Delhi HC upholds 2006 conviction of EPFO supervisor for Rs 500 bribe, orders surrender after 20 years on bail
Justice Madhu Jain dismissed Rajkumar appeal against his conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for taking Rs 500 from a provident fund claimant in a January 2003 CBI trap, holding that demand and conscious acceptance were proved by the complainant, the shadow witness, the recovery and pink hand washes, and that an objection to the missing Section 65-B certificate for the recorded conversation could not be raised for the first time in appeal.
A Rs 500 bribe demanded in January 2003 for releasing a provident fund payment has ended, more than twenty years later, with a Delhi High Court order to surrender. On 29 October 2026, Justice Madhu Jain dismissed the appeal of Rajkumar, a former section supervisor at the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation's sub-accounts office at Nehru Place, against his 2006 conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The demand was proved by the complainant and a written complaint lodged before the trap, the acceptance by a shadow witness who watched the notes go from hand to hand to shirt pocket, and the story of money thrust into the pocket was contradicted by phenolphthalein on both the appellant's hands. An objection that the taped conversation lacked a Section 65-B certificate, raised for the first time in appeal from a trial that ended in 2006, came too late.
A sanctioned claim that did not move, and a demand for Rs 500
The complainant, Pankaj Kumar Vishnoi alias Bishnoi, applied on 18 November 2002 to withdraw his provident fund and pension after leaving his job. His provident fund claim of Rs 60,279 and pension claim of Rs 17,624 were sanctioned on 2 and 3 January 2003, but no payment came. On repeated visits he was directed to Rajkumar, the section supervisor and head clerk, who, the prosecution said, asked for some “seva pani” to get the work done and on 29 January 2003 fixed the amount at Rs 500, saying he would collect it from the complainant's office. The complainant went to the CBI's Anti-Corruption Branch on 30 January 2003 with a written complaint, and RC No. DAI-2003-A-0008 was registered.
Inspector Alok Kumar put together a trap team the same day, with two DDA officials, Suresh Chand Garg and Madhav Thakur, as independent witnesses. The complainant produced five Rs 100 notes, their numbers were recorded and they were treated with phenolphthalein powder. He was told to hand over the money only on demand. Garg was made the shadow witness, and the complainant was given a digital recorder. At Nehru Place, R.K. Chandila, personnel manager at the complainant's former employer, told the team that Rajkumar was in his office. The complainant and Garg went in. According to the prosecution Rajkumar demanded and took the Rs 500 and put it in the left pocket of his shirt; on Garg's signal the team moved in, Thakur recovered the notes from the pocket, the numbers tallied, and separate washes of both hands and the shirt pocket in sodium carbonate solution turned pink. The recording was transferred to an audio cassette, a specimen of Rajkumar's voice was taken, the claim file was seized and, after sanction, a charge-sheet was filed.
The Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi, framed charges under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d). The prosecution examined eleven witnesses, among them the complainant (PW-1), Garg (PW-2), Thakur (PW-4), Chandila (PW-7), the forensic chemist (PW-3), the voice expert (PW-9), EPFO Assistant Commissioner Sarita Jain (PW-5) and dealing clerk A.K. Tirkey (PW-8). In his Section 313 statement Rajkumar denied any demand, said the complainant had thrust the money into his pocket, denied that his hand washes turned pink while conceding the pocket wash did slightly, and said he had nothing left to do on the claim once the dealing clerk prepared the payment scroll. His one defence witness, a colleague named Ram Kumar, described an unidentified man quarrelling with Rajkumar in December 2002, but admitted he did not know the complainant.
On 27 July 2006 the trial court convicted Rajkumar and the next day sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 10,000 under Section 7 and three years and Rs 15,000 under Section 13(2), to run concurrently. The High Court admitted the appeal on 18 August 2006 and suspended the sentence on a bond of Rs 25,000; the order recorded that the fine had already been deposited and that he had been on bail throughout the trial. The appeal was heard and reserved on 13 October 2026.
The appeal: shifting dates, a file that had left his desk, and a tape with no certificate
Counsel Yudhishtar Kahol and Kunal Kahol attacked the foundations of demand and voluntary acceptance. The written complaint, they said, bore an alteration in the date of the earlier demand, the complainant placed one visit on 26 January, a national holiday, and the dates and nature of the alleged demands kept shifting. No work was pending with Rajkumar: he had done his part by 2 January 2003, and the later steps belonged to the dealing assistant and the cash section, whose officers were on leave in January. Rajkumar had gone to Chandila's office as an acquaintance, and the complainant was summoned there only after the CBI learnt he was present.
The defence pointed to hostility as a motive for false implication, through PW-8's account of the complainant losing his temper when asked to come through the PRO with a visitor's pass and DW-1's account of the December 2002 quarrel, and questioned the FIR's chronology, since the complainant admitted signing the formal FIR after returning from the trap. On the electronic evidence, the witnesses variously described a Samsung digital recorder, a pencil-type tape recorder and an audio cassette; the original recorder was never produced or sent to the CFSL; the witnesses disagreed on whether the cassette was played when the transcript was prepared; and the demand at the spot, said to be by a gesture of the eyes, was nowhere in the transcript. Relying on Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, and Meghraj Singh v. CBI, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1683, counsel argued that without the original device or a Section 65-B certificate the copied cassette could not be used. They added that the prosecution had been allowed to lead PW-1, PW-4 and PW-7 after they omitted material facts, and that PW-7 could not remember whether Rajkumar took the money in his hand or the complainant put it in his pocket.
The CBI: a complaint written before the trap, and a witness who saw the notes change hands
Special Public Prosecutor Kamal Kant Goel, with Jyoti Goel, said the trial court had dealt with every one of these objections. The initial demand stood proved by the written complaint and PW-1; at the trap, PW-2 saw the demand made by a gesture of the eyes and the notes taken in the left hand, transferred to the right and put in the left shirt pocket, from where PW-4 recovered them. Lay witnesses calling the device a tape recorder did not show tampering; the recording was transferred at the spot to a new TDK D-60 cassette, sealed and sent with the specimen voice to the CFSL, whose expert gave a positive opinion. The FIR was registered by the Superintendent of Police before being handed to PW-10, a statement never challenged in cross-examination. As for pendency, the claim remained in the section Rajkumar supervised until the payment scroll was prepared on 29 January 2003, and PW-8 was a colleague trying to take the delay on himself.
Demand proved twice over, and a complaint untouched by the outcome of the trap
Justice Madhu Jain framed the question as whether demand and conscious acceptance of Rs 500 were proved beyond reasonable doubt, and took the governing law from the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731: for the unamended Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), the demand and the resulting acceptance or obtainment must be proved as facts in issue, by direct evidence or a complete chain of circumstances; once the foundational facts for Section 7 are proved, Section 20 raises a rebuttable presumption that the gratification was taken as a motive or reward; and that presumption does not extend to Section 13(1)(d).
On demand, the court found PW-1's account clear and categorical: he was sent to Rajkumar, was told some seva pani would have to be done, the amount was settled at Rs 500, and Rajkumar said he would come to PW-1's office on 30 January to collect it. The written complaint, lodged before the trap and so untouched by its outcome, corroborated this. The uncertainty over whether an earlier visit fell on 26 or 27 January did not matter; the complaint pinned the monetary demand to 29 January, and the defence had itself suggested to PW-1 that he visited on 27 January. The demand at the spot was independently proved: PW-1 asked about his refund, Rajkumar replied “ho jayega yaar” and, by a gesture of his eyes, indicated the money be handed over, as PW-2 saw and heard from inside the room, unshaken in cross-examination. Rajkumar's presence in Chandila's office that afternoon matched the complaint's statement that he would come to collect the money, and the theory of a chance visit did not explain why the claim was discussed and payment followed at once. This, the judge said, was not a case where demand was inferred from recovery alone.
Both hands pink: why the thrust-into-the-pocket story failed
PW-2 gave direct evidence of acceptance: notes received in the left hand, moved to the right, placed in the left shirt pocket, with no interval in which they could have gone anywhere else before the signal brought the team in. PW-2, PW-7 and PW-10 all spoke of the recovery from the shirt pocket, which the appellant did not dispute, and the chemist proved that the washes of the left hand, right hand and shirt pocket each tested positive for phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate. The difference between PW-1, who said the notes went into the right hand, and PW-2, who described left hand then right, concerned only which hand came first in a transaction lasting moments, and the positive washes of both hands supported handling with both. PW-7's failure to remember whether Rajkumar took the money in his hand or PW-1 put it in his pocket was not affirmative proof of forcible insertion; at no point did he say the notes were pushed in against Rajkumar's will.
The judge then turned to Rajkumar's own answer to question 14 in his Section 313 statement, that “the money was thrust into my pocket” and the pocket wash turned slightly pink while his hand washes did not. A Section 313 statement cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case, the court said, but where the prosecution has independently proved demand, acceptance and recovery, the answer may be weighed for the probability of the explanation offered. Here it collapsed: had the notes merely been thrust into the pocket, the chemical on both hands would be unexplained, and no suggestion of accidental contamination during the wash proceedings was ever put to the witnesses or elicited from the chemist. The Section 20 presumption therefore arose for Section 7 and was not rebutted, and the independent proof of demand and obtainment satisfied Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) as well.
Pendency, hostility, the FIR, leading questions and the tape
The claim was not a closed transaction, the court held. Payment had not been released; the payment scroll was prepared only on 29 January 2003, as Rajkumar himself admitted; the file then had to go to the cash section and had not gone when the trap was laid; and as section supervisor he remained associated with the claim until it moved on. The judge agreed that PW-8, back from leave by about 16 January, had tried to take the whole delay on himself to help a colleague. Section 7 does not require exclusive authority over every stage of a process; it is enough that the gratification was taken as a motive or reward for an official act connected with the public servant's functions.
The false-implication plea had no evidentiary footing: PW-8's visitor-pass incident was never put to PW-1, and DW-1 admitted he did not know PW-1. On the FIR, PW-10's unchallenged evidence that the RC was registered and signed by the SP before being entrusted to him ruled out registration after the trap. As for leading questions, Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727, holds that permission under Sections 142 and 154 of the Evidence Act does not efface a witness's testimony, and the findings of demand and acceptance in any case rested on PW-1's examination-in-chief and on PW-2, who was never treated as hostile.
The recorded conversation raised two issues. Before the trial court the attack was that the cassette was doctored and the transcript incomplete; no Section 65-B objection was taken when the cassette was tendered, the voice expert identified the voice as Rajkumar's without any suggestion of alteration being put to him, and missing words in the transcript showed imprecise transcription, not a doctored recording. The certificate objection came only in appeal. Under Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, a certificate under Section 65-B(4) is ordinarily a condition of admissibility, but Rajkumar had let the cassette be proved and cross-examined on the recording, the devices, the transfer and the voice comparison, denying the prosecution any chance to cure the defect. Sonu v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570, holds that an objection to the mode of proof must be taken when the record is tendered and cannot ordinarily be raised first in appeal; the trial here ended in 2006, well before Anvar was decided on 18 September 2014, and Sundar v. State, (2024) 12 SCC 764, applied Sonu to such trials. Even so, the judge treated the recording only as corroboration and distinguished Meghraj Singh, where the bribe-giver was not examined, there was no prior complaint and the recording's originality was in serious doubt. The case here was proved beyond reasonable doubt without treating the recording as substantive evidence at all.
Order
The appeal, CRL.A. 652/2006, was dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 27 July 2006 and the order on sentence dated 28 July 2006 of the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi, in CC No. 37/03, were left undisturbed: two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 10,000 under Section 7 and three years with a fine of Rs 15,000 under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d), to run concurrently, with default sentences of three and four months. Since his sentence had been suspended on 18 August 2006, Rajkumar was directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks of 29 October 2026 to serve the remainder, failing which the trial court is to take steps to secure his custody. The period already undergone is to be set off under Section 428 CrPC. Pending applications were disposed of, interim orders vacated, and a copy of the judgment sent to the trial court and the Jail Superintendent.