Chhattisgarh HC Refuses to Quash FIR Against 20-Year-Old Over Instagram Post Allegedly Insulting Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
A Division Bench led by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha dismissed a petition seeking to quash an FIR, charge-sheet, and cognizance order in a SC/ST Act case arising from a social media post, holding that disputed questions of fact must go to trial.
The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur has declined to quash the FIR, charge-sheet, cognizance order, and charge-framing order arising out of an Instagram post that allegedly carried derogatory remarks against Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. A Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, deciding CRMP No. 2017 of 2026 on 3 August 2026, found that the allegations in the charge-sheet prima facie disclosed cognisable offences and that the petitioner’s objections — going to the admissibility of electronic evidence, chain of custody, witness credibility, and the context of the remarks — were all disputed questions of fact that could only be adjudicated at trial.
The Proceedings Before the Special Court
On 19 April 2026, Dhananjay Sahu alias Jai Sahu, described in the charge-sheet as a social activist, lodged a written complaint at Police Station Bhilai Nagar, District Durg. He alleged that Anamika Upadhyay, a 20-year-old resident of Housing Board Colony, Jawahar Nagar, Bhilai, had posted objectionable and derogatory remarks against Dr. B.R. Ambedkar through her Instagram account under the username “anamika-upadhyay”.
Crime No. 189/2026 was registered initially for offences under Sections 299, 296, 352, and 353(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. During investigation, the statements of the complainant and other witnesses led to the addition of offences under Sections 3(1) and 3(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Upadhyay was apprehended on 19 April 2026 itself; her mobile phone was seized and forwarded to the Cyber Forensic Laboratory.
Before the final charge-sheet was filed as Final Report No. 172/2026, the investigating agency further opined that the post had the potential to promote enmity and social disharmony on the basis of caste and religion, resulting in the addition of Sections 196(1)(b) and 197(1)(a) of the BNS, 2023. The Special Judge, SC/ST (Atrocities) Act, Durg, took cognizance on 2 July 2026 and framed charges on 3 July 2026 in Special Criminal Case No. 09/2026.
What the Petitioner Sought to Quash
Upadhyay moved the High Court through CRMP No. 2017 of 2026, praying for the quashing of FIR No. 189/2026, Charge Sheet No. 172/2026, the cognizance order dated 2 July 2026, and the charge-framing order dated 3 July 2026. The charges framed against her span Sections 296, 299, 352, 353(1)(c), 196(1)(b), and 197(1)(a) of the BNS, 2023, along with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
Mr. Anand Mohan Tiwari, counsel for the petitioner, advanced arguments on multiple fronts. On the SC/ST Act charges, he submitted that the complainant belongs to the Other Backward Class and not to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, that neither the transcript nor any independent material contains the caste-specific expressions attributed to the petitioner, and that the only witness attributing such words to her is an office-bearer of the same organisation as the complainant. He also argued that the remarks, even if made, were in response to a provocative question and were directed at the conduct of the questioner rather than as an intentional insult against any SC/ST community member.
On the BNS offences, counsel argued that the alleged remarks do not satisfy the legal ingredients of obscenity under Section 296, lack the deliberate or malicious intention required under Section 299, and that Sections 352, 353, 196, and 197 had been added on the same allegations without any independent factual foundation.
A separate attack targeted the cognizance order itself. Counsel contended that the Special Court had merely recorded that cognizance was taken under the “SC/ST Act” without specifying the exact statutory provisions, demonstrating non-application of mind under Section 210 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
Challenges to the Electronic Evidence
The petitioner mounted a pointed challenge to the electronic evidence underpinning the prosecution. Counsel submitted that the original electronic devices were never seized by the police; the pen drive containing the alleged video was prepared by the complainant himself. The certificate under Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam was issued by the complainant rather than by an independent or competent authority. The seizure memo recorded a 16 GB pen drive whereas the Cyber Forensic Laboratory received a 128 GB device — a discrepancy that, counsel argued, broke the chain of custody entirely. Further, the charge-sheet admitted that the forensic examination report was still awaited when investigation was concluded and cognizance sought.
Additional procedural irregularities were pressed: contradictory dates in witness statements, statements recorded before notices were issued, the arrest checklist prepared after the arrest, and an incorrect address in the arrest memo. Counsel argued these were not mere technical defects but substantial defects striking at the root of the prosecution case.
The State’s Position
Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate for the respondents, opposed the petition and supported both the cognizance order and the continuation of the criminal proceedings. He submitted that the material collected during investigation — the complaint, witness statements, the seized mobile phone, the electronic evidence, and other documents — prima facie disclosed the commission of cognisable offences.
On the evidentiary challenges, the State argued that questions of admissibility, chain of custody, forensic examination, and witness credibility are all disputed questions of fact that can only be examined at trial. The State further submitted that any omission or deficiency in the wording of the cognizance order does not invalidate proceedings when the order was passed on the basis of the police report and accompanying material. A petition for quashing, the State contended, was not the stage for a premature evaluation of prosecution evidence.
The Division Bench’s Reasoning
Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, writing for the Division Bench, set out the governing legal position: the jurisdiction to quash an FIR or charge-sheet is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. Where allegations, taken at face value and accepted in entirety, disclose the ingredients of an offence, quashing is not warranted. The Bench drew on three Supreme Court decisions — Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill (1995), Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi (1999), and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. (2000) — for the proposition that courts should not quash complaints where a prima facie case disclosing the ingredients of an offence is made out, but should not hesitate to quash where allegations are patently absurd and improbable.
The Bench relied on Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, where the Supreme Court held that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the BNSS) cannot enquire into the reliability or genuineness of FIR allegations, appreciate evidence, or conduct a mini-trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at face value, disclose a cognisable offence.
Most recently, the Bench noted Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 2 September 2025), where the Supreme Court reiterated that a High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of material collected during investigation while exercising power under Section 528 of the BNSS.
Applying these principles, the Bench found that the allegations in the complaint, witness statements, and investigation material, taken at face value, prima facie disclose cognisable offences for which the charge-sheet was filed. Every ground pressed by the petitioner — context of the remarks, absence of intention to insult SC/ST persons, caste identity of the complainant, the transcript not containing caste-specific expressions, inadmissibility of electronic evidence, discrepancy in the pen drive, broken chain of custody, and procedural irregularities — involved disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. Such questions could not be examined under Section 528 of the BNSS.
On the attack to the cognizance order, the Bench held that the order had been passed on the basis of the police report under Section 193 of the BNSS along with the charge-sheet and investigation material, which specifically mentioned the offences alleged. The fact that the cognizance order did not reproduce the exact statutory provisions of the SC/ST Act would not by itself render it illegal or vitiate the proceedings, especially when no prejudice to the petitioner had been demonstrated.
The Bench concluded that the allegations could not, at this stage, be said to be so absurd, inherently improbable, or legally untenable as to justify quashing.
Order
CRMP No. 2017 of 2026 was dismissed as devoid of merit. The charge-sheet, FIR No. 189/2026, the cognizance order dated 2 July 2026, and the charge-framing order dated 3 July 2026 all survive. Special Criminal Case No. 09/2026 before the Special Judge, SC/ST (Atrocities) Act, Durg, will proceed to trial.