Chhattisgarh HC Sets Aside CBI's Phone Interception Order in Medical College Bribery Case, Finds Retrospective Authorisation Legally Unsustainable
The High Court of Chhattisgarh struck down a CBI phone-tap authorisation for covering a period 27 days before the original order existed, while allowing the broader prosecution to continue on independent evidence.
A Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, led by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, has set aside the interception authorisation dated 28 June 2025 issued by the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, the consequential Ministry of Home Affairs confirmation order dated 4 July 2025, and the Review Committee proceedings dated 15 September 2025 — all relating to the tapping of the mobile telephone of Shri Ravi Shankar Ji Maharaj, chairman of Shri Rawatpura Sarkar Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Raipur. The court found that the MHA confirmation order purported to cover interception from 1 June 2025, twenty-seven days before the original authorisation even came into existence, an irreconcilable defect the respondents could not cure. The FIR, chargesheet and pending trial before the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur, were not disturbed.
The CBI Case and the Petitioner's Position
On 30 June 2025 the CBI registered FIR No. RC 2182025A0014 at CBI/AC-III, New Delhi. The FIR alleged a large-scale conspiracy involving Ministry of Health and Family Welfare officials, National Medical Commission members, intermediaries and private medical colleges for leaking inspection details, securing favourable reports through bribes, deploying ghost faculty and fake patients, and manipulating the Aadhaar-based Biometric Attendance System. Thirty-five institutions across the country were named. The petitioner figured as accused A-04.
CBI also filed Chargesheet No. 18/2025 on 28 August 2025. The Special Judge, Raipur, issued a summoning order on 25 February 2026 in Criminal Case No. CBI/11/2025. Offences alleged included Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with Sections 7, 7A, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018), and Sections 66 and 72-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
The petitioner filed CRMP No. 1504 of 2026 under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to quash the FIR, chargesheet, summoning order and the entire criminal case. His case was substantially founded on the allegation that the interception of his telephonic conversations — the principal basis of the prosecution case — was legally unsustainable. By the time of the final hearing, Senior Advocate Mr. Manu Sharma, for the petitioner, narrowed the relief. The petitioner stated he was willing to face trial on other evidence and pressed only for the interception orders to be set aside.
The Specific Illegality: A Confirmation Order That Pre-dated Its Own Authorisation
The interception authorisation bearing No. SU/DLI/TS(84)/2023-1 was issued by the Director, CBI, on 28 June 2025 under sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Telecommunications (Procedure and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024, read with Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023. The order directed interception of telephone number 99819-97615 for a period not exceeding seven working days, on the stated ground that obtaining prior permission of the Competent Authority was not feasible.
Because the petitioner had not initially challenged this authorisation, he filed I.A. No. 07/2026 on 12 June 2026 seeking permission to raise additional grounds. The court directed the CBI to file an affidavit of the Competent Authority addressing compliance with Rule 3(3)(b) of the Rules of 2024. On 14 July 2026, CBI's Standing Counsel disclosed that the interception order had been placed before the MHA within seven working days, the MHA confirmed it on 4 July 2025 for a period not exceeding sixty days from 28 June 2025, but counsel was unaware whether the Review Committee had further approved it.
The court then directed impleadment of the Ministry of Home Affairs as Respondent No. 2. On 22 July 2026 the Deputy Solicitor General submitted that the Department of Telecommunications could better answer the query, leading to impleadment of the Secretary, Department of Telecommunications, as Respondent No. 3, with directions to file a personal affidavit.
That affidavit, filed pursuant to the court's order, contained the decisive disclosure: the “specific interception order dated 4.7.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Central Bureau of Investigation pertains to the duration from 1.6.2025 to 31.7.2025.” The affidavit further disclosed that the Review Committee, in its meeting of 15 September 2025, reviewed interception orders issued by MHA for the period 1 June 2025 to 31 July 2025 and concluded that the order relating to CBI was in accordance with Section 20(2)(a) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and did not merit intervention.
The petitioner's senior counsel argued that this affidavit exposed an incurable jurisdictional defect: if the original authorisation was issued for the first time only on 28 June 2025, the MHA confirmation could not validly cover a period commencing 1 June 2025 — twenty-seven days before the authorisation existed. The Union of India sought to explain the discrepancy as referring to an administrative review cycle rather than retrospective authorisation, contending that no interception of the petitioner's communications occurred before 28 June 2025.
How the Bench Reasoned
Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, writing for the Division Bench, began by reaffirming that telephone interception is an exception to the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. Invoking Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 128, People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, and the Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the court held that surveillance powers are constitutionally sustainable only when exercised in strict conformity with law.
The bench extracted Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 at length. It held that under PUCL, occurrence of a public emergency or the existence of a public safety interest are the sine qua non before any interception order can be made. These are not procedural formalities but jurisdictional facts. Only once those preconditions exist may the competent authority move to consider whether interception is necessary in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, or for preventing incitement to an offence.
Examining the actual interception order dated 28 June 2025, the court found it mechanically reproduced all five stated grounds without identifying any specific reason applicable to the petitioner's case. The order referred to “public order and for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence” but recorded no satisfaction as to the occurrence of a public emergency or existence of a public safety interest. The bench held this showed absence of application of mind and non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 5(2).
The bench then addressed the three reasons for rejecting the Union of India's explanation that the period 1 June 2025 to 31 July 2025 was merely an administrative review cycle. First, the affidavit was filed by the highest administrative authority in the Department pursuant to a specific judicial direction; it was neither tentative nor qualified, and its language admitted of no ambiguity. Second, the respondents had consistently maintained that the original authorisation came into existence only on 28 June 2025; the confirmatory order under Rule 3(3)(b) of the Rules of 2024 is confirmatory in character and cannot create jurisdiction retrospectively. Third, the statutory architecture itself negatives retrospective validation: the existence of a lawful authorisation by the Competent Authority is a jurisdictional fact, and without it, neither the MHA nor the Review Committee can validate interception for an anterior period.
On the Review Committee proceedings of 15 September 2025, the court held that the Committee's function is supervisory. It examines whether the order conforms to statutory requirements. It cannot validate an order suffering from a foundational jurisdictional defect, and its endorsement cannot confer legality upon an otherwise invalid exercise of power.
The court applied the principle from State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 — that where law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner alone or not at all — holding that the procedural safeguards in the Rules of 2024 perform the same constitutional function as Rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules and are mandatory, not directory.
The bench also addressed the CBI's reliance on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, and CBI v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686, to argue that admissibility questions belong to the trial court. The court distinguished those cases: the issue before it was not appreciation of evidence but the legality of executive action authorising interception. Judicial review of administrative action affecting fundamental rights operates on a different footing from quashing criminal proceedings on disputed facts.
Severability: Trial to Proceed on Independent Evidence
The bench found substance in the CBI's submission that the investigation was not founded exclusively upon intercepted conversations. The prosecution had collected documentary evidence, electronic records, financial material and witness statements. The petitioner's own senior counsel had stated the petitioner was prepared to face trial on such independent material.
The court held that setting aside the interception orders did not automatically collapse the prosecution or warrant quashing the FIR and chargesheet. The effect of the declaration was confined to the legality of the interception process and material derived from it. The Special Judge was to proceed on all other legally admissible evidence, uninfluenced by any observation in the judgment except to the extent of the declaration on interception.
The bench described this approach as preserving both competing constitutional values: ensuring procedural safeguards protecting the right to privacy are not diluted by permitting retrospectively defective authorisations, while equally ensuring a prosecution supported by independent admissible evidence is not terminated merely because one part of the investigation is legally unsustainable.
Order
The Division Bench, by its order dated 3 August 2026, disposed of CRMP No. 1504 of 2026 with the following directions:
The challenge to the interception proceedings was allowed. The interception authorisation dated 28 June 2025 issued by the Competent Authority under Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, the consequential confirmation/interception order dated 4 July 2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the decision/proceedings of the Review Committee dated 15 September 2025 — insofar as they relate to the petitioner — were set aside. The court further directed that copies of intercepted messages pursuant to the said orders shall be destroyed, if there is no legal impediment.
The prayer for quashing FIR No. RC 2182025A0014, Chargesheet No. 18/2025, the summoning order dated 25 February 2026 and the pending criminal proceedings was declined.
The Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur, was directed to proceed with the trial strictly in accordance with law on the basis of remaining legally admissible material, uninfluenced by the interception proceedings set aside by the judgment. The trial court retains full power to determine the admissibility, relevance and evidentiary value of every item of evidence in accordance with the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and other applicable law.
The petitioner was directed to appear before the trial court on all dates fixed, cooperate in expeditious conduct of proceedings, and refrain from seeking unnecessary adjournments. No order was made as to costs.