Calcutta HC Restores CISF Constable's Termination After Division Bench Finds Suppression in Attestation Form

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a Single Judge's order that had quashed a CISF constable's probationary termination, holding that his own appeal letter admitted implication in criminal cases under a different name.

A Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, comprising Justice Madhuresh Prasad and Justice Prasenjit Biswas, on 29 June 2026 allowed an intra-court appeal filed by the Union of India against a Single Judge's judgment dated 9 December 2021. That earlier judgment had quashed the termination of a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable, Gujjudi Varaprasad, on the ground that the employer had failed to establish that he was actually an accused in the criminal cases he was alleged to have concealed. The Division Bench reversed that finding. It held that the petitioner's own representation filed before the appellate authority in November 2016 conclusively admitted his implication in the two criminal cases, making it impermissible for him to contend before the writ court that he was not an accused at all. The termination order dated 18 October 2016 and the appellate authority's order dated 23 December 2016 were accordingly restored.

Recruitment, Appointment and the Attestation Form

Gujjudi Varaprasad had applied for enrolment as a Constable in the CISF pursuant to a notification issued by the Staff Selection Commission, New Delhi, in 2012–2013. He cleared all stages of the recruitment process and was appointed on probation by a letter dated 15 September 2014.

Simultaneously, the attestation form he had submitted on 28 September 2014 was sent for verification to the concerned authorities. Query 12(i) in that form asked: “Is any case pending against you in any Court of law at the time of filling up this Attestation Form?” The petitioner answered in the negative.

The attestation form itself carried a clear warning on its first page: if false information or suppression of factual information came to notice at any time during service, the employee's services would be liable to termination. The petitioner signed and submitted the form with this warning in front of him.

Verification revealed that two criminal cases had been registered at Saravakota Police Station — Crime No. 70 of 2013 and Crime No. 5 of 2014. The names of the accused persons in those cases were recorded as “Gujjidi Ramakrishna son of Satyam” and “Gujjidi Ramakrishna son of Satyanarayana” respectively, not as Gujjudi Varaprasad son of Gujjudi Satyanarayana.

Termination During Probation and the Writ Challenge

On 18 October 2016, the Commandant, acting as the disciplinary authority, terminated Varaprasad's services with immediate effect under Rule 25(2) and Rule 26(4) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 (CISF Rules, 2001). One month's pay in lieu of notice was credited to his bank account.

Varaprasad filed an appeal before the Inspector General of the Force on 3 November 2016. The Inspector General, by an order dated 23 December 2016, found no reason to interfere and rejected the appeal. Both orders were then challenged before the Single Bench by way of a writ petition.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the basis that the names of the accused persons in the two criminal cases did not match the petitioner's name. The Single Judge gave the Union of India an opportunity to establish the identity of the petitioner with the accused persons named in the FIRs. When the Union of India failed to do so, the Single Judge quashed both the termination order and the appellate authority's order.

The Admission Hidden in the Petitioner's Own Appeal

Before the Division Bench, the advocate for the Union of India argued that the Single Judge had plainly erred. The petitioner's own representation dated 3 November 2016, filed before the Inspector General, contained a detailed narration of his implication in the very criminal cases he had denied in the attestation form. The Division Bench extracted the relevant passage from that representation at length.

In that appeal, Varaprasad had written that due to political rivalries in his village he was made involved in a false criminal case under the name “Ramakrishna” and his father's name “Satyanarayana.” He stated that he was not aware his name had been included in the criminal case, that the complainants and witnesses had stated he was not involved, and that he had been acquitted along with others by the Judicial Magistrate's Court of First Class at Pathapatnam, Srikakulam District, by a judgment dated 21 September 2015, in C.C. No. 49 of 2014 (arising out of Crime No. 5 of 2014) and C.C. No. 44 of 2014 (arising out of Crime No. 70 of 2013). He enclosed copies of the acquittal judgment.

The Division Bench observed that this was not a case where the petitioner denied being the person named in the criminal cases. His representation before the Inspector General did not deny his identity with the accused; instead it asserted that he had been wrongly implicated under a different name and had subsequently been acquitted. The implication and the acquittal were both acknowledged by him in that document.

The bench held that, having made those admissions before the departmental appellate authority, Varaprasad had no basis to contend before the writ court that he was not an accused in the criminal cases at all. The Single Judge had, in the Division Bench's view, glossed over this factual position and had wrongly cast a burden on the Union of India to prove the petitioner's identity with the accused.

Application of Avtar Singh and Satish Chandra Yadav

The Union of India had placed reliance on two Supreme Court decisions: Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Others, reported at (2016) 8 SCC 471, and Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India & Ors., reported at (2022) 10 S.C.R. 537.

The consistent position in those decisions, as summarised before the Division Bench, is that where an employee is found to have suppressed or given false information about a matter bearing on his fitness or suitability for the post, the employer may terminate the appointment during probation without holding a formal enquiry. Subsequent acquittal in the criminal case is not, in all circumstances, a mitigating factor that saves the employee.

The respondent's counsel had argued before the Division Bench that those judgments had no application here because the petitioner was factually not named as an accused. The Division Bench rejected that argument. Given that the petitioner himself had admitted his implication in his representation, the factual premise on which the respondent sought to distinguish Avtar Singh and Satish Chandra Yadav did not exist. Both decisions therefore directly supported the conclusion that the termination was valid.

Why the Single Judge's Reasoning Did Not Survive

The Division Bench's core reasoning is precise. The Single Judge had concluded that the names in the FIRs did not match the petitioner's name and had placed the burden of establishing identity on the Union of India. That approach, the Division Bench held, was unsustainable because it ignored the petitioner's own written assertions made before the departmental authority.

The petitioner was, at the material time, still a probationer. Rule 25(2) and Rule 26(4) of the CISF Rules, 2001 permit termination of a probationer's services without a formal disciplinary enquiry, subject to payment of notice pay. Those conditions were met: the order was passed under those rules and one month's salary was credited to his account.

The non-disclosure of the pending criminal cases in the attestation form constituted suppression of a material fact, in terms of the warning printed on the form itself. The petitioner's knowledge of the consequences of such suppression was evident from the fact that the warning was placed on the first page of the very form he signed.

The Division Bench found no legal or factual basis for the interference by the Single Judge with the termination order dated 18 October 2016 or with the Inspector General's order dated 23 December 2016. Both orders were held to be sustainable.

Outcome

The Division Bench, by its judgment dated 29 June 2026, set aside the judgment of the Single Bench dated 9 December 2021. F.M.A. 697 of 2022 was allowed. The termination order dated 18 October 2016 and the appellate authority's order dated 23 December 2016 stand restored. The court directed that urgent photostat certified copies of the order be supplied to the parties on compliance with the necessary formalities.