35-year no-remission term for acid murder stays: Delhi HC will not reopen trial court sentence

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court noted that only High Courts and the Supreme Court can fix such terms after V. Sriharan, but dismissed the writ petition because the High Court itself had confirmed the sentence in 2013 and the Supreme Court had dismissed his special leave petition.

On 13 May 2011 a Delhi trial court sentenced Mahender, alias Dabbu, to life imprisonment for killing his wife with acid, and ordered that he serve 35 actual years before any remission could be considered. On 4 November 2026 the Delhi High Court refused to disturb that term.

The petitioner argued that a trial court has no power to fix such a term, citing the Constitution Bench ruling in V. Sriharan. The High Court set that rule out at length but declined relief. It had itself confirmed the sentence in 2013, and the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition in 2014.

Justice Navin Chawla wrote the judgment for a Division Bench with Justice Arun Bhardwaj. The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

An acid attack and a dying declaration

On 29 February 2008 the petitioner’s wife, aged 24, was taken to hospital with 75 per cent acid burns, as the doctor recorded. On 12 April 2008 the hospital told police she had died. FIR No. 109/2008 at Police Station Saraswati Vihar, under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, was converted to Section 302.

The petitioner surrendered before a court on 5 March 2008. The Additional Sessions Judge-01, North-West District, Rohini Courts, convicted him by an order dated 12 May 2011 in Sessions Case No. 145/2008.

The conviction rested on the dying declaration recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Exhibit PW-15/A. Three witnesses, PW-8 Sanjay, Head Constable Devi Dutt (PW-12) and ASI Nain Singh (PW-16), said she had also told them her husband threw the acid.

Life, a fine and 35 years without remission

On 13 May 2011 the trial court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life, with a fine of Rs 10,000 and one year’s simple imprisonment in default. Relying on Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, it held that he must serve an actual 35 years, with no remission considered before then.

The High Court dismissed his appeal, Crl.A. 788/2011, on 1 November 2013. It held that both dying declarations, one to the PCR van in-charge and one to the magistrate, were truthful and voluntary. The defence had not cross-examined the two key witnesses on them.

On sentence, that bench began by describing acid attack as a horrifying form of gender-based violence. The Supreme Court dismissed his special leave petition, SLP (Crl.) No. 6040/2014, on 1 August 2014.

The writ petition filed in 2026

The petitioner then filed W.P.(CRL) 2943/2026 under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was filed along with a bail application, CRL.M.(BAIL) 1806/2026.

He asked the court to quash the sentencing order of 13 May 2011 and send the matter back so the trial court could hear him afresh on sentence, in line with V. Sriharan.

What the petitioner argued

Mr Rishi Malhotra, Senior Advocate, appeared for the petitioner. He cited V. Sriharan, Shiva Kumar, Vikas Chaudhary and Ravinder Singh for the rule that only the High Court and the Supreme Court can fix a specific term of incarceration. The trial court’s sentence, he said, was without jurisdiction and void.

He also relied on Kanishk Sinha v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443. Because Sriharan was not held to apply only prospectively, he argued, it operates retrospectively, and confirmation of the sentence before it was decided could not deny him the benefit.

What the State answered

Mr Amol Sinha, Additional Standing Counsel, appeared for the State. He said a sentence confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court cannot be reopened in writ jurisdiction, citing Neeta Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761.

On merits, he said fixed-term sentences were accepted in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745, and Swamy Shraddananda. Sriharan, he argued, left the concept intact and decided only which court may impose it, a question of forum and not of power.

From Swamy Shraddananda to Sriharan

The bench traced the line of cases. Swamy Shraddananda addressed the gap between a life sentence cut short by remission and the death penalty. It found a basis for a special category of sentence, beyond remission, in the few cases where death might be substituted.

The Constitution Bench in Sriharan considered two questions. The second, as the High Court quoted it, was:

“Whether a special category of sentence instead of death for a term exceeding 14 years can be made by putting that category beyond grant of remission?” (para 16)

The Supreme Court answered that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the rest of the convict’s life, subject to remission under Articles 72 and 161 and Section 432 of the Code. It held that only the High Court, and on appeal the Supreme Court, can impose a fixed term above 14 years.

Later rulings on fixed-term sentences

Shiva Kumar (2023) 9 SCC 817 held that constitutional courts can fix such a term even where capital punishment was not proposed. The term cannot be below 14 years, given Section 433A of the Code.

Vikas Choudhary (2023) 19 SCC 144 said trial courts are foreclosed from imposing a modified term. Ravinder Singh (2024) 2 SCC 323 extended the power to cases where the maximum punishment is life, but limited it to grave cases and required cogent reasons.

The bench also noted Ramasrey alias Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1402, which held a sentence for the remainder of natural life valid.

The Naval Kishore example

The bench set out Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 2000, at length. The trial court there had directed that the appellants remain in prison for the rest of their lives. The High Court had affirmed without examining whether the trial court could do so.

The Supreme Court held the trial court incompetent to give that direction. Exercising its own power, it substituted 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment without statutory remission, citing the murder of three people including two minor children, custody already served and satisfactory conduct in jail.

Why the bench left the sentence alone

Justice Chawla noted that neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court had the benefit of Sriharan when the sentence was confirmed. The High Court’s judgment of 1 November 2013 had considered the gravity of the allegations: the petitioner had been found guilty of throwing acid on his wife, resulting in her death.

The sentence had been affirmed by the High Court, which, even under Sriharan and the later cases, has the power to impose a fixed term. The Supreme Court had then dismissed the special leave petition.

“we see no reason in the present Writ Petition to interfere” (para 24)

The bench’s reasons do not separately deal with the retrospectivity argument based on Kanishk Sinha, or with the State’s reliance on Neeta Singh.

Order

The writ petition, W.P.(CRL) 2943/2026, was dismissed along with the pending application. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life, with 35 actual years before any remission is considered, stands. There was no order as to costs.