No injunction where the claimed copyright itself is not prima facie established

Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav refused an interim injunction over Delhi Law House titles, holding a claim to a share of revenue is compensable in damages, not by restraint.

The widow of a law publisher has failed to obtain an interim injunction restraining the family firm from dealing in the titles she says she owns the copyright in. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav held that she had not shown a prima facie right in the copyrights claimed, so the question of infringement does not arise at this stage; that the only goodwill pleaded in the suit belongs to Delhi Law House and not to her, so no case of passing off is made out; and that the loss she alleges is a loss of revenue from book sales, capable of computation and of being met by damages. The application was dismissed, with every question of title left to the trial.

A publishing house, two wills and a reconstitution deed

The suit, CS(COMM) 492 of 2024, was filed by Mrs. Shakti Sagar, widow of the late Subhash Sagar, against The Delhi Law House and three individual defendants, together with Delhi Law House through its partner the Subhash Sagar HUF and that HUF through its karta. Mr. Gaurav Bahl appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. Sanjay Vashishtha, Mr. Lavkesh Bhambhani, Mr. Siddhartha and Mr. Aditya for defendants 1 to 4.

The application decided here, I.A. 31143 of 2024 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sought to restrain the first four defendants, directly or indirectly, from using, transferring or sharing the titles in question. The documents on which the competing claims to those titles rest are set out in the judgment: wills dated 17 October 1995 and 21 January 2021, a certificate of 1 April 1962, guidelines of 1 December 1995, and a deed of reconstitution of 1 April 2016. The suit was reserved on 29 September 2026 and the order pronounced on 7 October 2026.

The first condition, and why it was enough

On the copyright claim the finding is short. The plaintiff had not been able to show a prima facie right in the copyrights claimed, and with no prima facie title the question of infringement does not arise at this stage.

The passing off claim failed for a different and sharper reason. An action for passing off protects goodwill and reputation. The only goodwill pleaded in the plaint was that of Delhi Law House, built over four decades of publishing. The plaintiff is admittedly not a partner of that firm, and she had disclaimed any relief relating to the partnership. No goodwill of her own having been shown, no prima facie case of passing off was made out.

Having failed the first of the three conditions, the application was liable to fail on that ground alone. Justice Kaurav nonetheless went on to the other two, which is what gives the order its practical interest.

Balance of convenience, and the Najma Heptulla line

On balance of convenience the judgment reads the substance of the grievance rather than the form of the prayer. The titles have been published for decades under the banner of Delhi Law House, a family business managed by the second defendant. The plaintiff's complaint, in substance, is about her share in the revenues earned from the titles — a reading the court drew from her own prayers for rendition of accounts and for damages.

For comparable circumstances the court turned to its own decision in Najma Heptulla, where an injunction was declined to the legal representative of an author. There the book India Wins Freedom had been published for thirty years under a 1958 agreement without objection from the author's widow or any descendant, so the balance of convenience was against the plaintiff and no irreparable loss would be caused, since the publisher could always be directed to keep true and correct accounts of sales. The principle that judgment stated is the one applied here: where the author's desire, intention and direction was that the work be published, the only interest a legal representative holding the copyright can have is adequate royalty from its publication, and so long as that right is secured it is not advisable or proper for courts to injunct the publication of the work.

The plaintiff here, the judgment holds, stands on a weaker footing than the plaintiff in Najma Heptulla, because her own title is not even prima facie established. Restraining defendants 1 to 4 from dealing in these titles until the conclusion of the trial, on the strength of a title yet to be shown, would cause them greater inconvenience than the plaintiff would suffer if the injunction were declined.

Which losses are irreparable

The third condition produced the most portable passage. The loss alleged was the loss of revenue from the sale of books. That loss is capable of computation, and the plaintiff had herself sought a decree for the sums to be ascertained on rendition of accounts.

The contrast drawn is with Shruti Manav Sharma, where the Supreme Court found an irreparable injury in the loss of a controlling shareholding in family companies, and found it precisely because that was not mere financial loss capable of computation and recovery from a solvent party — the kind of loss which courts, following Evans Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola SA, have held to be adequately met by an award of damages. The injury alleged in this case is of that latter kind, and if the plaintiff ultimately succeeds it can be adequately compensated in damages.

Order

With no prima facie case, the balance of convenience against her and no irreparable injury shown, the application was dismissed. Justice Kaurav clarified that the observations are only prima facie and for the purpose of deciding the application, and are not an expression of opinion on the merits. The questions of authorship, assignment, the genuineness and effect of the two wills, the 1962 certificate, the 1995 guidelines, the 2016 reconstitution deed and the pleas of defendants 1 to 4 are all to be decided at trial on the evidence led, uninfluenced by anything said in the order, with all contentions left open. The suit and the connected application were directed to be listed before the Joint Registrar on the date already fixed, 29 October 2026.