Anger Over School Gossip, Not Sexual Intent: Bombay HC Discharges Accused Under Section 12 of POCSO Act

The Bombay High Court held that a 19-year-old who followed and slapped a schoolmate out of anger lacked the sexual intent required to attract Section 12 of the POCSO Act. IPC charges will proceed to trial.

Justice Shiv Kumar Dige, sitting singly at the Bombay High Court, has partly allowed a criminal revision filed by Prasad Kashinath Bade, challenging the Special Court Mumbai's refusal to discharge him. The Special Court, by its order dated 12 February 2020 in Spl. Case No. 859/2020, had declined to discharge the applicant from charges under Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The High Court found that the incident, rooted in the applicant's anger over remarks the victim had allegedly made about him at school, did not disclose the sexual intent that Section 11 of the POCSO Act requires before Section 12 can be attracted. The IPC charges — under Sections 354-D, 509, and 323 — remain, and the applicant will face trial under those provisions.

What Happened on 12 February 2020

According to the prosecution, at around 5:00 pm on 12 February 2020, the victim — a 17-year-old girl — was returning home when the applicant followed her. He stopped her, abused her in filthy language in Hindi, and slapped her across the face, causing injury. The words attributed to him were directed at the victim for something she had reportedly said about him among their schoolmates. A complaint was registered, and a chargesheet was filed under Sections 354-D (stalking), 509 (word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman), and 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) of the Indian Penal Code, along with Section 12 of the POCSO Act.

The applicant, described as a 19-year-old student with no prior antecedents, moved a discharge application before the Special Court, which was rejected. That rejection was the subject of the criminal revision before the High Court.

The Legal Question: Does Section 12 of POCSO Require Sexual Intent?

Section 11 of the POCSO Act defines sexual harassment of a child. It specifies that a person commits sexual harassment when that person “exhibits sexual intent towards the child.” Section 12 prescribes punishment for such harassment. The central question before the High Court was whether the applicant's conduct — following the victim, abusing her verbally, and slapping her — demonstrated sexual intent as Section 11 requires.

The applicant's counsel argued that the entire incident was a confrontation arising from a school dispute. The applicant wanted to question the victim about what she had said against him among their peers. There was no sexual motivation behind the act. The IPC provisions, counsel conceded, may apply, but not POCSO.

The prosecution and counsel for the victim (Respondent No. 2) took the opposing view. They argued that the act of following a 17-year-old girl, abusing her in sexual language, and physically assaulting her itself demonstrated sexual intention and amounted to outraging her modesty. The Special Court's order was well-reasoned and warranted no interference.

How the High Court Reasoned

Justice Dige accepted that the IPC offences were, on the face of the record, clearly attracted. The applicant had followed the victim, abused her, and struck her — conduct squarely covered by Sections 354-D, 509, and 323 of the IPC. That was not in dispute.

The question was narrower: did the applicant exhibit sexual intent? The court found that the evidence pointed to a different motive altogether. The applicant was angry about something the victim had said about him in school. He confronted her about that. The conduct, while undeniably aggressive and unlawful under the IPC, appeared to be driven by that anger rather than any sexual purpose.

The court observed that from the facts of the incident, it did not appear that the applicant had the sexual intent described in Section 12 of the POCSO Act. The cited judgments relied upon by Respondent No. 2 were considered but distinguished on facts, the court holding that the factual matrix in those cases differed from the present one.

The State and the victim's counsel had relied on the judgment in Bhushan s/o. Vikasrao Palwe v. State of Maharashtra, decided by the Bombay High Court's Nagpur Bench in Criminal Application (APL) No. 225 of 2026 on 9 March 2026. The applicant's counsel relied on Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (2026 SCC OnLine SC 40), Ajay Prasad v. State NCT of Delhi, and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudha and Another. The High Court did not apply any of the cited precedents as directly governing, finding the facts in the present case to be distinct.

The practical weight of the reasoning lies in the court's insistence on the element of sexual intent as a precondition for POCSO liability under Section 11 read with Section 12. Physical aggression accompanied by abusive language, even of a sexualised character, does not automatically convert an IPC offence into a POCSO offence. The intent behind the act must be sexual, not merely that the language used was sexually offensive or that the victim is a child.

Order

By its order dated 27 July 2026, the High Court partly allowed Criminal Revision Application No. 189 of 2026. The applicant, Prasad Kashinath Bade, stands discharged from the charge under Section 12 of the POCSO Act. He will, however, face trial under the IPC provisions — Sections 354-D, 509, and 323 — which remain in force against him.

The court directed that the Trial Court shall not be influenced by the observations made in the revision order and shall decide the matter on its own merits.