Bombay HC Stays Civil Court Order Reinstating Expelled Mumbai Press Club Member to Contest Elections
The Bombay High Court found the Bombay City Civil Court's ad-interim order cryptic and reasonless, holding it had effectively granted final relief at an interlocutory stage without analysing any material on record.
The Bombay High Court, sitting as a vacation court, on 22 May 2026 stayed an ad-interim order passed by the Bombay City Civil Court that had suspended the Mumbai Press Club's expulsion of journalist Gurbir Singh and directed that he be permitted to contest the Club's upcoming elections. Justice Gautam A. Ankhad, sitting singly, found the civil court's order of 7 May 2026 to be “cryptic” and devoid of any reasoning, and held that it had virtually granted the substantive final reliefs sought in the suit at the ad-interim stage itself. The High Court also rejected Respondent no.1's application to stay its own order.
The Disciplinary Proceedings at the Mumbai Press Club
The Mumbai Press Club issued a show cause notice to Gurbir Singh on 22 February 2026. Singh filed replies on 25 February 2026 and 10 March 2026. A three-member Inquiry Committee considered those replies and granted him a personal hearing. On 25 April 2026, the Inquiry Committee submitted its report to the Managing Committee, finding that Singh and two other members had violated certain bail conditions, thereby exposing the Club to potential legal and reputational risks.
The report recommended action under the Club's bye-laws. On 27 April 2026, the Managing Committee accepted the report by a two-thirds majority and resolved to expel Singh and two other members for a period of six years with effect from 27 April 2026.
Singh filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction before the Bombay City Civil Court on 5 May 2026. The matter was heard for urgent reliefs on 6 May 2026, and the civil court passed the impugned ad-interim order on 7 May 2026.
What the Civil Court Ordered
The civil court's order, reproduced in full by the High Court, recorded that Singh is a senior journalist and member of the Mumbai Press Club for 40 years, having served as its President from July 2018 to February 2021 and again from February 2021 to July 2024. The civil court noted that the allegations against Singh were that he had facilitated a gathering of accused persons in the 2018 Bhima Koregaon case, and that the police and the NIA had issued notices to the Club about an incident on 19 January 2026.
The civil court concluded that the Club had not followed the principles of natural justice, had denied Singh an opportunity of cross-examination, and that the expulsion appeared intended to prevent him from contesting the Club's elections. On that basis, it passed the following directions: it stayed the operation, effect, implementation and findings of the show cause notice dated 22 February 2026, the Inquiry Committee's report dated 25 April 2026, and the Managing Committee's resolution dated 27 April 2026, until all defendants filed their reply to the Notice of Motion. It further directed that Singh be permitted to contest the Club's elections.
The Club's Challenge Before the High Court
Senior Advocate Girish Godbole, appearing for the Mumbai Press Club and the other appellants, attacked the civil court's order on several grounds. He submitted that the order was perverse because it provided no reasons or basis for the ad-interim reliefs granted. The findings were cryptic, and the trial court had erred in concluding that natural justice was violated when the Club had, in fact, issued a show cause notice, received replies, constituted a three-member Inquiry Committee, and granted a personal hearing.
Godbole argued that the impugned order virtually granted the final relief sought in the suit by nullifying the Inquiry Committee's findings at the ad-interim stage itself. He contended that a civil court has limited jurisdiction over the internal affairs and disciplinary actions of a club, and cannot sit in appeal over the decision of a disciplinary authority or reassess the sufficiency of the material before it. Judicial interference, he submitted, is warranted only where mala fides or a violation of natural justice is clearly demonstrated, neither of which was shown here.
He also pointed out that the nomination process for the Club's elections was scheduled only in July 2026, and there was therefore no urgency that justified passing the order without first affording the appellants an opportunity to file a reply affidavit. Godbole relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No.363 S.C. Belgaum and Others and a Division Bench order of the Bombay High Court dated 5 September 2006 in Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. & Others v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad and Others.
Senior Advocate Shiraz Rustomji, appearing for Singh, opposed the appeal. He submitted that Singh is a respected journalist who has held leadership positions within the Club and the Press Council of India, and that the disciplinary action was mala fide, triggered by a meeting held at the Club on 19 January 2026 and a requisition notice for a Special General Meeting raising issues against the Club's President. Rustomji pointed to documents in the appeal paper-book showing that the personal hearing on 17 April 2026 was adjourned and never concluded, and that several documents sought by Singh were not provided to him. He relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi and urged that the interim application be dismissed.
The High Court's Reasoning
Justice Ankhad examined the civil court's order and found it wanting on multiple counts.
The High Court held that the civil court had arrived at four conclusions, that natural justice was violated, that Singh was denied cross-examination, that the expulsion was intended to prevent him from contesting elections, and that he would suffer irreparable loss, without analysing the material on record or assigning any reasons for those conclusions. The order neither engaged with the events recorded in the Inquiry Committee's report nor explained why the report's findings were unsustainable.
On the question of natural justice, the High Court noted that a show cause notice was issued, replies were filed, and a personal hearing was conducted before the three-member Inquiry Committee. The Inquiry Committee's report recorded that due to certain events no further personal hearing was necessary. The civil court, Justice Ankhad held, could not have simply held that natural justice was violated without discussing those events. Equally, it could not have stayed the entire disciplinary process without recording reasons demonstrating patent illegality or a complete denial of fair hearing.
The High Court also found that the civil court's order travelled far beyond the limited scope of ad-interim protection. By staying the show cause notice, the Inquiry Report, and the Managing Committee's resolution, and by directing that Singh be permitted to contest the Club's elections, the civil court had granted the substantive final reliefs sought in the suit. This, Justice Ankhad held, amounted to granting a mandatory injunction at the ad-interim stage, which can be done only in exceptional cases. The impugned order disclosed no such exceptional circumstance.
On urgency, the High Court found merit in the Club's submission. The suit was filed on 5 May 2026, arguments were heard on 6 May 2026, and the order was passed on 7 May 2026. The nomination process for the Club's elections was admittedly scheduled only in July 2026. In those circumstances, it would have been prudent to direct the appellants to file a reply affidavit and consider the prayer for interim relief on a more complete record.
Turning to the legal framework, Justice Ankhad applied the principle from T.P. Daver that a civil court's jurisdiction in matters of disciplinary action by clubs and associations is limited, and that a civil court would ordinarily refrain from substituting its own view for that of the disciplinary body unless mala fides or a violation of natural justice is clearly demonstrated. As for Ramakant Ambalal Choksi, the High Court accepted the legal principles in that decision but held them inapplicable here because the impugned order itself disclosed no analysis of the material or reasons in support of its conclusions.
On the basis of this analysis, Justice Ankhad concluded that the appellants had made out a strong prima facie case that the civil court's order was perverse and that the discretion exercised by the trial court was untenable.
Outcome
The High Court granted ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause (a) of the Interim Application, staying the effect, operation, implementation and execution of the civil court's ad-interim order dated 7 May 2026 passed below Notice of Motion No.6419 of 2026 in S.C. Suit (St.) No.6419 of 2026, pending the hearing and final disposal of the Appeal from Order.
Singh's application for a stay of the High Court's order was rejected. Justice Ankhad noted that since the civil court's order was stayed on the ground that it was cryptic and provided no reasons, there was no basis to stay the High Court's order in turn.
The Interim Application was listed for final hearing on 15 June 2026.