Calcutta HC Holds Writ Maintainable Where Customs Authority Invoked Morality Without Statutory Basis to Prohibit Imported Goods

Justice Smita Das De declined to dismiss a Customs Act writ on alternative-remedy grounds, finding the revenue had invoked Section 292 IPC and Section 11 without any specific statutory or notification-based prohibition.

The High Court at Calcutta, on 14 September 2026, ruled that a writ petition challenging a Customs order dated 22 July 2026 was maintainable, rejecting the revenue's preliminary objection that the petitioner should instead pursue a statutory appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. Justice Smita Das De, sitting singly on the Original Side, held that when a statutory authority acts entirely outside the boundaries of objective law and enters the domain of subjective morality — thereby affecting a citizen's fundamental right to trade — the High Court will not shut its doors. The case turns on whether classifying goods as “obscene adult sex toys” and applying Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, without any identified statutory or notification-based prohibition, can validly render goods “prohibited” under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, M/s. Pracha Aalloy Private Limited, approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 22 July 2026 passed by respondent no. 4. The petition was registered as WPO/370/2026, accompanied by applications GA/1/2026 and GA/2/2026.

Counsel for the customs authority raised a strong preliminary objection to maintainability. Their argument was straightforward: the Customs Act, 1962 is a self-contained code providing a complete machinery for departmental appeals. The impugned order was appealable under Section 128 before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), subject to pre-deposit under Section 129E. Bypassing this remedy and invoking Article 226 directly, the revenue argued, was not sustainable in law.

The revenue relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported at 2021 (48) GSTL 113 (SC), and also on Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Mangalore Stock Exchange, reported at (2005) 10 SCC 274, for the proposition that the issue of maintainability must be decided at the threshold before the matter is examined on merits.

The Alternative-Remedy Rule and Its Exceptions

The revenue's reliance on Radha Krishan Industries centred on paragraph 27 of that judgment, which the court reproduced in full. The principles that emerge from that paragraph, as set out by the Supreme Court, are:

• The power under Article 226 extends beyond enforcement of fundamental rights and may be exercised for any other purpose as well.
• The High Court has discretion not to entertain a writ petition where an effective alternate remedy is available.
• Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the petition is filed for enforcement of a fundamental right under Part III; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order is wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of legislation is challenged.
• An alternate remedy does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226, though ordinarily a writ should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy exists.
• Where a right is created by statute which itself prescribes the remedy, resort must first be had to that statutory remedy before invoking Article 226. This is a rule of policy, convenience, and discretion.
• In cases with disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decline jurisdiction, but if it is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires exercise of writ jurisdiction, that view will not readily be interfered with.

The revenue argued that the petitioner had failed to bring itself within any of these exceptions.

The Petitioner's Position

The petitioner's counsel countered that the existence of an alternative remedy does not absolutely oust jurisdiction under Article 226. It is, rather, a self-imposed rule of judicial discretion governing entertainability and does not by itself render the petition not maintainable.

Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's rulings in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademark and Godrej Sara Lee v. Excise and Taxation Officer, supporting the position that an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not an absolute jurisdictional bar. A writ petition remains maintainable, the petitioner submitted, where the impugned order violates fundamental rights, breaches principles of natural justice, or suffers from a patent lack of jurisdiction.

On the specific facts, the petitioner contended that the adjudicating authority had created an unlegislated category of prohibition out of subjective moral biases, rendering the order an absolute nullity. The invocation of Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — without identification of a specific statutory or notification-based prohibition — could not, by itself, bring the goods within the definition of “prohibited goods” under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962.

How the Court Reasoned on Maintainability

Justice Smita Das De, after considering rival submissions on the preliminary objection, identified the precise legal question at issue: whether the description “obscene adult sex toys” and the alleged applicability of Section 292 IPC, without identification of a specific statutory or notification-based prohibition, can by themselves render goods “prohibited goods” under Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The court held that it is no longer res integra that when a statutory authority acts completely outside the boundaries of objective law and enters the realm of subjective morality, thereby severely affecting a citizen's fundamental right to trade, the High Court will not shut its doors. This finding placed the matter within the exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule articulated in Radha Krishan Industries.

The court also observed that the case involves what it described as systematic misrepresentation of trade regulations across various custom houses, which — on the petitioner's case — necessitates an authoritative judicial pronouncement rather than a routine departmental appeal. The precise statutory basis for the alleged prohibition, and the basis for invoking Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962, were held to require examination.

At the same time, the court was careful to record that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the matter. The ruling was confined entirely to the question of whether the writ petition could proceed to be heard.

Correction of Earlier Order Under GA/2/2026

The court also disposed of GA/2/2026, which sought correction of typographical errors in an earlier order dated 21 August 2026. Three corrections were directed:

• On the first page, the figure “4036” was to be read as “4636”.
• On the third page, the case reference “W.P.C. No. 6731/2020” was corrected to “W.P.C. No. 3542/2025”, and the party name “Rajat Kumar v. Commissioner” was corrected to “Techsync v. The Superintendent of Customs SIIB ACC Imports and Exports”.
• On the fourth page, the figure “4036” was again corrected to “4636”, and the amount of Rs. 34,20,319.65 was corrected to Rs. 7,00,000.

All other portions of the 21 August 2026 order were left unaltered. GA/2/2026 was accordingly allowed and disposed of.

Order

The preliminary objection raised by the revenue was rejected. The writ petition WPO/370/2026, along with GA/1/2026, was listed for hearing on 9 October 2026. The respondents were directed to file a short affidavit-in-opposition within two weeks from 14 September 2026. The petitioners were permitted to file a reply, if any, within one week thereafter. Law notes filed by both sides were directed to be kept on record.