Delhi HC Upholds ₹15,000 Monthly Maintenance for Wife Separated for Four Decades, Dismisses Army Pensioner's Revision

The Delhi High Court declined to disturb ad-interim maintenance granted to a wife living separately since 1985, holding that long separation and delay do not extinguish her statutory claim under Section 125 CrPC.

Justice Madhu Jain, sitting singly at the High Court of Delhi, on 8 September 2026 dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by Bhim Singh Rana, a retired Army personnel, against an order of the Principal Judge, Family Courts, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi. That Family Court order, dated 18 April 2026, had directed him to pay ad-interim maintenance of ₹15,000 per month to his wife Shardha Rana from the date of the order. Rana challenged the order on grounds that it was non-speaking, that his wife had voluntarily deserted him in 1985, and that she had delayed approaching the court by more than forty years. The High Court found none of those grounds sufficient to interfere at the revisional stage, and confirmed the interim arrangement while directing the Family Court to consider all material afresh on quantum.

Dispute Before the High Court

The parties married in April 1975 according to Hindu rites and have three children, all now major, married and independently settled. The marriage has not been dissolved by any decree of divorce.

The rupture in the marriage dates to March 1985. Shardha Rana alleged that her husband assaulted her and drove her and two of the children out of the matrimonial home around that time. She stated she went to her parental home, later shifted to Delhi in search of employment, and maintained herself through work as a labourer and subsequently as a thread-cutter in a garments factory. She alleged that though the petitioner met her and the children on occasions and made assurances of reunion, he never paid her regular maintenance. Claiming she now has no sufficient independent income and is dependent on her married daughter, she sought maintenance of ₹40,000 per month before the Family Court.

Bhim Singh Rana's account was directly contrary. He stated that the respondent left voluntarily in February/March 1985 while he was away on Army duty, taking two children with her. He said an FIR about her disappearance was registered in March 1985 and that she did not return despite his efforts. He contended that the parties had been living separately for several decades and that she never sought maintenance during that entire period.

Shardha Rana filed an application for interim maintenance before the Family Court in MT Case No. 13/2025. After the petitioner filed his reply, objections, and affidavit on 8 August 2025, and after both parties filed affidavits of assets, income and expenditure, the Family Court passed the impugned order on 18 April 2026. The matter was then listed for 16 July 2026. Rana challenged the Family Court's order by filing CRL.REV.P.(MAT.) 523/2026 before the Delhi High Court.

The Petitioner's Grievances

Counsel for Bhim Singh Rana pressed three main objections before the High Court.

First, he argued the Family Court's order was non-speaking and mechanical. The petitioner's reply and affidavit, filed on 8 August 2025, were already on record, yet the impugned order made no reference to them. This rendered the determination one-sided.

Second, he submitted that the Family Court was required to form at least a prima facie opinion on the respondent's entitlement before granting ad-interim maintenance. He argued that the issue of voluntary desertion for more than forty years and the potential bar under Section 125(4) CrPC — which excludes a wife living separately by mutual consent or without sufficient reason — were specific, substantiated objections that could not simply be ignored.

Third, he pointed to inconsistencies in the respondent's own affidavits. Her affidavit dated 20 December 2024 disclosed that she was self-employed and earning approximately ₹5,000 per month, whereas her subsequent affidavit dated 18 March 2026 stated she was unemployed with no income. Her maintenance petition itself, at paragraphs 17 and 22, recorded that she had worked as a labourer in Shillong and as a thread-cutter in Delhi. The Family Court's observation that she had never worked thus directly contradicted her own pleadings.

On quantum, counsel submitted that the order fixing ₹15,000 per month disclosed no reasoning about the petitioner's income, pension amount, dependants, liabilities, or other financial obligations. The petitioner did not seek a final adjudication of disputed questions at the revisional stage; his limited prayer was for the ad-interim order to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Jain began from an uncontested fact: no decree of divorce has been passed between the parties. The marital relationship therefore continues to subsist in law, and a wife's right to claim maintenance during the subsistence of marriage is a recognised statutory right, subject only to the conditions prescribed under applicable law. The court held that the mere fact of prolonged separation does not, by itself, bring the marriage to an end or extinguish the wife's claim.

Citing Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, the court recalled that Section 125 CrPC proceedings are summary in nature and are intended to provide immediate relief to a wife unable to maintain herself. Maintenance is awarded on the basis of the husband's financial capacity and other relevant factors; substantive disputes regarding dissolution of marriage are left for civil or family court proceedings.

On the desertion objection, the court noted that the circumstances in which Shardha Rana started living separately are seriously disputed. She says she was driven out on account of cruelty; he says she left voluntarily. Whether she left of her own accord, whether she had sufficient reason to live separately, and whether the parties were living separately by mutual consent are questions requiring appreciation of pleadings and, if necessary, evidence. The court held that at the ad-interim stage, a mere assertion by the husband of desertion cannot defeat the wife's claim for interim maintenance.

On Section 125(4) CrPC (corresponding to Section 144(4) of the BNSS), the court acknowledged that the provision excludes maintenance where a wife refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason or where the parties live separately by mutual consent. However, it held that the applicability of this exception depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Since both parties have furnished contradictory accounts, the issue cannot be conclusively decided on pleadings alone at an interlocutory stage.

On delay, the court held that delay in seeking maintenance cannot, by itself, be treated as a complete bar. Maintenance is a continuing obligation, and the absence of an earlier claim does not establish that the respondent had voluntarily relinquished her right permanently. The effect of delay, if any, would have to be assessed alongside the respondent's explanation and the other material on record.

Turning to the respondent's income, the court referred to Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316, where the Supreme Court held that “unable to maintain herself” does not mean the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can claim maintenance, and that even where the wife earns some income, the relevant question is whether that income is sufficient for her to maintain herself.

On the allegation that the Family Court ignored the petitioner's reply, Justice Jain accepted that the impugned order is brief and does not deal with each objection. She held, however, that an ad-interim maintenance order is not required to contain a detailed determination of every disputed issue. The court is required to arrive at a tentative assessment of the parties' circumstances and ensure the wife is not left without financial support during proceedings. The Family Court had recorded that the petitioner receives pension and is capable of maintaining the respondent — a fact the petitioner did not dispute. He is a retired Army personnel receiving pension.

On quantum, the court noted that ₹15,000 per month is ad-interim and subject to variation once the complete material, income affidavits, bank statements, pension documents, and other relevant records are placed before the Family Court. The direction is not a final adjudication of the respondent's entitlement or of the petitioner's liability for the entire period claimed.

The court was clear that the absence of a divorce decree is particularly significant. The petitioner cannot contend that the respondent's status as his wife has ceased, or that her claim for maintenance is extinguished, merely because of decades of separate residence. Whether her separate residence falls within any exception under Section 125(4) CrPC or Section 144(4) BNSS remains to be determined on evidence.

Outcome

The Delhi High Court found no ground to interfere with the Family Court's order dated 18 April 2026. CRL.REV.P.(MAT.) 523/2026, along with the pending application CRL.M.A. 27715/2026, was dismissed. All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

The court directed the Family Court to proceed with the matter uninfluenced by any observation made in the revision order, and to consider the affidavits, documents and objections of both parties while determining the further quantum of maintenance. The petitioner remains at liberty to place all relevant material before the Family Court and to seek modification of the maintenance amount on disclosure of the complete financial circumstances of both parties.