Sonography Alone Cannot Trigger POCSO Reporting Duty, Chhattisgarh HC Quashes Case Against Radiologist
The High Court of Chhattisgarh quashed POCSO Section 21 proceedings against a radiologist, holding that conducting a routine sonography cannot substitute for the statutory knowledge requirement under Section 19.
A Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, led by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, has quashed criminal proceedings launched under Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against Dr. Aarti Uike (Vaskle), a radiologist practising in Rajnandgaon. The court found that neither the FIR, nor the witness statements, nor the supplementary charge-sheet disclosed any material showing that the doctor had knowledge of a sexual offence being committed against the minor victim when she performed the sonography. Without that foundational fact, the court held, the POCSO reporting obligation under Section 19 is simply not triggered, and Section 21 cannot follow.
The Allegation Against the Radiologist
According to the prosecution case, a written complaint was lodged on 31 December 2025 by the mother of a 15-year-old victim before Police Chowki Chichola, District Rajnandgaon. A Zero FIR was registered and transmitted to Police Station Bortalav for investigation, resulting in Crime No.01/2026, FIR dated 1 January 2026.
The victim had complained of vomiting in March 2025 and was treated locally. In September 2025, when she complained of abdominal movement, she was taken to a doctor at Pathri, where it emerged that she was carrying a pregnancy of approximately eight months. The victim then allegedly disclosed that a minor schoolmate had established physical relations with her without her consent on 12 February 2025 during a family function. She was taken to Rajnandgaon for sonography and later gave birth to a male child at Krishna Hospital. The prosecution also alleged that the newborn was given in adoption at the instance of certain co-accused persons.
The FIR was initially registered only against the juvenile accused for offences under Section 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, and a separate charge-sheet was filed before the Juvenile Justice Board. Dr. Uike was drawn into the case only during the course of investigation. A supplementary charge-sheet, Charge-sheet No.08-A/2026 dated 10 March 2026, was filed implicating her and several others, attributing to her an offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act on the sole ground that she had conducted the sonography of the victim without reporting the matter to the police.
Dr. Uike was arrested on 8 March 2026 for the alleged offence, which is a bailable one, and was subsequently released on bail. The Additional Sessions Judge, Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon, took cognizance against her by order dated 11 March 2026 in Special Sessions Case No.07/2026. She then filed CRMP No.947 of 2026 under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — the provision corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — seeking to quash the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings.
The Statutory Framework: Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act
The bench read Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act together before analysing the facts. Section 19 casts a statutory obligation on any person, including a medical practitioner, to report the commission of an offence under the Act — but only when that person has knowledge that an offence has been committed or has an apprehension that such an offence is likely to be committed. Section 21 provides the penal consequence for failure to discharge that obligation.
The court stated plainly that the existence of knowledge or apprehension is the foundational requirement. If Section 19 is not attracted, Section 21 cannot be invoked. The two provisions are not independent; Section 21 is purely consequential.
The petitioner's counsel placed reliance on the Supreme Court's judgment in Sr. Tessy Jose v. State of Kerala, AIR 2018 SC 4654, which had interpreted the same two provisions and held that the obligation to report arises only when the person has knowledge of the commission of an offence, and that Section 21 cannot be invoked mechanically against persons discharging professional duties in the absence of that foundational knowledge.
The State opposed the petition, arguing that the victim was a minor found carrying an advanced pregnancy and that a qualified medical professional who conducted the sonography was necessarily under a statutory obligation to report. The State submitted that whether the petitioner had the requisite knowledge was a disputed question of fact to be decided at trial, and that the court exercising inherent jurisdiction should not conduct a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage.
How the Bench Reasoned
The bench acknowledged the general rule that inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is to be exercised sparingly. It also accepted that at the quashing stage the court does not weigh evidence or conduct a mini-trial. However, the court found that the question before it was not one of weighing disputed evidence — it was whether the charge-sheet and investigation material, taken at face value, disclosed the ingredients of any offence at all.
On that question, the court found the prosecution material conspicuously wanting. Neither the FIR, nor the witness statements recorded during investigation, nor the supplementary charge-sheet contained any allegation that the victim had informed Dr. Uike of the sexual assault, or that the doctor had otherwise come to know that an offence under the POCSO Act had been committed. There was no allegation that she had participated in the commission of the offence, facilitated it, or sought to shield the principal accused.
The bench held that the mere act of conducting a diagnostic sonography in the ordinary course of professional duties, without anything more, cannot automatically lead to an inference that the medical practitioner had knowledge of the commission of a POCSO offence. The court stated that criminal liability cannot be fastened on surmises or assumptions in the absence of the statutory prerequisites. The charge-sheet was, in the court's words, “conspicuously silent as to any circumstance from which such knowledge can reasonably be inferred.”
The bench applied the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, under which inherent jurisdiction may be exercised where uncontroverted allegations do not prima facie disclose the commission of any offence or where continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the court. It also referred to R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, which collectively affirm that the High Court's inherent power exists precisely to prevent proceedings that disclose no cognisable offence from proceeding to trial.
The court also noted that Dr. Uike had complied with the requirements under the PC-PNDT Act and its rules, including forwarding the requisite Form ‘F’ to the competent authority. This compliance, while not directly determinative of the POCSO question, was part of the broader picture indicating professional conduct in the ordinary course of duties.
The court was clear that the present petitioner's case “squarely falls within the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal” and that permitting the prosecution to continue in the absence of any prima facie material satisfying the ingredients of Sections 19 and 21 would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.
Outcome
The Division Bench allowed CRMP No.947 of 2026 on 21 July 2026. It quashed the order dated 11 March 2026 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dongargarh, taking cognizance against Dr. Uike; Supplementary Charge-sheet No.08-A/2026 dated 10 March 2026, insofar as it relates to the petitioner for the offence under Section 21 of the POCSO Act; and all consequential criminal proceedings in Special Sessions Case No.07/2026 arising therefrom. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. No order as to costs was made.
The bench expressly clarified that its observations are confined to Dr. Uike alone and shall not affect the merits of the prosecution against the remaining accused persons, which will be decided independently on the basis of evidence adduced before the trial court.