Delhi HC Dismisses Custodial Torture Writ for Want of Corroborative Material Against Named Officers

Justice Madhu Jain held that an MLC recording the petitioner's own account of assault, without independent evidence linking named officers, cannot ground directions for departmental action or compensation.

Two tenants from Ashok Nagar, Delhi, alleged that police officers at Police Station Jyoti Nagar, North-East District, illegally detained them, extorted ₹25,000/-, and then physically assaulted them when they refused to confess to a theft. They filed a criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking departmental action against the named officers and compensation of ₹5,00,000/- each. On 2 September 2026, Justice Madhu Jain, sitting singly, dismissed the petition. The Court accepted that no person — witness or accused — can be tortured in custody, but found that the material on record fell short of prima facie establishing that the named respondents caused the injuries alleged.

The Theft FIR and the Petitioners’ Position at the Police Station

FIR No. 267/2026 was registered on 13 June 2026 at Police Station Jyoti Nagar in connection with a theft that occurred during the intervening night of 12/13 June 2026 at premises in Gali No. 7A, Ashok Nagar. The FIR was lodged against unknown persons. The petitioners, who were tenants on the ground floor of the same premises, were not named.

The petitioners stated that they were first taken to the police station on 13 June 2026 and held for about six hours, during which respondent nos. 2 and 3 allegedly demanded and received ₹25,000/- before releasing them. They were summoned again on 18 July 2026. They contended they had been called as witnesses, pointing to a notice issued to petitioner no. 1 under Section 179 of the BNSS directing him to appear on 19 July 2026 at 3:00 p.m.

The State offered a different account. The Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the complainant had, in a subsequent handwritten complaint, expressed suspicion against petitioner no. 1, and that a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS — applicable to persons being proceeded against as accused — had been issued for the purposes of investigation. The State maintained that petitioner no. 1 was not being treated as a witness.

The Assault Allegation and the Medical Record

According to the petitioners, on 18 July 2026 at the police station they were pressurised to confess to the theft. When they refused, respondent no. 2 allegedly assaulted them. Following a PCR call made by the elder brother of petitioner no. 2, both petitioners were taken to GTB Hospital. The MLC of petitioner no. 2 was prepared at about 11:30 p.m. on 18 July 2026. It recorded a history of physical assault at Police Station Jyoti Nagar at about 9:00 p.m. and noted tenderness and swelling over different parts of his body.

No MLC for petitioner no. 1 was placed on record, despite the allegation that both petitioners were assaulted. The petitioners submitted complaints dated 19 July 2026 and 29 July 2026 to the SHO and to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, North-East District, respectively. Alleging no action was taken, they approached the High Court.

On the emergency call, the State submitted that it was not made from inside the police station. According to the State, the concerned petitioner had already come out of the police station, a crowd had gathered, and only then was the call placed. The PCR call record itself was not produced before the Court.

The Legal Standard the Court Applied

Justice Madhu Jain opened her analysis by affirming the constitutional position without equivocation: D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416, makes it clear that the safeguards against custodial torture are binding on every police official and apply whether the person in custody is a witness or an accused. The Court accepted this proposition fully.

The Court then set out the threshold it was required to apply before directing departmental action or awarding compensation under Article 226. The allegations of custodial violence must find prima facie support from the material on record. Disputed assertions, however serious, are not sufficient to return findings against named individual officials.

Justice Jain declined to treat the witness-versus-accused distinction as the central question. She observed that the FIR had been registered against unknown persons, so the absence of the petitioners' names did not automatically mean they could only have been summoned as witnesses. Competing notices — one under Section 179 of the BNSS relied on by the petitioners and one under Section 35(3) relied on by the State — pointed in different directions. The Court set that controversy to one side: “the real issue is not the capacity in which the petitioners were called, but whether the material on record establishes the allegation of custodial assault.”

Why the Evidence Did Not Satisfy the Threshold

The MLC of petitioner no. 2 was the centrepiece of the petitioners' case. The Court examined it carefully. It was contemporaneous medical material showing that petitioner no. 2 was examined and that tenderness and swelling were noticed. However, the history recorded in the MLC came from petitioner no. 2's own account to the doctor. It did not identify who caused the injuries. No independent or corroborative material was placed before the Court connecting respondent nos. 2 and 3 to those injuries.

The absence of any MLC for petitioner no. 1 weakened the case further. Both petitioners alleged assault, yet only one was medically examined and that examination was limited to recording what petitioner no. 2 himself said.

The emergency call to number 100 did not advance the petitioners' case. Without the PCR call record, the timing and circumstances of the call could not be determined. The State's version — that the call was made after the petitioner had left the police station and a crowd had gathered — could neither be confirmed nor refuted on the available material.

On the extortion allegation, the Court found no independent material substantiating the claim that ₹25,000/- was demanded and paid. The complaints submitted by the petitioners on 19 July 2026 and 29 July 2026 reiterated their version but, standing alone without corroboration, could not establish the allegations.

Justice Jain acknowledged the seriousness of what was alleged. Custodial violence is a grave matter. But a finding against named individual officers, followed by orders for departmental action and compensation, requires something more than one side's account supported only by a medical record that traces the history of injuries to that same account.

Outcome

Justice Madhu Jain dismissed W.P.(CRL) 2659/2026 on 2 September 2026. The Court held that, on the material before it, no ground was made out to conclude that respondent nos. 2 and 3 subjected the petitioners to illegal detention or custodial torture. Consequently, none of the reliefs sought — action against the officers, initiation of departmental proceedings, or compensation of ₹5,00,000/- each — were granted. All pending applications were disposed of simultaneously.