Calcutta HC Allows Post-Revision Composition After Converting Conviction from Section 326 to Section 325 IPC, Holds Section 482 Power Survives Functus Officio Bar
The Calcutta High Court held that a changed circumstance, conversion of conviction from a non-compoundable to a compoundable offence, permits fresh invocation of Section 482 CrPC even after the revisional court becomes functus officio.
The Calcutta High Court, in a judgment delivered on 12 May 2026, allowed six convicted persons to compound an offence under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code after the court itself had, in an earlier revisional order, converted their conviction from Section 326 IPC, a non-compoundable offence, to Section 325 IPC, which is compoundable. Dr. Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, sitting singly, held that the conversion of conviction created a fresh right of compounding that did not exist before the revisional judgment, and that this change of circumstance justified invoking the court's inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even after the revisional court had become functus officio. The judgment directly addresses the tension between the finality bar under Section 362 CrPC and the court's residual inherent jurisdiction.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The matter has its origins in an FIR lodged on 21 March 2010 by the complainant, alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC against six accused persons. After trial, the trial court convicted all six accused under Section 326/34 IPC by a judgment dated 26 February 2019 and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment of one year along with a fine of Rs. 5,000, with a default sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment.
The convicted persons appealed before the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 2018. The appellate court, by its judgment dated 10 September 2018, affirmed the trial court's conviction and sentence.
The convicted persons then filed a criminal revision before the Calcutta High Court, being CRR 3174 of 2018. By a judgment and order dated 2 March 2026, the High Court partly allowed the revision, altering the conviction from Section 326 IPC to Section 325 IPC and reducing the sentence to simple imprisonment for six months along with fine.
After that revisional order, the parties entered into a settlement and the complainant agreed to compound the offence. The convicted persons filed CRAN 2 of 2026 on 19 March 2026, seeking permission to compound the offence on the basis of this post-revisional settlement.
The Legal Issue: Can a Functus Officio Court Accept Composition?
The State opposed the composition application. Counsel for the State argued that once a court has signed its final judgment, it becomes functus officio and Section 362 CrPC expressly bars any alteration or review of that judgment except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. The State relied on P.A. Damodaran v. State, (1992) SCC Online Ker 141, Tanveer Aquil v. State of M.P., 1990 (Sup) SCC 63, Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 500, and Hari Singh Mann v. Harbajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 169.
The State's position was that filing miscellaneous petitions after disposal of the main case, seeking fresh directions, is unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provision, and amounts to abuse of the process of the court. The State also argued that the authorities cited by the applicants arose under the special provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act and were not applicable to an IPC offence.
The court framed two questions for consideration: first, whether composition of an offence under Section 325/34 IPC can be accepted even after conviction and sentence have become final through the trial, appellate, and revisional courts, given the bar under Section 362 CrPC; and second, whether the High Court retains any inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to accept such composition and relieve the accused of the obligation to undergo sentence.
How the Bench Reasoned
Dr. Justice Mukherjee began by setting out the text of Section 362 CrPC, which bars any court from altering or reviewing a signed judgment or final order except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. He accepted the general proposition that a trial, appellate, or revisional court which has become functus officio cannot accept a subsequent composition and convert its earlier judgment into a deemed acquittal under Section 320(8) CrPC.
The court explained the Latin term functus officio as meaning “having performed the office,” signifying that once a court has pronounced a final judgment, its authority over that specific matter is exhausted. A court in that position cannot re-hear the case on merits, revise its decision because it changed its mind, or recall its final order in the absence of a statutory provision enabling it to do so.
However, the court identified what it called the unique feature of the present case. When the revision CRR 3174 of 2018 was disposed of on 2 March 2026, the right to compound the offence did not exist at all, because Section 326 IPC is not compoundable. It was only by virtue of the High Court's own revisional order converting the conviction to Section 325 IPC that the right of compounding accrued to the parties for the first time. The parties exercised that right at the earliest opportunity after the revisional judgment.
The court drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Mostt. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee, 1990 Criminal Law Journal 1599, which held that if there has been a change in the circumstances of a case, it is in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process of the court. The bar under Section 362 applies only where the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order; re-examining the same materials to arrive at a different conclusion would amount to a review, which is expressly barred.
Applying that principle, the court held that when the revision was disposed of, the circumstance of the parties having settled and the complainant having compounded the offence simply did not exist. The right to compound accrued only after conversion of conviction. This was a genuine change of circumstance, not a re-examination of the same facts.
The court also addressed the precedents relied upon by the State. It accepted that Damodaran and Tanveer Aquil correctly state the law that a post-revision composition cannot be readily accepted, and that a court which is functus officio cannot exercise power in respect of a disposed matter in view of Section 362 CrPC. But it held that neither case had dealt with a situation where the revisional court itself converted a conviction from a non-compoundable offence to a compoundable one, thereby creating a right of compounding that had not previously existed. The ratio of those decisions was therefore not applicable to the present facts.
The court referred to the Supreme Court's handling of a similar situation from the Calcutta High Court itself. In P. Ramaswamy v. State, (2013) 14 SCC 577, the Calcutta High Court had converted a conviction under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 to Section 354 IPC and thereafter refused to entertain a composition application on the ground that it had become functus officio. The Supreme Court, without going into whether the High Court was right in refusing, directly granted permission to compound the offence and set aside the Calcutta High Court's orders. The court read this as the Supreme Court implicitly recognising that such composition ought to have been permitted at the High Court level itself.
On the question of whether Section 482 CrPC could be invoked after disposal of the revision, the court held that the power under Section 482 is sui generis and is enjoyed by the High Court by virtue of its establishment. Section 320 CrPC prescribes no embargo against compounding after disposal by invocation of inherent power under Section 482. The court quoted the Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409, for the proposition that when any power is expressly granted by statute, there is impliedly included in the grant every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective.
The court also addressed the concern about finality and the majesty of law, quoting a coordinate bench of the Kerala High Court in Sabu George and Ors. v. The Home Secretary, Union of India and Anr., 2007 SCC Online Ker 243: “By being humane and considerate towards such an accused who has made amends and reversed his culpable conduct, the majesty of law will not suffer at all.” The court adopted that reasoning, holding that the doctrine of functus officio must yield to justice for which law exists.
The court also noted that compelling the applicants to either undergo imprisonment despite a lawful settlement, or to approach the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petition merely to obtain composition, would amount to misinterpreting the legislature's intention. Where a right is conferred by statute, it should not be rendered nugatory on grounds of technicality.
Outcome
Dr. Justice Mukherjee disposed of CRAN 2 of 2026 with a direction that the sentences imposed on all six convicted persons shall not be executed, subject to each convicted person depositing Rs. 2,500 with the Calcutta High Court Legal Services Authority within six weeks from the date of the order. In default of payment by any individual convict, that person shall undergo the sentence approved by the court in its revisional judgment dated 2 March 2026 in CRR 3174 of 2018.