Tenancy Inherited After 1997 Act Attracts Five-Year Cap Under Section 2(g), Rules Calcutta High Court

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissed an eviction appeal, holding that tenancy rights accruing after the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 came into force attract Section 2(g)'s five-year moratorium, and post-death rent receipts alone cannot create a fresh tenancy.

The Calcutta High Court, in a judgment delivered on 13 August 2026, dismissed a first appeal by a defendant-tenant seeking to resist eviction from premises his family had occupied since 1910. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, leading the Division Bench with Justice Sandip Kumar De, affirmed the eviction decree passed by the Sixth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta on 29 June 2024 in Title Suit No. 97 of 2016. The Bench held that because the appellant's own tenancy right accrued only in 2009—after his father Tapan's death and well after the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 came into force—Section 2(g) of that Act applied in full, extinguishing his tenancy five years after that date. The decision also resolves which court has jurisdiction over eviction suits where the occupant is no longer a “tenant” within the meaning of the 1997 Act.

Three Generations, One Disputed Tenancy

The suit premises were let to one Hemanta, the appellant's grandfather, in 1910. On Hemanta's death, tenancy passed to Tapan, the appellant's father. On Tapan's death in 2009, the appellant Srikanta Paul claimed to have inherited the tenancy as Tapan's son. Throughout the successive tenancies, rent receipts were issued in the name of whichever sole proprietorship the successive tenants operated.

The respondents—Purshottam Lal Sanganeria (HUF), represented by its Karta—sued for eviction before the City Civil Court, relying on Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. Section 2(g) limits the tenancy that devolves on a specified heir to a period of five years from the death of the original tenant. The City Civil Court passed a decree of eviction. Srikanta Paul challenged that decree before the Division Bench in FA No. 204 of 2024.

Three Grounds of Challenge

The appellant, represented by senior counsel Mr. Debnath Ghosh, pressed three distinct arguments. First, that the City Civil Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Second, that Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act could not apply retrospectively to extinguish tenancy rights that accrued in his predecessors' favour before the Act came into force. Third, that the issuance of rent receipts in the appellant's name even after Tapan's death constituted an independent acknowledgment of his tenancy by the landlords.

Mr. Rahul Karmakar appeared for the respondents and opposed each ground.

Jurisdiction: City Civil Court or Small Causes Court?

Senior counsel for the appellant invoked Section 12A of the 1997 Act, which bars any court other than those listed in Schedule IV from entertaining a landlord-tenant eviction suit under the Act. Schedule IV channels suits valued above ten lakh rupees to the High Court, suits valued between sixty thousand and ten lakh rupees to the City Civil Court, and all remaining suits to the Chief Judge of the Presidency Small Causes Court under the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882. The suit here was valued at Rs. 4,391 (twelve months' last paid rent) plus nominal amounts for damages and injunction—well below the City Civil Court threshold—so, it was argued, the Small Causes Court alone had jurisdiction.

The respondents countered that Schedule IV and Section 12A apply only to suits by a landlord against a “tenant” under the 1997 Act. Because Section 2(g) had already rendered the appellant a non-tenant, the suit was one for eviction of a trespasser or a tenant at sufferance—not a tenant—and Section 12A was not attracted. Since Section 19 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 excludes suits for recovery of immovable property from the Small Causes Court's jurisdiction, the City Civil Court was the proper forum.

The Bench accepted the respondents' position. The language of Section 12A is specific: it covers a suit “by a landlord against a tenant.” As per the frame of the suit itself, the plaintiffs had categorically pleaded that by operation of Section 2(g), the appellant had ceased to be a tenant. The Bench noted that whether the appellant was a trespasser or a tenant at sufferance was beside the point—what mattered was that he was not a “tenant” within Section 2(g). The statutory jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court under Schedule IV(c) read with Section 12A was therefore not attracted. The City Civil Court had subject-matter jurisdiction.

On the trespasser-versus-tenant-at-sufferance distinction, the appellant had cited the coordinate Bench ruling in Nellimarla Jute Mills Company Ltd. v. Rampuria Industries & Investments Ltd., (2000) 2 Cal LJ 70, affirmed by the Supreme Court at (2004) 13 SCC 448, for the proposition that a person who originally held title cannot be called a trespasser. The Bench acknowledged the principle but held it was immaterial here: the question under Section 12A was not the label attached to the occupant but whether he was a “tenant” as defined in the Act, and on the case as framed, he was not.

Retrospectivity of Section 2(g): Distinguishing Rajesh Mitra

The appellant's second argument drew on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rajesh Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., (2024) SCC Online SC 2607. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that the 1997 Act could not retrospectively extinguish tenancy rights that had already accrued in the appellants' favour—specifically because the tenancy had devolved on them, together with their mother, under the predecessor statute (the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956) before the 1997 Act was enacted.

The Division Bench read Rajesh Mitra carefully and found it distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the original tenant had died in 1970. Under Section 2(h) of the 1956 Act, tenancy devolved on his widow and children who ordinarily resided with him—an event that occurred long before 1997. The Supreme Court in Rajesh Mitra had also observed, in paragraph 12 of its judgment, that where the original tenant dies after the commencement of the 1997 Act, the position is clear: the specified heirs get only five years of protection.

Applying that rider to the present facts, the Bench found that the appellant's grandfather had become a tenant in 1910, and his father Tapan had inherited the tenancy before 1997. But the appellant himself inherited nothing until Tapan died in 2009—after the 1997 Act was in force. The accrual of the appellant's own tenancy right therefore fell squarely within the post-1997 scenario described in paragraph 12 of Rajesh Mitra.

The Bench was direct: for purposes of the appellant's claim, Tapan was to be treated as the original tenant. Since Tapan died after the 1997 Act's enactment, Section 2(g) applied in full to the tenancy that devolved on the appellant. The five-year moratorium ran from 2009 and expired thereafter, extinguishing the appellant's tenancy by operation of law.

The Bench added that any contrary reading would render Section 2(g) “otiose”—because an argument that each successive heir inherits the accrued rights of all prior tenants without fresh limitation would allow indefinite succession regardless of when death occurs.

Rent Receipts Issued After Tapan's Death

The third ground rested on rent receipts issued by the respondents in the name of the appellant's sole proprietorship after Tapan's death. The appellant argued this amounted to an independent recognition of his tenancy.

The respondents relied on an unreported coordinate Bench ruling, Bela Rani Goswami v. Alok Roy Chowdhury (FA 34 of 2012), which held that mere acceptance of rent after the expiry of a tenancy does not automatically create a fresh tenancy. Creation of a new tenancy requires evidence of an intention and consent on the landlord's part to establish one.

The Bench agreed. To establish novation or a fresh tenancy, the appellant had to show positive evidence of the respondents' intention to create a new tenancy on the premise that the earlier tenancy had ceased. The Bench found no such evidence. Beyond that, all the rent receipts issued after Tapan's death were issued within the five-year moratorium period that Section 2(g) itself contemplates. The last receipt was for October 2010, after which the appellant began depositing rent with the Rent Controller. Receipts issued during the moratorium reflect nothing more than what the statute already permitted: the appellant remained a tenant during those five years. They could not be read as a fresh grant of tenancy rights beyond the moratorium.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed FA No. 204 of 2024 on contest and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 29 June 2024 passed by the Sixth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 97 of 2016. All three grounds of challenge were decided against the appellant. Interim orders, if any, were vacated. No order as to costs was made. The trial court records were directed to be sent down immediately.