Justice M. Jain Delhi HC PROCEEDING QUASHED How a court tests what a smallchild says happened
[ High Court of Delhi ]

A suggestion of tutoring is not proof of it, and a six-year-old's consistent account carried the conviction

Justice Madhu Jain dismissed an appeal under Section 415(2) of the BNSS, setting out when a child witness can be the sole basis of a conviction.

In almost every prosecution of this kind the complaint is that the child was coached. The question for an appellate court is what turns on the suggestion when it is put in cross-examination and nothing comes of it. On 13 October 2026 the Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal against a conviction under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, holding that the child's testimony was consistent and inspired confidence, that the minor variations in it were not material contradictions, and that the allegation of tutoring had not been established.

How the case began

A PCR call reached a Delhi police station at about 9.10 p.m. on 12 April 2020. The caller said his six-year-old daughter had been subjected to a wrongful act by a person living in the neighbourhood and asked for police assistance. A sub-inspector reached the place with a constable and called a woman sub-inspector to the spot, who met the child and her mother. The accused had by then injured his own hand and had been taken to hospital.

The mother's complaint was that at about 7.30 p.m. her daughter, then in Class II, had told her that the neighbour had touched her private parts and kissed her, and that she had then told her husband, who called the police. An FIR was registered and the case was tried by the designated Special Court at Karkardooma, which convicted the appellant by judgment of 13 April 2026 and sentenced him by an order of 20 April 2026. The appeal came under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

How the case was built

On the complaint and the child's medico-legal examination, the FIR was registered under Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 8 of the POCSO Act. During investigation her statement was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which she repeated the allegations, and her age documents were obtained from her school, which put her date of birth in April 2014. A site plan was prepared. The accused was medically examined, arrested and sent to judicial custody, and Section 363 of the Penal Code and Section 10 of the POCSO Act were later added before the chargesheet was filed in June 2020.

The accused was granted bail during the COVID-19 pandemic. Charges were framed in October 2022 under Sections 363 and 354 of the Penal Code and Section 10 read with Section 9 of the POCSO Act, and he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined six witnesses, the child being examined in chief on two dates in 2022.

The parameters for a child's evidence

The judgment sets out the settled approach. Even where the victim is the sole witness to the incident, a conviction can be sustained if her testimony is found credible and reliable — but the testimony of a child witness has to be carefully scrutinised against established parameters.

Among those parameters, the Court noted that discrepancies, or parts of a deposition that appear coached, will not by themselves destroy the credibility of a child witness. Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon where the tutored part can be separated from the untutored part and what remains inspires confidence. The untainted part can then be believed and used, including for corroboration, in the way the evidence of a hostile witness is treated.

What the trial court did, and why it held

The trial court had put questions to the child and recorded its satisfaction that she was able to understand the questions and give rational answers to them — the preliminary exercise on which the admissibility of a child's evidence depends.

Suggestions of tutoring were put to her in cross-examination. On the High Court's reading of the record the allegation could not be established, and no material contradiction was pointed out that would make her testimony untrustworthy. The variations that did appear were minor. On that footing the Court held her testimony consistent and confidence-inspiring, and found no ground to interfere.

Order

The Court found no ground to interfere with the judgment of 13 April 2026 or the order on sentence of 20 April 2026 passed by the Special Court. The appeal was dismissed, pending applications disposed of, and a copy of the judgment directed to be sent to the trial court for information and compliance.