Calcutta HC Upholds Eviction of Chandanpur Hawkers, Grants 90-Day Grace Period to Vacate Railway Land
A Division Bench ruled Section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989 empowers railway authorities to evict occupants from railway land without following the West Bengal Public Premises Act, 1971, and dismissed the appeal of a hawkers' cooperative at Chandanpur Railway Station.
The Calcutta High Court has dismissed the appeal of hawkers operating on railway land at Chandanpur Railway Station, affirming an eviction notice issued by the railway authorities on 1 August 2025. A Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De held that Section 147(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 gives railway authorities independent power to remove unauthorised occupants from railway property, and that this power operates without any obligation to follow the procedure under Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. While dismissing the appeal on contest, the Bench granted the appellant cooperative society and its members 90 days from the date of the judgment to vacate the railway premises voluntarily.
Three Rounds of Litigation Over Chandanpur Railway Premises
The appellants — Alok Chakraborty and others, including the Chandanpur Bazar Railway Premises Shoppers’ Cooperative Society Limited (appellant no.2) — had been vending from railway land in the vicinity of Chandanpur Railway Station. The dispute had a protracted procedural history before a writ petition finally came before the Single Judge whose order triggered the appeal.
On two earlier occasions, the appellants had filed writ petitions against similar eviction notices issued by the railway authorities. In the first round, the notice was stayed and the railway authorities were directed to consider the appellants’ representation. A hearing was held and an order was passed against the appellants, which they challenged again. The second writ petition resulted in a direction to the railway authorities to give another opportunity of hearing and to pass a reasoned order.
Pursuant to that direction, the railway authorities passed a speaking order on 17 October 2023. In that order, they found that the appellants had not produced authentic documents supporting their entitlement to do business on railway land at Chandanpur Railway Station. The speaking order also recorded that the railway had not given permission for the registration of the cooperative society, and that the Government of West Bengal had no authority to issue a registration certificate for business on railway premises without the railway’s consent.
Despite the speaking order, the appellants preferred a writ petition against it, but no stay was obtained. On 1 August 2025, the railway authorities issued a fresh eviction cum show cause notice directing members of the society to peacefully remove all their structures from the railway land. The notice scheduled an eviction programme for 18 August 2025, failing compliance. The appellants assailed this notice before the Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition by order dated 8 August 2025. MAT 1294 of 2025 was filed before the Division Bench against that dismissal.
Whether Section 147 of the Railways Act Overrides the 1971 Act
Two distinct legal contentions were advanced before the Division Bench on behalf of the appellants.
Senior Advocate Mr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya argued that the eviction notice of 1 August 2025, although styled as a show cause notice, gave no real opportunity of hearing and in effect directed removal outright. He submitted that the mandatory procedure under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act had not been followed by the railway authorities before initiating eviction, vitiating the notice entirely.
He further contended that the appellants could not be characterised as rank trespassers. In support, he placed reliance on a communication dated 21 February 2006 from the Divisional Engineer (ARBN)/Howrah to the Chief Promoter of the cooperative society, wherein the railway had asked the appellants to submit proper documents regarding the formation of a registered cooperative society. The appellants argued that this amounted to an in-principle acceptance by the railway of the appellants’ proposal to do business on spareable railway land on a cooperative basis, subject only to formal registration, which was later obtained.
The railway authorities countered both arguments. On the statutory question, counsel for the railway relied on a judgment dated 22 July 2024 by a Single Judge of the same court in WPA 18248 of 2024, which had held that Section 147 of the Railways Act permits removal of trespassers and encroachers from railway property without resort to the 1971 Act. That judgment was affirmed by a Division Bench on 21 August 2024, and the Supreme Court, by order dated 28 March 2025, also affirmed both the Single Judge and Division Bench orders, holding that there was no illegality in the eviction order for removing encroachments from railway land.
The railway also cited G. Phalaguna v. General Manager, reported at 2006 (2) Cal LJ 193, where a Single Judge had held that Section 147(2) of the Railways Act does not require railway authorities to initiate proceedings under the 1971 Act before evicting unauthorised occupants from railway property, and that Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be used to enlarge or curtail the scope of Section 147(2) or to enforce a fundamental right of unauthorised occupants in this regard. The same position was reiterated in Subrata Ghosh v. Union of India and others, reported at 2019 (2) CHN 62.
On the 2006 communication, the railway submitted that it was no more than an administrative request for documents to process the appellants’ application — not an assurance that permission would follow. The Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Hooghly, had himself, by letter dated 9 January 2007, asked the railway to issue a no-objection certificate before registration could proceed. No such certificate was ever issued by the railway, yet registration was granted to the cooperative society. The railway argued that the registration itself was therefore vitiated.
How the Division Bench Reasoned
The Division Bench, in a judgment authored by Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya (with Justice Sandip Kumar De concurring), accepted the position taken by the railway authorities on every contested point.
On the statutory question, the Bench noted that this Court has repeatedly interpreted Section 147 of the Railways Act and consistently held that it overrides the 1971 Act in respect of railway properties. The Bench reproduced Section 147 in full. Sub-section (1) penalises any person who enters railway land without authority or, having lawfully entered, misuses it or refuses to leave. Sub-section (2) separately empowers railway servants — or persons called to their aid — to remove any such person. The Bench held that Section 147(2) does not contain any statutory prerequisite, not even an obligation to issue a notice before removal.
The Bench also applied Section 2(31) of the Railways Act, which defines “railway” to include all lands within the fences or other boundary marks indicating the limits of land appurtenant to a railway. Since it was admitted that the subject land belonged to the railway, Section 147 applied squarely.
The Bench addressed the natural justice argument directly. It observed that the principle of audi alteram partem, when applicable to administrative action, must be tested against the element of prejudice. In this case, ample opportunity of hearing had already been given to the appellants in the earlier round, leading to the speaking order of 17 October 2023. That order had categorically rejected all claims of the appellants to the railway property. No stay of that speaking order had been obtained. The Bench held that the appellants could not insist on an infinite repetition of hearings once a conclusive decision had already been taken after due process. The chapter of hearing had already been exhausted.
On the 2006 communication, the Bench rejected the appellants’ reading. It held that the railway’s request for documents was merely the first step for the appellants to cross the threshold of consideration of their application. It was not an assurance that even if registration was obtained, a right to possess railway property would automatically follow. Mere formation of a cooperative society, the Bench held, does not confer any right to possess railway property without express or tacit consent of the railway, which was entirely absent here.
The Bench went further and found that the cooperative society’s own registration was vitiated, since it was granted without the mandatory no-objection certificate from the railway, as the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies had himself acknowledged was required.
The Bench also addressed the caption of the impugned notice. Although it was styled an “eviction cum show cause notice,” the Bench held that the phrase “show cause notice” in the caption was a surplusage. The notice operated within the framework of Section 147(2) of the Railways Act and was not legally defective on account of its caption.
Outcome
MAT 1294 of 2025 was dismissed on contest. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment and order dated 8 August 2025 passed by the Single Judge in WPA 18067 of 2025, which had dismissed the writ petition challenging the eviction notice.
Taking note of the appellants’ long presence at the site and the plight of the hawkers and their members, the Bench granted 90 days from 3 September 2026 for appellant no.2 and its members to vacate the railway premises voluntarily. In the event they fail to do so within that period, the railway authorities are at liberty to take appropriate steps for their removal under Section 147(2) of the Railways Act, 1989. There was no order as to costs.