Sole holdout in a Pune redevelopment must vacate by 20 November: Bombay HC faults two courts
Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that once a majority has chosen redevelopment and the time to vacate has come, a strong prima facie case for a mandatory injunction against a dissenting member must be presumed, and set aside orders of the Co-operative Court and its Appellate Court.
Seventeen of the 18 members of a Kothrud housing society have moved out. The building is empty, ready for demolition, and the developer has paid three months of transit rent. One flat is still locked, and its owner has not appeared in any court. On 5 November 2026 the Bombay High Court ordered it vacated.
Justice Sandeep V. Marne set aside the orders of two co-operative courts that had refused the society an interim injunction. He said both had misread the Supreme Court's test, and called the way they handled the case disquieting.
A society, a developer and a majority
The petitioner, Pritam Sadan Sahakari Gruharachana Sanstha Maryadit, was registered on 20 March 1987 under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. Its building at Ideal Colony, Kothrud, Pune is 37 years old.
The general body resolved on redevelopment on 29 July 2018. It invited offers on 22 July 2021, and on 20 July 2022 chose Kotibhaskar Infrastructures and Developers Private Limited. Seventeen of the 18 members voted for it, and the Deputy Registrar granted a no-objection under Section 79A on 19 December 2024.
The respondent, Jyotsna S. Rajopadhya, is the legal representative of Late Shubhada Waman Deodhar, who had been the member in Flat No. 3. The society said she had not co-operated from the start and owed maintenance dues of Rs 60,160.
Two refusals and an ex parte dispute
On 18 February 2025 the society filed Dispute No. 42 of 2025 in the Co-operative Court at Pune, with an application for a temporary injunction to have Flat No. 3 vacated. The summons came back unclaimed, and on 9 June 2025 the dispute proceeded ex parte.
The developer got a commencement certificate on 13 August 2025. The society signed a development agreement with it on 31 March 2026, registered on 15 April 2026. On 2 April 2026 the developer asked the society to have members vacate.
On 29 April 2026 the Co-operative Court rejected the injunction application. On 5 May 2026 the society emailed members to hand over their flats by 31 May. Seventeen did.
The society appealed in Appeal From Order No. 23 of 2026. Ms Rajopadhya did not appear there either, and on 10 September 2026 the Co-operative Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The society then came to the High Court.
A locked door and a bailiff
On 22 October 2026 the High Court issued notice and allowed private service. The speed post packet came back marked door locked, and the bailiff could not locate the building at first.
The court sent its bailiff again. He confirmed that the flat was locked and sent a photograph of the door with the respondent's nameplate. Noting that she had stayed away from both co-operative courts, the court said the urgency did not allow further delay.
Mr Prahlad Paranjape appeared for the society. The respondent was not represented. Mr Paranjape told the court that the developer must finish the new building by 1 December 2029, with only a six-month grace period.
He added that the Appellate Court had agreed that a mandatory injunction was possible, yet sent the society back to the trial court. He asked for both orders to be set aside.
How the Co-operative Court read Dorab Cawasji Warden
The Co-operative Court refused the injunction on two grounds. Granting possession would amount to final relief at an interim stage, it said, and the case was not in the exceptional category for a mandatory injunction under Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden.
Justice Marne held that it had completely misunderstood that decision. The judgment sets out three non-exhaustive principles: a strong case for trial, a risk of serious injury that money cannot cure, and balance of convenience.
But the court also has to ask, he said, whether withholding a mandatory interim order would carry a greater risk of injustice than granting it. The Supreme Court, quoting Halsbury, said such an order issues where the case is clear, or where the defendant tries to steal a march on the plaintiff.
Dissent as a way of stealing a march
A member who refuses to vacate, and so holds up redevelopment, is trying to steal that march, the court said. Courts are duty bound to put it right. The people who suffer are the disciplined members who gave up their homes in the spirit of a majority decision.
When a society or developer seeks possession from dissenting members, he held, civil and co-operative courts cannot apply the usual idea that a temporary injunction should not amount to final relief. Even if it does, it must be granted, because refusing it puts the subject matter at risk.
If the developer leaves after seeing that it will not get the whole building, he said, the real sufferers are the members who have already moved out. Asked whether courts can countenance that, he answered with an emphatic no.
Precedents the court relied on
The judge relied on a Division Bench ruling of the High Court in Pranav Constructions v. Priyadarshani CHSL, decided under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It held that individual members are bound by the covenants in the development agreement, and that their rights are subservient to the society's obligations.
It also held that disputes between members and the society about their entitlements cannot stop a court from ordering vacation of premises as an interim measure.
He also quoted the High Court order of 27 August 2026 in Lakhani Realty LLP v. Kalina Darshan CHSL, a suit in which 134 of 158 members had vacated and the developer said it had spent Rs 35.79 crore. The court there found a perfect case for a temporary injunction, because 24 flats were holding the project to ransom.
The presumption the court laid down
Justice Marne then stated the rule for every case of this kind. Wherever a society, an association of apartments or a developer seeks an interim order for possession from a dissenting occupier, the strong prima facie case required by Dorab Cawasji Warden must be presumed.
Holding up redevelopment through minority dissent is enough. The court said:
“a factor enough for the Courts to presume existence of a strong prima-facie case” (para 16)
The society need prove nothing more, he held, once it shows that a majority has decided on redevelopment through the chosen developer and the time to vacate the flat has arrived.
What the Appellate Court got wrong
The Appellate Court had itself held that a member in the minority is bound to vacate when the rest have acted on the society's resolutions, and that a mandatory injunction can be granted at the interim stage. Yet it dismissed the appeal on the ground that the society could apply again in changed circumstances.
Justice Marne found that wrong on the record. The developer's letter of 2 April 2026 and the society's email of 5 May 2026, which gave 31 May as the last date, were before the Appellate Court.
That court had recorded the date as 31 August 2026 in paragraph 15 of its order, which the High Court called an error. Having found the case fit for an injunction, he said, it should have granted one. Instead it sent the society back to the trial court:
“This footballing approach by the Appellate Court ought to have been avoided.” (para 20)
The court added that the approach leaves the society in a maze of litigation, and expressed its disapproval of the way both courts had exercised jurisdiction.
Balance of convenience on the ground
The court weighed the position on the ground. Seventeen members had left, photographs showed the building set for demolition, and the developer held a commencement certificate. Rent for June, July and August 2026 had been paid to every member who vacated.
A WhatsApp chat on record showed the respondent knew how the redevelopment and the litigation were going. She would get transit rent from the day she vacates and a new flat in the rebuilt society, so no serious prejudice would follow.
Irreparable injury to the society, in the court's words, was writ large. Both courts, it found, had grossly erred in not directing her to vacate, since one member's attitude threatened the other 17.
Order
The writ petition is allowed and disposed of with no order as to costs. The Co-operative Court order of 29 April 2026 and the Appellate Court order of 10 September 2026 are set aside. The society's application at Exhibit 5 in Dispute No. 42 of 2025 is allowed.
Ms Rajopadhya must hand over possession of Flat No. 3 to the society on or before 20 November 2026. If she does not, the society may take possession with police aid, and the local police station must give that assistance.
If she is absent when possession is taken, the society must prepare an inventory of the movables in the flat and tell her. If she does not collect them, the society may deal with them in accordance with law.