Two Decades Apart, No Children: Calcutta HC Grants Divorce on Irretrievable Breakdown as Cruelty Under Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA

A Calcutta High Court Division Bench applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Rakesh Raman v Kavita to dissolve a marriage that had been separated for nearly twenty years, treating irretrievable breakdown as cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act.

A Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta on 23 July 2026 set aside a trial court decree dismissing a husband’s matrimonial suit and granted him a divorce from his wife under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The ground was not cruelty in the conventional sense, but irretrievable breakdown of marriage — a circumstance the Bench, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rakesh Raman v Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, held amounts to cruelty by both parties against each other. The parties had married on 28 January 2007, separated by 24 March 2007, and had not resumed conjugal life in nearly two decades. Mediation also failed. The Bench rejected the husband’s alternative grounds of nullity, desertion, and psychiatric disorder of the wife, but found the sheer irreversibility of the estrangement sufficient.

The Suit and Its Dismissal by the Trial Court

The husband filed Matrimonial Suit No. 40 of 2007 before the Additional District Judge, Tenth Court at Alipore, District South 24 Parganas, on 13 April 2007 — less than three months after the wedding. He sought, first, a declaration that the marriage was a nullity for non-consummation, and alternatively, divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion.

The trial court dismissed the suit on 13 April 2022 — fifteen years after it was filed. The husband appealed by way of FAT 234 of 2022 before the High Court’s Civil Appellate Division.

Before the Division Bench, Mr. Chittaranjan Panda appeared for the appellant/husband. Mr. Suranjan Mandal appeared for the respondent/wife. The matter was heard on 16 July 2026 and 23 July 2026.

The Husband’s Three Lines of Attack

The appellant pressed three distinct arguments. The first was non-consummation, said to be due to the wife’s wilful refusal. The second was the wife’s alleged psychiatric disorder, evidenced by medical prescriptions that the trial court had declined to exhibit. The third, and primary, was irretrievable breakdown of marriage for nearly twenty years.

On the secondary evidence point, the husband argued that his inability to produce the originals of the wife’s medical prescriptions — because they were not in his possession — should have entitled him to adduce the photocopies as secondary evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Bench was asked to receive those documents as additional evidence on appeal.

Why the Wife’s Cross-Examination Defeated the Nullity Claim

The respondent’s counsel pointed to a specific exchange during cross-examination of the appellant as PW1 on 25 June 2015. The husband admitted: “it is not a fact that the marriage was not consummated.” Counsel for the wife argued that the double negative in that admission amounted to an acknowledgment that consummation had occurred.

The Division Bench accepted this. It held that the ground of nullity had not been established at all; the husband’s own deposition pointed the other way. The Bench also held that the suit had been filed within the statutory moratorium period applicable to desertion, which independently defeated that ground.

On cruelty, the Bench agreed with the trial court that the husband had produced no corroborative evidence. The cross-examination of PW1 on 19 July 2016 further revealed that the husband admitted, using another double negative, that mental and physical torture was inflicted on the wife by the husband and his family — which the Bench found effectively nullified the cruelty allegation against the wife.

Secondary Evidence: No Foundation, No Relevance

The Bench examined the photocopies of the wife’s medical prescriptions and refused to permit them as additional evidence on appeal. It found two independent reasons.

First, there was no foundational evidence from the husband establishing that the originals existed and were not in his power to produce, which is the prerequisite under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(aa) of the Code before secondary evidence can be justified.

Second, and separately, even if the documents were admitted, they would not help the husband. The Bench perused the photocopies and found that at least one prescription, dated 24 March 2007, showed the treating doctor had diagnosed the wife with anxiety and disturbed sleep. The Bench observed that such conditions “afflict more than half of the population and cannot be construed to be a psychiatric disorder as such.” There was no corroborative evidence of the effect of the medicines prescribed or the precise ailments. The documents were, in the Bench’s view, irrelevant to the question of whether the wife suffered from any disorder that could ground a divorce decree.

Applying Rakesh Raman: Irretrievable Breakdown as Cruelty

Having disposed of every conventional ground, the Bench turned to the one argument it accepted. The husband relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rakesh Raman v Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, which the Bench described as establishing, for the first time in Indian matrimonial law, that irretrievable breakdown of marriage, though not a statutory ground for divorce, amounts to cruelty within Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Bench quoted paragraphs 22 and 23 of Rakesh Raman at length. In those paragraphs, the Supreme Court had reasoned that “a marital relationship which has only become more bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing but inflict cruelty on both the sides” and that keeping alive the facade of such a marriage would do injustice to both parties.

The Bench added its own reasoning grounded in Article 141 of the Constitution of India: law laid down by the Supreme Court, and propositions of law set forth in its judgments, have the same efficacy as statutory legislation and bind all courts in India. Rakesh Raman was therefore not merely persuasive authority; it was binding on the Division Bench.

The husband had also cited an unreported judgment, Nayan Bhowmick v Aparna Chakraborty (Civil Appeal No. 5167 of 2012). The Bench distinguished it. It found, from paragraph 35 of that judgment, that the Supreme Court had granted divorce by exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice — a power unavailable to High Courts or District Courts. Nayan Bhowmick was accordingly not a binding precedent but an exercise of Article 142 jurisdiction specific to the Supreme Court.

Facts That Sealed the Irretrievable Breakdown Finding

The Bench applied the Rakesh Raman ratio to the facts before it. The parties lived together as spouses for approximately two months after the January 2007 wedding. They separated by 24 March 2007. In the nearly two decades since, neither party made any attempt to resume conjugal life. The Bench found that animus revertendi — the intention to return to the matrimonial home — was entirely absent on both sides.

Mediation had been attempted. A mediator’s report dated 4 December 2025 confirmed that the parties were not willing to settle their disputes. The wife’s counsel argued before the High Court that the wife was still willing to resume conjugal life. The Bench did not accept that this changed the character of the marriage, given the complete absence of any step toward reconciliation over twenty years and the failed mediation.

The Bench also noted that there were no children of the marriage. Balancing these circumstances, it held that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, bringing it squarely within the Rakesh Raman ratio. Sustaining the marriage further would, as that judgment had held, operate as cruelty by both parties against each other.

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed FAT 234 of 2022 on contest. It set aside the judgment and decree dated 30 April 2022 passed by the Additional District Judge, Tenth Court at Alipore, in Matrimonial Suit No. 40 of 2007, and decreed the suit. A divorce was granted in favour of the husband against the wife on the ground of cruelty arising out of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

All interim orders, if any, were vacated. No costs were awarded.

The Bench made clear that nothing in the judgment would bar the wife from filing an application for permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the jurisdictional trial court. If filed, the trial court was directed to adjudicate the application on its own merits after giving both parties adequate opportunity to file pleadings and furnish materials.

Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya authored the judgment. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya recorded his agreement.