Calcutta HC Halts Syama Prasad Mookherjee Port's Demolition Drive at Garden Reach Quarters, Holds Action Unlawful Under Public Premises Act

A Division Bench held that Aadhaar cards, voter ID and gas bills were prima facie proof of occupation, making the Port's demolition drive without Section 4 notice plainly unlawful.

A Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta on 21 July 2026 set aside a Single Judge's dismissal of a writ petition and permanently restrained the Syama Prasad Mookherjee Port (SPMP) from demolishing or evicting residents of the Calcutta Dock Labour Board (CDLB) Quarters and Calcutta Port Trust (CPT) Quarters at Brooke Lane, Garden Reach, Kolkata. The bench, led by Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and joined by Justice Supratim Bhattacharya, held that the demolition drive was conducted without any notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, and that the residents had furnished sufficient prima facie evidence of occupation. The Port's own correspondence admitted that 502 residential quarters were occupied by approximately 8,000 residents, directly contradicting its claim that the buildings were vacant and abandoned.

The Demolition Drive and the Writ Before the Single Judge

The appellants — 52 in number — filed W.P.A. No. 12272 of 2026 before a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, challenging a demolition drive initiated by SPMP in respect of residential buildings they occupied. They produced Aadhaar cards, voter identity cards, and gas supply bills as evidence of occupation.

The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 30 June 2026, finding that the petitioners could not explain how they had come into possession of the premises and that a scrutiny of their Aadhaar cards revealed no sufficient material regarding their alleged occupation. On that basis, the court held that the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act had no application, since no unauthorised occupation had been established.

The appellants challenged that dismissal by filing M.A.T. No. 1072 of 2026. Mr. Kaustav Banerjee appeared for the appellants. Mr. Subhankar Nag and others appeared for the Port Authorities, while Mr. Uday Sankar Bhattacharya appeared for the Union of India.

Whether Aadhaar Cards and Allied Documents Established Prima Facie Occupation

The Port Authorities argued that only 22 of the 52 appellants had produced Aadhaar cards, and that the verification process underlying Aadhaar issuance does not involve any physical check of whether the applicant actually lives at the address furnished. They relied on Regulations 10 and 11 of the Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016, to contend that the process merely records information as stated by the applicant.

They cited a Single Judge decision in Debashis Nandy v. Union of India & Ors. [WP No. 15233(W) of 2018] for the proposition that an Aadhaar card is not conclusive proof of identity or address. They also placed reliance on a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Parvati Kumar and Others v. State of U.P., reported at 2019 SCC OnLine All 7085, which held that entries in an Aadhaar card regarding address are not conclusive proof under the Evidence Act. Finally, they cited the Supreme Court's decision in Association for Democratic Reforms and Others v. Election Commission of India and Others, reported at 2026 SCC OnLine SC 990, which held that Aadhaar does not constitute proof of citizenship or domicile.

The Division Bench rejected each of these arguments in the context of the 1971 Act. It drew a clear distinction between conclusive proof and prima facie proof, observing that the two are diametrically opposite concepts. All the cited authorities only established that Aadhaar is not conclusive proof — none of them negated its value as prima facie material.

The bench examined the Aadhaar Act and the 2016 Regulations in detail. Section 2(k) of the Aadhaar Act defines “demographic information” to include address, and Section 3(3) requires the Authority to verify that information before issuing an Aadhaar number. Schedule II of the Regulations lists documents accepted as proof of address, and that list expressly includes gas connection bills and voter identity cards — the very documents produced by the appellants. The bench held that the Legislature, by recognising those documents in Schedule II, had treated them as prima facie proof of address, and it was not open to the writ court to brush them aside.

The Supreme Court's Association for Democratic Reforms decision, the bench noted, arose in the specific context of electoral rolls and proof of citizenship — a concept with a far wider connotation than mere occupation of a premises. Citizenship and domicile require an element of permanence and additional ingredients that simple occupation of a property does not. That ruling therefore did not bear on the question of whether a document could serve as prima facie proof of physical occupation for the purposes of the 1971 Act.

Distinguishing Debashis Nandy, the bench pointed out that the Single Judge in that case was addressing Aadhaar as a source of identification in a civil dispute, where the standard of proof is conclusive determination of rights. The standard before a writ court or an Estate Officer under the 1971 Act is considerably lower.

The Meaning of “Unauthorised Occupation” Under the 1971 Act

The Port Authorities contended that occupation under the 1971 Act must be “settled occupation”, drawing an analogy with decisions under the Electricity Act, 2003 that require an element of permanence before a connection is granted. The bench disagreed.

Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act defines “unauthorised occupation” as occupation of public premises without authority for such occupation, and also includes persons who continue in occupation after a prior grant has expired or been determined. The bench held that this inclusive definition covers both persons who once had a valid grant and rank trespassers, and that neither limb of the definition attaches any element of permanence. Accordingly, the Single Judge's requirement that the appellants demonstrate how they came into possession was an erroneous one: the mode of entry into possession is not a threshold condition for the 1971 Act to apply.

The bench also addressed Sections 5-A, 5-B, and 5-C of the 1971 Act, which the appellants had raised in the alternative. Those sections deal exclusively with “unauthorised constructions” — structures erected by an occupant without authority. The subject buildings belong to the Port and were not erected by the appellants. Demolition powers under Sections 5-A, 5-B, and 5-C were therefore entirely inapplicable. Sections 4 and 5 alone govern the eviction of unauthorised occupants from existing public premises, and those sections carry no power of demolition — they empower eviction only.

Mandatory Procedure Under Sections 4 and 5 and the Port's Failure to Follow It

The bench set out the two-stage procedure mandated by the 1971 Act before any eviction can take place. Under Section 4(1), the Estate Officer must issue a written notice calling upon the occupant to show cause why an eviction order should not be made, disclosing the grounds for the proposed order and inviting the occupant — and even any person merely claiming an interest in the premises — to appear with evidence and seek a personal hearing. Only at the second stage, under Section 5(1), may the Estate Officer pass an eviction order, and only after considering the cause shown, the evidence produced, and any personal hearing, recording reasons in writing. Even then, the occupant receives at minimum 15 days to vacate, extendable by a further 15 days for compelling reasons.

The bench found that the Port Authorities had not issued a single notice under Section 4 to any of the residents. Although the Port claimed that a general notice had been pasted near the premises, no proof of that claim was placed before the Single Judge or the Division Bench. The Port's own correspondence belied its contention that the buildings were vacant: a letter dated 22 May 2025 from the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Port Division, Kolkata, to the Chairman of the Kolkata Port Trust acknowledged 502 residential quarters, and a communication dated 21 May 2025 from the Officer-in-Charge of the West Port Police Station reiterated that the premises housed 8,000 residents.

The bench relied on Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata & Anr. v. Vijay Kumar Arya & Ors., reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 266, which had held that prior adjudication by an Estate Officer as to whether a person is in unauthorised occupation — including the question of physical occupation — is a prerequisite to any eviction order.

Power of Demolition and the Dilapidation Argument

The Port Authorities urged that the buildings were in a dangerous and dilapidated condition and needed immediate demolition for public safety. The bench held that even if that were true, it was not a ground available to the Port Authorities under the 1971 Act. The 1971 Act permits demolition only of unauthorised constructions under Sections 5-A, 5-B, and 5-C; it does not empower authorities to demolish their own structures on grounds of dilapidation. Any demolition on safety grounds would have to be initiated by the concerned municipal authorities under the applicable municipal statute, with prior notice as required by that statute. The SPMP is not a municipal authority and holds no such power under any statute.

The bench was unambiguous: “the impugned action of demolition undertaken by the Port Authorities is palpably illegal and de hors the law.”

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed M.A.T. No. 1072 of 2026 on contest. It set aside the Single Judge's judgment dated 30 June 2026, dismissed in W.P.A. No. 12272 of 2026, and allowed the writ petition to the extent of restraining the Port Authorities from undertaking any demolition or eviction drive in respect of the CDLB Quarters and CPT Quarters at Brooke Lane, Garden Reach, Kolkata.

The court clarified that the judgment does not prevent the Port Authorities from initiating proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1971 Act in respect of the subject properties, provided the mandatory procedure is followed. CAN 1 of 2026 was consequentially disposed of. Interim orders, if any, were vacated. No order was made as to costs.