Calcutta HC Sets Aside Plaint Rejection, Holds Limitation on 1948 Gift Deed Is a Triable Issue
A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court restored a suit challenging a 1948 gift deed, ruling that the limitation question required evidence and could not be decided on plaint averments alone.
A Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, comprising Justice Debangsu Basak (leading the bench) and Justice Aryak Dutt, on 10 September 2026 set aside a Single Judge’s order that had rejected the plaint of Kalimata Infratech Limited under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The suit, filed on 18 March 2016, sought to have a registered deed of gift dated 1 August 1948 declared false and fabricated, along with a string of consequential reliefs over premises No. 2/1 Loudon Street, Kolkata. The Single Judge had rejected the plaint on 10 June 2026, finding it either barred by limitation or an abuse of process. The Division Bench disagreed, holding that the question of when the appellant first had notice of the 1948 deed was a triable issue that could not be resolved on the pleadings alone, and remanded the suit for hearing on merits.
The Suit and the Properties at Stake
Kalimata Infratech Limited claimed title to the Loudon Street property through a registered deed of conveyance dated 8 March 2011 executed in its favour by defendant No. 26. The chain of title it relied upon traced back to a sale by Justice Satish Chandra to one Charubala Devi on 17 May 1940. Charubala Devi bequeathed the property by will dated 6 September 1985 to her daughter Aparna Singh, who obtained probate on 25 October 1990 and sold the property to defendant No. 26 by a deed registered on 10 January 2011.
The registered deed of gift dated 1 August 1948 stood at the centre of the dispute. Rival defendants claimed title derived from or through that deed. Kalimata Infratech pleaded that it first became aware of the deed — and of the rival claims of the defendants — only on 29 October 2013, when a copy of the plaint in CS No. 371 of 2013 was served upon it. It filed the present suit on 18 March 2016, asserting that the three-year limitation period under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ran from that date of knowledge.
The plaint disclosed eight sets of competing claims over the suit property and sought, as its primary prayer, a declaration that the 1948 deed of gift and all documents of title derived from it were false, fabricated, and had not transferred any interest in the premises. Delivery of title documents and a perpetual injunction were prayed for as consequential reliefs.
Why the Single Judge Rejected the Plaint
The Single Judge, exercising original civil jurisdiction in CS 107 of 2016, allowed an application — IA GA 3 of 2024 — filed by contesting defendants and rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The impugned order treated the suit as barred by limitation and as an abuse of process, and found that leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, obtained as late as 2 January 2023, meant that the suit could not be treated as having been instituted in 2016.
The Limitation Dispute: Date of Filing and Clause 12 Leave
Before the Division Bench, the appellant’s senior advocate contended that the plaint was presented at the Centralized Filing Section on 18 March 2016. Leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 was obtained later, on 2 January 2023. He argued that the subsequent leave did not re-date the institution of the suit.
To resolve a factual dispute about the actual date of presentation, the Division Bench called for the original plaint, handed it to counsel on both sides for inspection during the hearing, and examined the endorsements on it. The bench found that the endorsements confirmed presentation on 18 March 2016. That finding was not disputed by any of the appearing parties.
The bench then turned to Chapter XXXIXA of the Original Side Rules, introduced with effect from 5 September 1996, which established the Centralized Filing Section. Rule 1 of that chapter states that its provisions on computerisation shall have effect notwithstanding anything contrary contained elsewhere in the Original Side Rules. Rule 3 carries a similar non-obstante clause and mandates that any plaint complete in all respects shall, save as otherwise directed by the Court, be presented at the Centralized Filing Section in the first instance.
Chapter VII Rule 4 of the Original Side Rules separately provides for endorsements to be made on a plaint when it is admitted by the Court. The bench accepted the appellant’s reliance on Shridhar Issar v. Bharnobari Tea & Industries Limited, AIR 2012 Cal 71, which had held that there is no conflict between Chapter VII Rule 4 and Chapter XXXIXA. That judgment had explained that limitation stops running the moment a plaint is filed in the Centralized Filing Section, and that a litigant cannot be made to suffer for procedural delays thereafter. The Division Bench endorsed this reading and held that Chapter XXXIXA and Chapter VII Rule 4 operate in complementary spheres: a plaint goes to the Centralized Filing Section as the default, but may be presented directly to the Court in genuine exigencies — such as where immediate interlocutory relief or leave under Clause 12 is sought. That exception is not to be misused for party convenience.
Applying G.M. Kokil, 1984 (Suppl) SCC 196, for the proposition that a non-obstante clause gives overriding effect to the provision containing it, and Lakhsmi Commercial Bank Limited v. Bengal National Textile Mills Limited, AIR 1992 Cal 278, for the principle that a suit is instituted upon presentation of the plaint regardless of subsequent procedural steps, the bench held that the plaint stood presented on 18 March 2016.
Whether Notice of the 1948 Deed Could Be Decided on the Plaint
Defendants Nos. 15 to 20 pressed Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, particularly Explanation I, arguing that registration of the 1948 deed of gift operated as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers once the three conditions in the proviso were met. They contended that Kalimata Infratech, which traced its title through a conveyance of 8 March 2011, was deemed to have notice of the 1948 deed well before 29 October 2013.
They also pointed to the person who had verified the plaint — one Mr. Alok Agarwal — who had been a director of Aarya Industrial Products Private Limited. That entity had entered into a registered agreement of sale on 25 March 2011 for part of the same property, and that document specifically mentioned the 1948 deed of gift. Mr. Agarwal had also been a director of the appellant until 5 January 2011. Defendants argued his knowledge of the gift deed as director of Aarya Industrial Products could be imputed to Kalimata Infratech.
Defendants Nos. 3 to 8 additionally pointed out that a deed of lease, annexed to the plaint itself, referred to the 1948 gift deed, and that the certified copy of the lease had been issued in September 2004. They argued that no triable issue arose on limitation because the applicability of Explanation I to Section 3 could be deduced from the plaint’s own statements.
The Division Bench was not persuaded. It observed that while the opposing defendants’ contentions were serious, the inferences they required the court to draw — about the appellant’s state of knowledge — were not available conclusively from the plaint and the documents annexed to it. The plaint averred that the appellant became aware of the rival claims only on 29 October 2013, and that claim had not been established on the balance of probabilities to be false at this stage. The defendants had not conclusively established earlier knowledge.
Under Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a purchaser is attributed notice of the title of a person in actual possession of the property at the relevant time. The bench found that there was nothing on the record, at this stage, to show that any person other than the appellant’s vendor was in actual physical possession of the property when the appellant purchased it.
The bench drew a clear line between what Order VII Rule 11 permits and what it does not. It is settled — affirmed in Chhotanben & Another v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushna Bhai Thakkar, 2018 (6) SCC 422, Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105, and B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 860 — that averments in the plaint are what matter, the plaint must be read as a whole, and the defendant’s defence on merits is irrelevant. The court cannot isolate individual statements to construct a case not visible from the plaint read as a whole.
The bench distinguished the cases on which the defendants relied. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844, had upheld a plaint rejection where the plaintiff had taken a fictional date as the date of knowledge and that fictional nature had been established. In the present case, no such conclusive finding could be made. Manjula and Others v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 831, had involved a plaint that disclosed no cause of action and a suit barred by specific statutory provisions; that was not the position here. N. Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar & Another, an unreported Supreme Court decision dated 17 August 2026 in CA 11194 of 2026, had proceeded on plaint averments and annexed documents that themselves established the bar; no comparable position emerged from Kalimata Infratech’s plaint.
The Court’s Reasoning on Triable Issues
The Division Bench held that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. Where the issue cannot be pronounced finally against the plaintiff on the basis of plaint averments taken as true, rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) is not warranted. In this case, the appellant had to be given the opportunity to explain the limitation point at trial, and the opposing defendants had to establish their case on knowledge and constructive notice through evidence.
“The inference that the opposing defendants have required us to draw with regard to the issue of limitation, are not available conclusively on the basis of the pleadings made in the plaint.”
The bench also rejected the argument that the documents mentioned in Schedule B to the plaint — including a sale deed dated 24 August 1981 executed pursuant to a decree for specific performance — were incapable of challenge. It treated these as matters going to the merits of the suit, to be examined at trial.
On the question of abuse of process, the bench held that obtaining Clause 12 leave belatedly in 2023 did not by itself characterise the suit as freshly instituted on that date or as an abuse, given that the plaint had been validly presented at the Centralized Filing Section in 2016.
Order
The Division Bench set aside the judgment and decree dated 10 June 2026 passed by the Single Judge in IA GA 3 of 2024, CS 107 of 2016. CS 107 of 2016 — described in the operative paragraph as CS 307 of 2016 — was remanded for hearing on merits. The issue of limitation was expressly kept open to be decided at trial after the parties have led evidence. APDT 21 of 2026 was disposed of without any order as to costs. Justice Aryak Dutt concurred in a single line.