Title Dispute Cannot Shield Son and Daughter-in-Law from Senior Citizen Eviction Order, Rules Chhattisgarh HC Division Bench
A Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court dismissed a writ appeal by a son and daughter-in-law against their eviction from a residential property, holding that an independent title claim cannot bar a Maintenance Tribunal's protective jurisdiction over a 93-year-old senior citizen.
The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in an intra-Court writ appeal decided on 7 August 2026, refused to disturb the eviction of a son and his daughter-in-law from the first floor of a residential house in Bilaspur, ordered by a Maintenance Tribunal and affirmed on appeal. Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, leading the Division Bench along with Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, held that a claim of independent registered title over the disputed property does not, by itself, strip the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 of its protective jurisdiction. The 93-year-old mother-in-law, Smt. Santosh Khanna, had complained of harassment, intimidation and interference with her peaceful residence. The Division Bench found no perversity or jurisdictional error in the concurrent findings of the statutory authorities or the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition.
The Family Dispute and the Tribunal Proceedings
Smt. Santosh Khanna, aged about 93 years and residing at B-7, Minocha Colony, Mungeli Road, Bilaspur, approached the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaspur, functioning as the Maintenance Tribunal under the Act of 2007. In her application, she alleged that after the death of her husband in 2004 she had been living in the house with her children and was dependent on a pension of Rs. 10,000 per month.
She stated that she had purchased land bearing Khasra No. 1608/10 admeasuring 0.0400 hectare, and that the adjoining land bearing Khasra No. 1608/08 had been purchased by her in the name of her daughter-in-law, Smt. Neerja Khanna, the second writ appellant. She alleged that her elder son, Devendra Khanna, the first writ appellant, was neglecting and refusing to maintain her, and was harassing and abusing her. Apprehending a threat to her life, she sought eviction of both writ appellants from the first floor of the house, a refund of Rs. 25,00,000/- and compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/-.
The writ appellants contested the application before the Tribunal. They contended that Smt. Santosh Khanna had sufficient independent means of livelihood, that Smt. Neerja Khanna held title over Khasra No. 1608/08 under a registered sale deed executed prior to her marriage, and that, according to revenue records, Khasra No. 1608/10 stood in the name of “Santosh Puri” and not in the name of respondent No. 3. They further alleged that the mutation over Khasra No. 1608/08 had been fraudulently obtained in the name of Smt. Santosh Khanna by the younger brother of Devendra Khanna, with whom the mother was residing, and that the proceedings had been initiated at that younger brother's instance. The writ appellants also pointed out that they themselves were senior citizens.
The Tribunal, by its order dated 12 September 2024, directed the eviction of the writ appellants. The District Magistrate cum Presiding Officer of the Appellate Tribunal, by order dated 25 November 2024, affirmed the eviction. The writ appellants then filed W.P.(C) No. 6077 of 2024 before the Single Judge, who dismissed it by order dated 2 July 2026. The present writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 followed.
The Jurisdictional Challenge: Can a Title Claim Oust the Tribunal?
Before the Division Bench, counsel for the writ appellants argued that the Maintenance Tribunal is a creature of statute and can exercise only the jurisdiction expressly conferred on it. Since neither writ appellant had received the property from Smt. Santosh Khanna subject to a condition of maintenance, Section 23 of the Act of 2007 — which deals with transfers made by a senior citizen subject to a condition of providing basic amenities and physical needs — had no application. The power of eviction, being only ancillary to the statutory jurisdiction, could not be invoked to dispossess persons who held an independent proprietary right under a registered sale deed.
Counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 669, on the limited nature of the eviction power under the Act of 2007, and on S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Others, (2021) 15 SCC 730. It was argued that the Single Judge, having himself observed that title questions must go to a civil court, could not simultaneously sustain an eviction order — doing so amounted to dispossession first and adjudication of title later. Article 300A of the Constitution was also invoked to contend that the appellants were being deprived of property without authority of law.
The State supported the Tribunal's orders on the basis that the Act of 2007 is a beneficial legislation meant to protect aged senior citizens. Counsel for Smt. Santosh Khanna submitted that the writ appellants' independent title claim could be agitated before a civil court but could not be used to deny a 93-year-old senior citizen immediate protection against the harassment and threat she had specifically complained of.
How the Division Bench Reasoned
The Division Bench identified the core question as whether the Single Judge was justified in declining interference with concurrent orders of eviction issued for the purpose of securing the peaceful residence, safety and dignity of Smt. Santosh Khanna.
The Bench accepted the abstract proposition that the Maintenance Tribunal is not a substitute for a civil court and that complicated questions of title cannot be finally adjudicated under the Act of 2007. However, it held that the mere assertion of an independent title cannot, by itself, render the proceedings non-maintainable — particularly when the relief granted was not a declaration of title but a protective direction to secure the senior citizen's peaceful and dignified residence. The material on record showed that Smt. Santosh Khanna, aged about 93 years, had approached the statutory authority complaining of harassment, intimidation and disturbance, and the Tribunal had found justification for protective relief, independently confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal.
On the argument that the absence of a claim for monetary maintenance made the proceedings non-maintainable, the Bench declined to read the Act so narrowly. The expression “maintenance and welfare” in the statute, the Bench held, cannot be confined only to payment of a monthly monetary allowance. A senior citizen may be financially independent and still be subjected to harassment or interference with peaceful residence. The beneficial character of the legislation requires an interpretation that advances rather than defeats the legislative purpose. The Bench drew support from S. Vanitha (supra), Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, (2025) 2 SCC 787, and Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 2077, recognising that effective relief, including eviction, may be moulded where necessary to protect a senior citizen.
The Bench also rejected the argument that the pendency of mutation proceedings or the daughter-in-law's registered sale deed completely divested the Tribunal of jurisdiction. The ultimate question of title in the disputed property remains open before the competent civil or revenue forum. What the Tribunal directed was eviction for the purpose of securing Smt. Santosh Khanna's peaceful and dignified residence, not a final adjudication of proprietary rights.
On Section 23, the Bench held that the statutory scheme cannot be construed by isolating that provision from the remaining provisions and the avowed object of the enactment. The Supreme Court, the Bench noted, has recognised that authorities under the Act may mould appropriate relief, including eviction, when such relief is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection and peaceful enjoyment of life and residence by a senior citizen. The question in the appeal was not whether the Tribunal can adjudicate title or exercise an unrestricted power of eviction, but whether the protective direction issued, in the facts found by the statutory authorities, called for interference. The Bench found that no jurisdictional error had been demonstrated.
The Bench further held that the writ appellants' own status as senior citizens did not confer upon them an overriding or indefeasible right to continue in occupation against the wishes of Smt. Santosh Khanna. The Act is intended to protect senior citizens from neglect, abuse and harassment, and the authorities must consider the circumstances of each case. Concurrent findings of fact by the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal cannot be disturbed in writ jurisdiction merely because another view of the material may be possible.
On the scope of the intra-Court appeal itself, the Bench reiterated that the Division Bench does not sit as a regular first appeal over the orders of statutory authorities. Interference is warranted only where the order under appeal suffers from patent jurisdictional error, perversity, violation of principles of natural justice or manifest illegality. The Single Judge had examined all the principal objections raised by the writ appellants, including the title questions, maintainability, Section 23, alleged procedural irregularities and the constitutional challenge under Article 300A, and had recorded cogent reasons for declining interference.
Outcome
The Division Bench found no perversity, jurisdictional infirmity or error of law in the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the writ appeal as devoid of merit. The Bench expressly clarified that any independent claim of title or proprietary right asserted by the writ appellants over the disputed property remains open to be agitated before the competent civil or revenue forum in accordance with law, and that the observations in the judgment shall not be construed as a final adjudication of such title.