Delhi HC Reverses Acquittal, Convicts Accused Under Section 354A IPC; Censures Cross-Examination on Victim's Clothing and Religion

The Delhi High Court set aside a trial court's acquittal, convicted the accused of sexual harassment under Section 354A IPC, and directed all district judges to prevent cross-examination that targets a woman's attire or religion.

The Delhi High Court, in a criminal appeal filed by the State (NCT of Delhi), has reversed the acquittal of Sajid Ali and convicted him of sexual harassment punishable under Section 354A(1)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Additional Sessions Judge-01 (Central), Tis Hazari Court, Delhi had acquitted the accused by judgment dated 22 August 2014 in Sessions Case No. 165 of 2013. Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha, sitting singly, found the trial court's reasoning erroneous on every ground it had relied upon. Beyond reversing the acquittal, the court took strong exception to a line of cross-examination focused on the victim's clothing and the religion of the locality, directing that its concerns be circulated to all Principal District and Sessions Judges in Delhi and be incorporated into training programmes at the Delhi Judicial Academy.

The Incident and Charges

The prosecution case arose from an incident on 17 July 2013, between 6:30 PM and 7:00 PM, in the area in front of House No. 2, Makbara Rodgran, Lal Kuan, Delhi. PW4, a minor girl alleged to be 17 years of age, stated that the accused, Sajid Ali, had been stalking her for six months, touching her cheeks, touching her hips from behind, and making sexually coloured remarks.

On the basis of PW4's First Information Statement (Ext. PW4/A) given on 17 July 2013, FIR No. 110/2013 was registered at Hauz Qazi Police Station. The chargesheet alleged commission of offences under Sections 354A and 354D IPC and Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). After committal, the Additional Sessions Judge framed charge under Section 354A IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act on 21 October 2013. The accused pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution examined eight witnesses. The defence examined one witness, DW1, a neighbour, who stated that on the date of the incident, the accused and others had gone to the police chowki to complain about PW4's conduct and attire, and that the accused had been falsely implicated because of his criminal antecedents and at the instance of the prosecutrix who was in a relationship with Sub-Inspector Pawan Tomar.

Why the Trial Court Acquitted

The Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the accused on six grounds: failure to prove the identity of the caller who informed the police; a discrepancy in the time of arrest; inconsistency about where PW4's written complaint was recorded; uncertainty about whether PW4's illness was typhoid or a simple fever; the investigating officer's failure to inquire into a complaint filed by the accused and over fifty residents against PW4; and the non-examination of independent witnesses from the crowded scene of occurrence.

The Age-Proof Problem and the POCSO Charge

A preliminary issue was whether the prosecution had established that PW4 was below 18 years of age, which is essential to attract the POCSO Act. The prosecution relied on Ext. PW5/A, a birth certificate showing a date of birth of 20 November 1996, and the testimony of PW5, Sub-Registrar, Birth and Death, Shahdara South Zone.

PW5's evidence unravelled under cross-examination. He produced the birth register covering 1 January 1996 to 28 December 1996 and admitted that it contained no entry corresponding to Ext. PW5/A. He further admitted that when birth registration occurs more than a year after the event, an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) is required—but no such order existed. PW5 also admitted that no records in the SDM office could be traced to verify whether Ext. PW5/A was genuine, and he could not say whether the certificate was genuine or false.

PW3, the mother of PW4, admitted in cross-examination that PW4's birth had not been registered at the MCD office at the time of birth, that she could not recall the year in which her daughter was born, and that registration was done only on 23 June 2009—approximately thirteen years after the claimed date of birth.

Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha held that the prosecution had failed to satisfactorily establish the age or minority of PW4. Without proof of minority, the provisions of the POCSO Act could not be invoked. The POCSO charge therefore fell away.

Dismantling the Trial Court's Grounds for Acquittal on Section 354A IPC

The court examined each of the six reasons given by the trial court and found none of them sustainable.

On the identity of the caller who informed police: the court held this was entirely immaterial because the accused himself did not dispute that PW4 had complained against him. His defence was false implication, not that no complaint was made.

On the discrepancy in the time of arrest—PW4 stated arrest around 7:15 PM while Ext. PW4/C arrest memo showed 9:00 PM—the court applied the settled principle that a defective investigation, unless it goes to the root of the prosecution case, cannot by itself be a ground for acquittal. Citing C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. (2010) 9 SCC 567, Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263, and Gajoo v. State of Uttarakhand (2012) 9 SCC 532, the court held that the court's duty is to examine prosecution evidence independently of investigative lapses.

On the place where PW4 wrote her complaint—PW4 said she wrote it at the police post, the IO said it was written at PW4's residence—the court held this minor inconsistency could not, standing alone, demolish the entire prosecution case.

The illness of PW4—whether typhoid or simple fever—was held to be wholly irrelevant. The case was about whether she was sexually harassed on her way home, not about the reason she had gone out in the first place.

On independent witnesses: the court held that non-examination of independent witnesses from the scene is not, by itself, a ground to disbelieve the prosecution, and depends on the facts of each case.

The Complaint Against PW4 and What the Court Found in It

The most pointed portion of the judgment concerned the trial court's reliance on the investigating officer's failure to inquire into Ext. PW2/DA, a complaint signed by over fifty residents of the locality against PW4. The trial court had treated this non-investigation as a defect in the prosecution case.

Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha read Ext. PW2/DA in full. The complaint alleged that PW4: resided alone with her mother without male members; wore clothes that had an “adverse effect on the innocent boys of the area”; and was indulging in immoral activities. The court asked the counsel for the accused, in open court, to identify the cognizable offence disclosed in Ext. PW2/DA. Counsel could not answer.

The court then examined the statutory framework. Under Section 154 Cr.P.C., an FIR must relate to a cognizable offence. Section 156 Cr.P.C. empowers police to investigate cognizable cases. Section 157 Cr.P.C. requires a reason to suspect commission of a cognizable offence before investigation begins. The proviso to Section 157(1)(b) explicitly permits the officer-in-charge not to investigate where there is no sufficient ground.

The court held that Ext. PW2/DA disclosed no cognizable offence, and therefore no investigation into it was legally required. The trial court's reliance on the IO's non-investigation of this complaint as a defect in the prosecution case was erroneous.

A second complaint, Ext. DW1/A, was filed with the DCP Central on 29 August 2013—over six weeks after the incident. It alleged blackmailing by PW4 and her mother and sought action against SI Pawan Tomar. The court noted that if the accused genuinely believed blackmailing was occurring, available remedies included approaching higher authorities or the jurisdictional court. No such step had been taken.

Cross-Examination Based on Clothing and Religion: The Court's Censure

A significant part of the judgment addresses the manner in which PW4 was cross-examined on behalf of the accused before the trial court. Counsel had put questions asking whether the locality was Muslim and orthodox, whether residents objected to PW4's western clothes, what she was wearing on the day of the incident, and whether she generally wore “western tight clothes.”

Before the High Court, when asked why these questions had been put, counsel stated: “Janab, har mohalle mein ek reeti riwaz hota hain jinko sabko manna padega.”

Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha rejected this submission unequivocally. The court held that the only question before the court was whether the testimony of PW4 disclosed commission of an offence under Section 354A IPC. The religion of the locality residents, and the clothing of PW4, had no bearing on that question. The IPC and the POCSO Act apply to every person irrespective of religion, and neither religion nor local custom can justify unlawful conduct or impose restrictions on a woman's personal choices.

The court found that these questions were not directed at testing PW4's truthfulness or impeaching her credit under Section 155 of the Evidence Act. They were, in the court's assessment, intended to insult, shame and annoy her within the meaning of Sections 151 and 152 of the Evidence Act. Such questions ought to have been disallowed at the outset by the trial judge.

Referring to State of U.P. v. Raghubir Singh (1997) 3 SCC 77, the court reiterated that courts have complete dominion over scandalous questions put to shake the credit of a witness and may forbid them. An advocate, as an officer of the court, cannot use the privilege of cross-examination as a licence to humiliate a witness or attack her dignity.

The court also held that the suggestion in the complaints—that PW4's clothing could “corrupt young boys”—reflected an unacceptable mindset. The answer lay in teaching children to respect boundaries and treat every person with dignity, not in controlling what women wear.

PW4's Evidence Assessed

On the merits of PW4's evidence, the court found her version consistent across three statements: the FIS/FIR (Ext. PW4/A) of 17 July 2013, the Section 164 statement (Ext. PW4/B) of 19 July 2013, and her deposition before the trial court. In all three, she consistently described the accused touching her cheeks despite her objection, and making sexually coloured remarks. The only variation was that the Section 164 statement also mentioned the accused touching her hips, which was absent from the FIR and the court testimony. The court treated this as a minor discrepancy that did not affect the core account.

The court held that PW4's consistent account of unwanted physical contact—touching of cheeks—combined with the sexually coloured remarks attributed to the accused, clearly made out the offence under Section 354A(1)(i) IPC, which covers physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. PW4's earlier complaints of eve-teasing by other boys of the locality, admitted by her mother PW3, did not automatically render the present complaint false.

The court also noted, drawing on State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Marlokar AIR 1991 SC 207, that even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and the protection of law, and her evidence cannot be discarded on the basis of character imputations.

Applying the principles governing appeals against acquittal—from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, Babu Sahebogouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248—the court found the trial court's conclusions perverse and warranting interference.

Directions to the District Judiciary

Beyond the conviction, the court issued a word of caution addressed to all judicial officers of the district judiciary in Delhi. Presiding judges are duty-bound to protect the dignity of every witness. Cross-examination is a valuable right but is not an unrestricted licence. Whenever questions are irrelevant, indecent, scandalous, insulting, or intended merely to annoy or humiliate a witness, the judge must intervene without hesitation. This duty assumes greater importance where the witness is a child, a victim of a sexual offence, or a person in a vulnerable position. Judicial proceedings cannot become a second site of trauma.

Questions concerning a woman's clothing, character, lifestyle, religion, or personal choices, unless strictly relevant to an issue in the case, must not be permitted.

Order

Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha allowed the State's appeal in CRL.A. 1065/2016, set aside the judgment of acquittal dated 22 August 2014, and convicted Sajid Ali of the offence punishable under Section 354A(1)(i) IPC. The POCSO charge was not sustained for want of proof of the victim's minority.

The accused was directed to appear before the High Court on 12 August 2026 for hearing on sentence under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C.

A copy of the judgment was directed to be forwarded to all Principal District and Sessions Judges in Delhi for circulation among judicial officers under their respective jurisdictions. A further copy was directed to be sent to the Director (Academics), Delhi Judicial Academy, with a direction to address the concerns in the judgment through training and sensitisation programmes.