Chhattisgarh HC Quashes Teacher's Dismissal for Skipping Departmental Enquiry Under Article 311

The High Court of Chhattisgarh held that invoking Article 311(2)(b) to bypass a departmental enquiry requires written reasons, not bare satisfaction, before dismissal.

The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur has quashed the dismissal of a government school teacher, holding that the competent authority dismissed him without conducting a departmental enquiry and without recording any written reasons to justify dispensing with that enquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, sitting singly, allowed the writ petition filed by Kamlesh Kumar Sahu, a teacher posted at Government Middle School, Godaiya, Block Bilha, District Bilaspur. The court found that the order dated 7 February 2025 was passed without due application of mind, in violation of Article 311(2) and Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The authority was left at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with the constitutional and statutory procedure.

The Dismissal and the Challenge Before the Court

Kamlesh Kumar Sahu, aged about 47 years and a resident of Amrish Vihar, Ameri, Bilaspur, was dismissed from service by an order dated 7 February 2025. The allegation against him was that he had sent an objectionable WhatsApp message and made a video call to a girl student.

The dismissal was passed under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which governs major penalties. Sahu moved the High Court seeking quashment of that order, reinstatement with all consequential service benefits, and a direction to the respondents to decide a pending representation he had submitted on 25 February 2025.

His counsel, Mr. Ashutosh Trivedi, argued that the order had been passed without issuing a show cause notice, without conducting any departmental enquiry, and without affording any opportunity of hearing. He characterised the dismissal as stigmatic in nature — one that had seriously prejudiced Sahu's career and future prospects — and contended it was arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable.

The State, represented by Ms. Apurva Nigam, Panel Lawyer, opposed the petition. She submitted that the petitioner had been dismissed on account of the serious nature of the misconduct alleged against him, and that the competent authority had exercised powers under Rule 10 after considering the material on record. The State argued that the order suffered from no illegality warranting judicial interference.

The Constitutional Requirement the Authority Ignored

Article 311(2) of the Constitution provides that no person holding a civil post shall be dismissed or removed except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The provision permits dispensing with such an inquiry in three specific situations. The one relevant here — Article 311(2)(b) — applies where the authority empowered to dismiss is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, provided the reasons for that satisfaction are recorded in writing.

Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966 prescribes the detailed procedure for departmental enquiries before a major penalty under Rule 10 is imposed. The court found that no such enquiry had been conducted in Sahu's case and that no reasons had been recorded in writing to justify bypassing that procedure.

The State had sought to bring the case within Article 311(2)(b), but the court held that this exception cannot be invoked by mere satisfaction alone. The authority is required to record the reasons in writing, and those recorded reasons are themselves subject to judicial review: they must be strong, cogent and relevant.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Bibhu Datta Guru drew on a line of Constitution Bench and Supreme Court decisions to anchor the ruling.

From the Constitution Bench decision in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, AIR 1978 SC 851, the court quoted the proposition that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons by way of affidavit or otherwise.

From the Constitution Bench ruling in Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, the court extracted the principle that a disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry “lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives.” That decision further held that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty, and that a vague reason or a mere repetition of the language of clause (b) does not satisfy the constitutional obligation. An order dispensing with the inquiry without a written reason, and the penalty order that follows, are both void and unconstitutional.

The court also referred to Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 362, which held that the decision to dispense with a departmental enquiry cannot rest solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the authority is questioned before a court, those supporting the order must show that the satisfaction was based on objective facts and not on the whim or caprice of the officer.

In Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, (2006) 13 SCC 581, the Supreme Court had similarly observed that subjective satisfaction must be backed by objective criteria, and that the purported reason for dispensing with the departmental proceedings must be supported by some material.

The Tulsiram Patel decision had also been referred to with approval in Southern Railway Officers Association and Another v. Union of India and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 24, which the court noted as well.

Applying these principles, the court found that the impugned order dated 7 February 2025 recorded no reasons at all for dispensing with the enquiry required under Rule 14 of the Rules, 1966. Since there was no reason recorded to invoke the exception, the decision was contrary to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The court declined to express any opinion on the underlying allegations, since no enquiry had been held in respect of them.

Order

The writ petition was allowed. The dismissal order dated 7 February 2025 was quashed. On the request of counsel for the respondent authorities, the court reserved liberty to the empowered authority to take appropriate steps in accordance with the constitutional provisions and the statutory rules, if it chose to do so. No direction was issued on the pending representation dated 25 February 2025 beyond what flowed from the quashment.