Zero Attendance Cannot Be Equated With Shortage: Delhi HC Dismisses LL.B. Student's Plea to Skip Semester-III

The Delhi High Court Division Bench held that a student who never attended a single Semester-III class cannot claim progression to Semester-IV, even if the denial of admission was not his fault.

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia, on 14 May 2026 dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal filed by Aman Bansal, an LL.B. student at Law Centre-I, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The student had sought admission to Semester-IV despite having neither attended any classes nor appeared in the examinations for Semester-III. The Bench drew a firm line between nil attendance and a mere shortage of attendance, holding that the benefit of the court's earlier decision in Courts on its Own Motion Re: Suicide Committed by Sushant Rohilla, Law Student of I.P. University in W.P.(CRL) 793/2017,  which addressed shortage-of-attendance situations, could not be extended to a student with 0% attendance in an intervening semester.

The Academic Dispute Before the Division Bench

Aman Bansal had cleared all five papers of Semester-I of the LL.B. programme, securing 354 out of 500 marks. In Semester-II, his attendance was recorded at 27.58%, and he was detained on that ground. A Committee constituted by the University, pursuant to an official notice dated 27 May 2025, provisionally permitted him to appear in the Semester-II examinations, subject to the outcome of the Committee's proceedings.

Bansal appeared in the Semester-II examinations held in May–June 2025. His result, however, was withheld. Because the result was not declared, he was denied promotion to Semester-III in August 2025 and was consequently precluded from attending Semester-III classes or appearing in the Semester-III examinations in December 2025.

Despite repeated representations, no final decision of the Committee proceedings was ever communicated to him. Facing the prospect of academic discontinuity, Bansal took re-admission in Semester-II and paid re-admission fees of ₹7,130/- on 10 January 2026, resuming classes in January 2026.

In March 2026, he filed W.P.(C) 3508/2026 before a learned Single Judge, seeking declaration of his Semester-II result and permission to appear in the Semester-IV examinations. The Single Judge, vide order dated 18 March 2026, directed the University to immediately declare the Semester-II result. However, the prayer for admission to Semester-IV, bypassing Semester-III entirely, was declined. The Single Judge held that the Sushant Rohilla decision applied only to shortage-of-attendance cases and that nil attendance in Semester-III was a materially different situation.

Bansal challenged that refusal before the Division Bench in LPA 361/2026, also seeking directions for supplementary Semester-III examinations and adjustment of the ₹7,130/- re-admission fee against Semester-IV fees, with refund of any excess.

The Legal Issue: Can Nil Attendance Be Treated as Shortage of Attendance?

The sole question the Division Bench identified was whether Bansal could be permitted to appear in Semester-IV examinations despite having neither attended any classes nor appeared in the examinations for Semester-III.

Bansal's counsel argued that under the Prospectus governing the LL.B. programme, a student is eligible for promotion to the Third Term upon passing at least five papers in the First and Second Term examinations cumulatively. Since Bansal had passed all five papers of Semester-I and had appeared in the Semester-II examinations with the University's own permission, he ought to have been granted admission to Semester-III regardless of the non-declaration of his Semester-II result. Counsel also pointed to similarly situated students who had been permitted to continue academic progression and appear in higher-semester examinations despite not having appeared in intervening odd-semester examinations.

The University's counsel countered that the Semester-II result had been declared as directed. On the Semester-IV prayer, the University relied on the coordinate bench decision in Harsh Meena & Ors. v. University of Delhi & Ors. [LPA 740/2025], where the appeal was dismissed on 4 December 2025. That bench had observed: “permitting students to sit for examinations who have not attended even a single class would not augur well in the public perception.”

How the Division Bench Reasoned

Justice Tejas Karia, writing the oral judgment for the Bench, traced the sequence of events carefully. Bansal had a shortage of attendance in Semester-II and was only provisionally permitted to sit for those examinations, subject to the Committee's outcome. When his result was withheld, he was denied Semester-III admission. He did not attend a single Semester-III class and did not appear in the Semester-III examinations.

The Bench held that students who have neither attended even a single class in a particular semester nor appeared in the examinations for that semester cannot claim the benefit of progression to the next semester, even where the denial of admission was for reasons not attributable to them.

On the Sushant Rohilla precedent, the Bench was clear. That decision was confined to situations where students fell short of the prescribed minimum attendance, meaning they had attended some classes but not enough. Its ratio could not be stretched to cover a student with 0% attendance who had never taken admission to the relevant semester at all. The Bench stated that “there is no parity between the Appellant's case of 0% attendance and cases involving shortage of attendance.”

The Bench also addressed the Prospectus argument. Bansal had contended that the cumulative five-paper passing criterion entitled him to Semester-III admission. The Bench declined to accept this at the appeal stage, pointing to Bansal's own conduct: he did not approach the court while Semester-III was in progress to press that clause of the Prospectus. Instead, he allowed Semester-III to conclude, took re-admission in Semester-II, and approached the court only when Semester-IV was already underway. The Bench held that in these circumstances, and having regard to his inaction, the relief of direct admission to Semester-IV was rightly rejected by the Single Judge.

On the supplementary examination prayer, the Bench was equally firm. Since Bansal had not attended even a single class in Semester-III, he could not be permitted to appear in supplementary examinations for that semester and then seek Semester-IV admission on the basis of the Sushant Rohilla decision.

Procedural Matters

The appeal was filed with a delay of 23 days. Bansal moved CM Appl. 32614/2026 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of that delay. The Bench allowed the application for the reasons stated therein and condoned the delay. A separate exemption application, CM Appl. 32615/2026, was also allowed subject to all just exceptions.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no ground to interfere with the Single Judge's order dated 18 March 2026. LPA 361/2026 was dismissed. There was no order as to costs.