Delhi HC Division Bench Sets Aside Stay on PP Act Eviction Notice Against Delhi Race Club, Faults Single Judge for Skipping Prima Facie Analysis

The Division Bench held the Single Judge's order deferring Estate Officer proceedings was unsustainable for failing to record any finding on prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of convenience.

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia, has set aside an interim order passed by a Single Judge that had directed the Estate Officer not to proceed further with a show cause notice issued to Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Division Bench, deciding Letters Patent Appeal 336/2026, found that the Single Judge had deferred the proceedings without recording any finding on the three essential requirements for interim relief, prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience. The bench also held that the impugned interlocutory order qualified as a “Judgment” within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, making the intra-court appeal maintainable.

The Dispute Before the Division Bench

The subject land is a plot of 84.484 acres leased by the Union of India to Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. on 8 March 1926 for use as a Race Course, initially for 25 years, with a provision for a further 25-year extension under Clause 6 of the lease deed. The lease was extended from time to time but, as stated in the show cause notice, stood determined on 31 December 1994 by efflux of time on expiry of the last extension. On 25 June 1985, a substantial portion of the land had already been resumed by the Union of India and allotted for public purposes including to the Ministry of Defence. The respondent continued in occupation of the remaining portion.

An earlier show cause notice dated 25 October 1999 under Section 4 of the PP Act was challenged by the respondent in W.P.(C) 7822/1999. That writ petition was disposed of on 9 July 2012 by a Single Judge who quashed the 1999 notice and directed the Union of India to decide a representation dated 19 December 2011 in which the respondent had sought extension or renewal of the lease. The 2012 order also recorded that if the representation were rejected, the Union of India would be free to determine the lease and re-enter the premises.

Pursuant to the 2012 order, a letter of demand dated 22 July 2013 was issued showing total dues of Rs. 3,48,82,723, which the respondent deposited on 23 and 26 August 2013. The request for extension or renewal was thereafter examined but was not acceded to, the Union of India citing requirements of the land for government and public purposes including defence and security considerations. Notices were subsequently issued in November 2017 and March 2022. On 12 March 2026, an eviction and vacation notice was issued directing the respondent to hand over peaceful possession, with a warning that failure would lead to proceedings under law.

The respondent challenged the March 2026 notice by filing a civil suit, CS (OS) 253/2026, before the Delhi High Court. That suit was disposed of on 9 April 2026 with a clear recording that any action for dispossession would be taken only in accordance with due process of law. Eight days later, on 17 April 2026, the Estate Officer issued a fresh show cause notice under Section 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the PP Act calling upon the respondent to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. The respondent then filed W.P.(C) 5608/2026 before a Single Judge seeking to quash the notice. On 24 April 2026, the Single Judge directed that the Estate Officer shall not proceed further with the show cause notice till the next date of hearing. It is this direction that the Union of India challenged in LPA 336/2026.

Two Issues Framed by the Division Bench

The Division Bench identified two issues for adjudication. First, whether the intra-court appeal against the Single Judge's order dated 24 April 2026 was maintainable, specifically whether that order constituted a “Judgment” within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Second, whether the impugned order was vitiated because no reason had been assigned for deferring the Estate Officer's proceedings and no finding had been recorded on prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience.

Appellants' Submissions

Mr. Chetan Sharma, Additional Solicitor General of India, argued that a writ petition against a show cause notice issued under Section 4 of the PP Act ought not to have been entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. He submitted that the respondent had every opportunity to reply to the notice before the Estate Officer and to raise all available pleas there, including a challenge to the notice itself. He relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. v. DDA & Anr., 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1180, which had held that the expression “unauthorised occupation” in Section 2(g) of the PP Act covers persons whose occupation was initially permissive but subsequently ceased to be authorised. He also relied on Anant Raj Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6406, where this Court had held that once a notice is issued under Section 4 of the PP Act, the only course open to the noticee is to respond to it before the Estate Officer and not to approach a civil court or seek restraint of the Estate Officer. The ASG further argued that the Single Judge had assigned no reason for deferring the proceedings beyond observing that the matter required consideration in view of the chequered history of litigation, and had not applied the principles governing grant of interim relief.

Respondent's Submissions

Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior Advocate for the respondent, raised a threshold objection: the impugned order being purely interlocutory was not amenable to challenge in an intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, which lies only against a “Judgment” of a Single Judge. He relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8; Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399; and Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634, as well as the Division Bench decision in MCD v. Krishan Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 316.

On the merits, the respondent argued that interference under Article 226 at the stage of a show cause notice is permissible in certain circumstances as laid down by the Supreme Court in J. Sri Nisha v. Enforcement Directorate, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 517 — namely, where the notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, is issued with a pre-determined approach, or amounts to abuse of process. The respondent contended that the 2012 order in W.P.(C) 7822/1999 had found the earlier notice bad in law because the lease had not been formally determined before the notice was issued, and that the fresh notice of 2026 was issued on the same grounds, amounting to abuse of process and pre-meditated action.

Whether the Impugned Order Was a “Judgment” Under the Letters Patent

The Division Bench traced the jurisdiction of intra-court appeal to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Lahore dated 21 March 1919, which is applicable to the Delhi High Court by virtue of Section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. Section 10 of the Act, 1966 separately provides that where a Single Judge exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, an appeal lies from the judgment of the Single Judge to a Division Court.

The bench worked through the Supreme Court's analysis in Shah Babulal Khimji, which had held that the expression “Judgment” in the Letters Patent must receive a wider and more liberal interpretation than the same expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court in that case had identified three categories: a final judgment deciding all issues; a preliminary judgment deciding maintainability or a preliminary objection; and an intermediary or interlocutory judgment. For an interlocutory order to qualify as a “Judgment”, the adverse effect on the party must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote, and the order must affect vital and valuable rights.

The bench also referred to Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 588, which had applied Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to the Patna High Court and held that the test is whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties, to be ascertained on the facts of each case. The categories set out in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. were also noted: orders which finally decide a question in the main case, orders which finally decide an issue materially affecting the final decision, and orders which finally decide a collateral issue are “Judgments”; routine orders facilitating progress of the case and orders causing inconvenience without finally determining rights are not.

Applying these principles, the Division Bench drew a distinction within the impugned order itself. The direction to complete pleadings was a routine facilitative order and could not be a “Judgment”. However, the direction restraining the Estate Officer from proceeding with the show cause notice was a different matter. The bench reasoned that Section 4 of the PP Act vests a statutory right in the Union of India to seek eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises by issuing a notice and initiating proceedings before the Estate Officer. Since the lease had expired in 1994, the respondent's occupation had ceased to be authorised within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the PP Act, as interpreted in Escorts Heart Institute. An interlocutory order restraining the exercise of that statutory right directly and immediately impacted a valuable right of the Union of India. The impugned order therefore qualified as a “Judgment” for the limited purpose of invoking the Division Bench's jurisdiction under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, and the appeal was held maintainable.

Rejection of the Abuse-of-Process Argument

The Division Bench declined to accept the respondent's contention that the notice dated 17 April 2026 was pre-meditated or amounted to abuse of process. The bench noted that the 2012 order in W.P.(C) 7822/1999 had quashed the 1999 notice and directed the Union of India to decide the respondent's representation for extension or renewal. That representation was processed, but the prayer was not acceded to. It was only thereafter that a fresh notice under Section 4 of the PP Act was issued. The bench observed that Section 4 vests a statutory right to seek eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises, and resort to that statutory provision cannot be characterised as misuse or abuse of process or as reflecting a pre-meditated mind.

The bench also noted that the respondent would have the fullest opportunity in the proceedings before the Estate Officer to explain why an eviction order should not be passed, including the ground that the notice itself is not lawful. The earlier order dated 9 April 2026 disposing of CS (OS) 253/2026 had recorded that any action for dispossession would be taken only in accordance with due process of law. The Division Bench observed that recourse to Section 4 of the PP Act is precisely such due process.

The Absence of Prima Facie Case Analysis

On the second issue, the Division Bench found the impugned order unsustainable on a straightforward ground: the Single Judge had passed an order halting statutory proceedings without recording any finding on prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of convenience. The Single Judge's entire reasoning, as extracted by the Division Bench, was that “looking at the chequered history of the previous litigation… the matter requires consideration.” No analysis of the three requirements for interim relief followed.

The Division Bench referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000) 5 SCC 57, which had held that although Order XXXIX of the CPC may not apply directly to Article 226 proceedings, the principles it embodies for granting ad interim relief must be taken into consideration. Those principles include whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue, whether refusal would involve greater injustice than grant, and the general requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. A coordinate bench of the Delhi High Court had reiterated this position in an order dated 7 August 2025 in W.P.(C) 11876/2025, Mohammed Javed v. Union of India & Ors.

The bench further referred to Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 697, which had addressed the rare situation where withholding interim relief would render the main petition infructuous. Even in such cases, the Supreme Court had held that a very strong prima facie case, of a standard higher than an ordinary prima facie case, along with balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting in the applicant's favour, must be demonstrated before such relief is granted. The Division Bench noted that even if the respondent's case was that non-interference with the show cause notice would render the writ petition infructuous, the Single Judge was still required to record findings on these aspects before granting the interim direction.

Since the impugned order contained no discussion and no finding on any of these requirements, the Division Bench held it was not sustainable.

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed LPA 336/2026 and set aside the order dated 24 April 2026 passed by the Single Judge in W.P.(C) 5608/2026, to the extent it directed the Estate Officer not to proceed further with the show cause notice dated 17 April 2026. All pending applications were disposed of. No order as to costs was made. The judgment was delivered on 26 May 2026.