Revenue Court Cannot Declare a Registered Sale Deed Null and Void, Rules Chhattisgarh High Court
The Chhattisgarh High Court set aside Collector orders voiding registered sale deeds in three connected petitions, holding that only Civil Courts can cancel registered instruments of transfer under the Specific Relief Act and the Transfer of Property Act.
The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur has held that a Revenue Court lacks the power to declare a registered sale deed null and void, even where the underlying land transaction allegedly violated the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, sitting singly, set aside the Collector's order of 5 May 2022 in three consolidated writ petitions that each raised the identical jurisdictional question. The ruling draws a firm line between the revenue authority's power to regulate transfers of government-lease land and the exclusive domain of the Civil Court to cancel registered instruments of transfer under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act.
The Land Transaction and Collector's Order
The lead case, WPC No. 2349 of 2022, was filed by Sheikh Hameed, a resident of Gariyabandh. The disputed land is Khasra No. 147/2, admeasuring 0.73 hectare, situated at Village Gariyaband, Patwari Halka No. 8, Dongrigaon.
The land's history begins with a revenue order of 28 April 2000, by which the Additional Collector, Gariyaband excluded a portion of Khasra No. 147, measuring 0.86 hectare, from the Nistrar Patrak and declared it cultivable land. On 14 December 2000, it was recorded in the name of Daya Ram, who received a Patta granting Bhumiswami rights. After Daya Ram's death, the Gram Panchayat mutated the names of his legal heirs — widow Yashoda, and children Kiran, Pawan, and Meena. Those legal heirs then sold the land to Sheikh Hameed, and his name was subsequently mutated in the revenue records.
The Tahsildar, Gariyaband registered a case against Sheikh Hameed, issuing notice that the sale contravened Section 158(3) and Section 165(7-b) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code because no prior permission had been obtained from the Collector before the transfer. The Tahsildar recommended the sale be declared null and void. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) concurred and proposed proceedings, which the Collector then took up.
Before the Collector, Sheikh Hameed's position was that Daya Ram had held the Patta for more than 10 years before the sale deed of 12 December 2012 was executed. Full Bhumiswami rights had therefore accrued by operation of law upon expiry of that statutory period, removing the need for prior permission. He also argued that a registered sale deed could not be declared null and void by a revenue authority except under Section 170-B of the Code.
The Collector rejected these submissions. Holding that land originating from a government lease permanently requires prior Collector permission for any transfer — regardless of whether Bhumiswami rights have since accrued — the Collector declared the sale deed of 12 December 2012 non-est and directed that the land be recorded in the name of the State Government.
Identical Issue in the Two Connected Petitions
WPC No. 4192 of 2022 was filed by Afreen Bano, and WPC No. 2439 of 2022 by Mohammed Rizwan. Both arose from comparable Collector orders concerning land in District Gariyabandh that originated from government leases. All three petitions raised the same two legal challenges: first, that Bhumiswami rights accruing after 10 years extinguish the prior-permission requirement; and second, that a Revenue Court has no jurisdiction to void a registered sale deed. Given the common legal question, Justice Prasad consolidated all three matters, treated WPC No. 2349 of 2022 as the lead case, and stated that the decision would govern all three.
Four Questions Framed by the Court
The Court identified four questions for determination:
- Whether the land in question was originally granted on lease by the revenue authorities.
- Whether government-lease land carrying Bhumiswami rights can be sold without prior Collector permission under Section 158(3) and Section 165(7-b) of the Code.
- Whether a sale deed executed without that permission is null and void.
- Whether a Revenue Court has the power to declare a registered sale deed null and void.
Statutory Framework: Sections 158(3) and 165(7-b)
Section 158(3) of the Code treats a person who holds land under a government-granted lease as a Bhumiswami from the date of the lease or allotment, but expressly prohibits transfer of such land within 10 years of the grant.
Section 165(7-b) goes further. It provides that a person who holds land from the State Government — or who holds Bhumiswami rights under Section 158(3) and was originally a government lessee — shall not transfer the land without the written permission of a Revenue Officer not below the rank of Collector. The proviso to Section 165(7-b) carves out an exception only for Bhumiswamis holding a Bhumiswami Right Certificate under sub-section (4) or a Free-hold Right under sub-section (5) of Section 158.
On Questions 1, 2, and 3, the Court answered against the petitioners on the substantive land-law point. The revenue records confirmed that the subject land was originally a government grassland that was converted and granted on lease to Daya Ram. The Court held that once land has its origin in a government lease, it retains its character as leased land regardless of whether Bhumiswami or other rights subsequently accrue. Prior Collector permission under Section 165(7-b) was therefore mandatory before any transfer, and the absence of such permission rendered the transaction illegal. On the question whether the sale deed was null and void as a matter of substantive land law, the Court agreed with the Collector's analysis.
The Jurisdictional Bar on Revenue Courts
Question 4 produced the dispositive ruling. The Court held that the power to grant a declaration setting aside a registered sale deed vests exclusively in Civil Courts. This jurisdiction does not vest in Revenue Courts, which lack the competence to set aside or cancel a registered instrument of transfer.
The Court anchored this conclusion in two statutes. First, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a sale and mandates its execution through a registered document. Adjudicating the validity of such a document is an inherent judicial power that cannot be assumed by revenue authorities. Second, Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act confers on the Court the power to adjudge a written instrument void or voidable at the suit of any person against whom it may cause serious injury, and specifically requires the Court to notify the registration office if the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908. The language of Section 31 refers to “the court,” which means only a Civil Court.
The Court also relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. S.P. Velayutham, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 210. That decision explained that a challenge to the very execution of a registered document is a challenge to its DNA, and any such challenge has to be made only before the civil court and certainly not before the writ court. The Court drew from paragraphs 53, 54, 57, 58, and 59 of that judgment to hold that even where a High Court under Article 226 finds that a registering authority failed its statutory duties, the Court cancels the act of registration without declaring the execution itself null and void — that latter declaration being the exclusive province of the Civil Court.
Applying this to the present case, the Court concluded that even if the sale deeds were executed without the prior permission mandated by Section 165(7-b) of the Code, the Collector exceeded jurisdiction by issuing an outright declaration of nullity. Such an outright declaration of nullity by the revenue authority is not in accordance with law.
Outcome
Justice Prasad set aside the impugned Collector orders in all three writ petitions to the extent they declared the subject sale deeds null and void. The remainder of the Collector orders was not examined on the merits. The Court reserved liberty in favour of the State Government to seek appropriate recourse before a competent Civil Court in accordance with law. All three writ petitions were disposed of accordingly.
The judgment was reserved on 7 May 2026 and pronounced on 17 July 2026.