, not for the Senior Citizens Tribunal.
The court held that the Maintenance Tribunal's original order — which restrained the Petitioner from obstructing Kiran Sanu's entry and directed the Petitioner to preserve Kiran Sanu's dignity and peace — had correctly balanced the competing rights. The Appellate Tribunal's decision to set that aside and order eviction was in error.
Order
Justice Jamadar allowed Writ Petition No. 1532 of 2026 and passed the following directions on 30 June 2026:
The impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal directing the eviction of the Petitioner was quashed and set aside. The order dated 31 October 2025 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal was restored, and all directions issued by the Maintenance Tribunal were affirmed. Additionally, the court directed that Kiran Sanu and her family members shall have an unrestricted right to reside in the subject flat, and the Petitioner shall not cause any obstruction to their residence. The Petitioner was restrained from committing any act or omission that would prevent Kiran Sanu from living a normal, dignified, and peaceful life in the flat. Rule was made absolute to that extent. No costs were awarded.