Two digits were missing from the address on the postal receipt, and that is why a 2017 arbitral award is still open to objection
Justice Ajay Digpaul held the presumption of service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot be divorced from proper addressing, and refused to disturb the trial court's finding under Article 227.
Under a Gas Sale Agreement dated 1 November 2011, the petitioner was to supply 450 standard cubic metres a day of gas to the respondent's manufacturing unit at Village Jat Joshi, Sonipat, from 15 January 2012 to 14 January 2017. It claimed ₹32,12,190 for supplies that were not paid for. A sole arbitrator made an award on 24 March 2017 directing the respondent to pay that sum with interest and ₹2,50,000 as costs.
Nearly a decade later the award is still unexecuted, because the award-holder has been unable to establish that it delivered a signed copy of the award to the other side — and under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the period for filing objections does not begin to run until it does. On 14 October 2026 the Delhi High Court declined to interfere with the trial court's conclusion that the objections were within time.
What the receipt did and did not say
The arbitrator had despatched the award on 24 March 2017. The petitioner relied on a Speed Post receipt and a Delivery Report recording delivery of the consignment on 25 March 2017, and asked the Court to draw from that the presumption of service.
The difficulty is in the address written on the receipt. The respondent's registered office address includes the premises number “26/2” in Shakti Nagar. That part of the address was omitted from the Speed Post receipt. The Court held that “26/2” is not merely an additional description of the locality; it is the premises number which identifies the particular flat, building or premises in Shakti Nagar at which the registered office is situated. Without it the receipt does not identify the precise premises to which the communication was addressed. The Delivery Report records delivery of the consignment on 25 March 2017, but it does not by itself establish that the article was delivered at 26/2, Shakti Nagar, or that the respondent received it.
Proper addressing is the foundation of the presumption
The legal proposition the judgment turns on is a sequencing point. The presumption of service can arise only when the foundational requirement of proper addressing is established. The presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot be divorced from the requirement that the communication must have been properly addressed; it is only when that foundation is laid that the subsequent fact of postal delivery can give rise to a presumption of service. The mere fact that an article was delivered at a locality cannot, by itself, establish delivery to a particular company when the address does not identify the premises at which that company is situated.
The point was sharpened by what else was on the file: the respondent's complete address was available on the record, and yet the very document on which the petitioner sought to found the presumption omitted the premises number. The District Court was therefore justified in examining whether the postal material was sufficient to establish valid delivery of the award.
The limits of Article 227
Having found the trial court entitled to make that examination, the High Court declined to make it again. The finding that the material was insufficient to establish valid service could not be said to suffer from a patent lack of jurisdiction or perversity, and re-appreciation of the postal documents to arrive at a different factual conclusion would fall outside the limited scope of Article 227.
One further argument was disposed of as misconceived. The petitioner had submitted that the trial court erred in holding service defective contrary to the mode and manner of service prescribed in the arbitration agreement. The Court's answer was that the question does not arise: once it is demonstrated that the complete address was not provided, so that no presumption of service arises, whether delivery had been effected in the manner prescribed by the relevant clause of the agreement is of no consequence.
The Court found no ground to interfere with the order of 9 October 2025. The material on record does not establish that the signed copy of the arbitral award was duly delivered to the respondent on 25 March 2017 so as to commence the period of limitation under Section 34(3). The omission of the premises number “26/2” from the Speed Post receipt assumes significance, particularly when it forms part of the respondent's complete registered-office address. The trial court could not be said to have acted without jurisdiction in holding that the objections under Section 34 were not barred by limitation.
The petition was dismissed with pending applications disposed of, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the objections under Section 34 in accordance with law, with the judgment to be uploaded forthwith. Mr N.L. Ganapathi and Ms Anaida Khan appeared for the petitioner, and Mr K.K. Aggarwal and Ms Gayatri Aggarwal for the respondent.