Delhi HC Dismisses VIMAL Elaichi Maker's Challenge to FDA Mumbai Notice for Lack of Territorial Jurisdiction

The Delhi High Court held that P.B. Agro LLP could not challenge an FDA Mumbai show cause notice before it, even though the company and FSSAI are based in Delhi. The court found no material part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial limits, and directed the petitioner to Maharashtra courts.

The Delhi High Court dismissed a writ petition filed by P.B. Agro LLP — Master Licensee for manufacture and sale of cardamom (elaichi) and pan masala not containing tobacco under the brand “VIMAL” — challenging a show cause notice dated 11 August 2026 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Food), Food and Drug Administration, Greater Mumbai Division, Maharashtra. Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, sitting singly, held on 14 September 2026 that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The impugned notice was addressed not to P.B. Agro LLP but to three of its brand ambassadors, all residents of Mumbai, in connection with the advertising campaign for VIMAL Elaichi. The petition was dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability, with the court expressly declining to express any opinion on the merits of the petitioner's challenge.

The Dispute Before the High Court

P.B. Agro LLP promotes its cardamom product under the VIMAL brand through formal brand endorsement agreements with reputed actors. The agreements required the advertising campaigns to comply with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and the brand ambassadors agreed to render services on the basis of the petitioner's representations concerning the quality and credibility of the product and its compliance with law.

The petitioner learnt through media reports that the FDA, Mumbai — acting under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act) — had issued the impugned notice to three of its brand ambassadors in relation to the VIMAL Elaichi advertising campaign. The petitioner's grievance was that, although the notice concerned its own advertising campaign, no notice was issued to it and it was not afforded any opportunity of hearing.

The impugned notice bore the heading “Government of Maharashtra, Food and Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Mumbai” and was issued with reference to Section 24 of the FSS Act, dealing with restrictions on advertisements and prohibition of unfair trade practices. Respondent no. 3 also referred to Section 30(2)(a) of the FSS Act concerning prohibition of pan masala in Maharashtra.

The petitioner sought quashing of the notice and a direction restraining the respondents from taking any coercive action against the petitioner or its brand ambassadors for alleged non-compliance.

Respondents in the petition were the Union of India through the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; FSSAI, Delhi; the Assistant Commissioner (Food), FDA, Greater Mumbai Division; and the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA), Delhi. The State of Maharashtra was not before the court.

The Territorial Jurisdiction Question

Before the court could consider the merits, the respondents raised a preliminary objection: the petition was non-maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. Arguments on this issue were heard from both sides.

P.B. Agro LLP contended that the petition was maintainable under both Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Under Article 226(1), it argued that FSSAI — the apex statutory body under the FSS Act, established under Section 4 and situated in Delhi — was a respondent, and that FDA, Mumbai, functioned under FSSAI's directions under Section 16(5) of the FSS Act. The impugned notice had also been marked to the CEO, FSSAI, in Delhi.

Under Article 226(2), the petitioner argued that a substantial part of the cause of action arose in Delhi: the petitioner carried on business only from Delhi, the advertising campaign was managed and paid for from Delhi, and the injury from the impugned notice was felt in Delhi. It further argued that the directions in the impugned notice — requiring brand ambassadors to take down advertisements from platforms under their control and not to assist in disseminating the same — effectively amounted to a ban on the petitioner's advertisements. The direction requiring sponsors to produce documentary information to establish that VIMAL Elaichi was an independent product actually available for sale could, in substance, be complied with only by the petitioner. On these grounds, the petitioner argued the notice was, in substance, directed against it in Delhi.

The petitioner also relied on the pending proceedings before CCPA in Delhi, which it said arose from a direction of the Allahabad High Court in a public interest litigation concerning surrogate advertisements and pan masala.

The respondents countered that the Ministry had no role in issuing the impugned notice and that no substantive relief was sought against the Ministry or CCPA. The impugned notice was issued by FDA, Mumbai, under the Government of Maharashtra, and the three noticees were all residents of Mumbai. None of the noticees had challenged the notice before the Delhi High Court.

How the Court Reasoned

Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma identified the principal question: whether the Delhi High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction in respect of a show cause notice issued by FDA, Mumbai, merely because the petitioner was based in Delhi and certain respondents — the Ministry, FSSAI, and CCPA — were located there.

The court found on the undisputed facts that the impugned notice was issued by FDA, Mumbai; bore the heading of the Government of Maharashtra; was addressed to three brand ambassadors resident in Mumbai; and that no direction or communication of FSSAI, Delhi, had directed FDA, Mumbai, to take that action. The notice was, therefore, independently initiated by the FDA, Mumbai, in the exercise of its own statutory powers. The court held that the mere fact that FSSAI is the apex body under the FSS Act and situated in Delhi could not alter the source or character of the impugned notice.

On the petitioner's business nexus with Delhi, the court was clear that the facts of incorporation, office location, payment of brand ambassadors, and management of the advertising campaign from Delhi did not constitute a part of the cause of action. The impugned notice was not addressed to the petitioner; no direction had been issued to it to remove any advertisement, produce any document, or appear before any authority. The court held that a petitioner cannot be permitted to create territorial jurisdiction by referring to facts with no nexus to the impugned action.

The court drew on the Supreme Court's ruling in Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim: (2007) 11 SCC 335, which held that only facts constituting a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action can confer territorial jurisdiction. It also applied Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu: (1994) 4 SCC 711, where the Supreme Court held that facts such as the petitioner's office location, its submission of documents from Calcutta, and its receipt of communications there were merely incidental and conferred no jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court.

The court also engaged with the petitioner's own pleadings. P.B. Agro LLP had averred that pan masala was prohibited in Maharashtra; that VIMAL Elaichi was not a prohibited commodity; that FDA, Mumbai, had allegedly admitted in media interviews that the petitioner's pan masala had not been manufactured in Maharashtra since 2001; and that no manufacturing unit or transport network dealing in VIMAL-branded pan masala had been found in Maharashtra by GST authorities. The court observed that these averments, far from establishing Delhi's connection to the dispute, themselves demonstrated that the central controversy was situated in Maharashtra — concerning the legality of an action by FDA, Mumbai, about alleged activities in that State.

On the CCPA proceedings in Delhi, the court noted that the CCPA's proceedings arose from a separate public interest litigation before the Allahabad High Court and that no order of CCPA had been challenged in the present petition. The CCPA's proceedings and the FDA, Mumbai's notice were, prima facie, separate actions by separate authorities. The mere pendency of similar proceedings before an authority in Delhi could not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court in respect of an independent notice issued by a State authority in Maharashtra.

The court also rejected the argument premised on the alleged injury to the petitioner. Since the impugned action was only a show cause notice and no order had been passed against the petitioner (which had not even been served with a notice to reply), the claimed injury was founded substantially on apprehension about the possible consequences of the notice issued to the brand ambassadors. Such apprehension did not amount to a completed or substantial cause of action arising in Delhi.

On the reliance placed on Bakshish Ahmad v. Union of India and Ors.: 2026 INSC 630, the court distinguished the facts. That case involved a member of the Border Security Force challenging his dismissal before the Delhi High Court, and the Supreme Court's conclusion rested on the specific statutory context of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 — particularly Rule 22(4), which required every order of dismissal to be reported to the Director General, BSF, in New Delhi — and the principle that the Union of India would be liable for enforcement of a quashing order. No such statutory or administrative nexus was present in the case before the court.

Accepting the petitioner's argument, the court observed, would have far-reaching consequences: since FSSAI is situated in Delhi, every show cause notice or order issued by any Food Safety Commissioner or Food and Drug Administration officer across the country could be challenged before the Delhi High Court, even where the notice was issued by a State authority, the affected persons were in that State, the alleged activity occurred there, and no decision of FSSAI was under challenge. The court held this would render the territorial limitations in Article 226 practically meaningless.

The court quoted approvingly from a Coordinate Bench's judgment in Indure Private Limited v. Government of NCT of Delhi: 2026 SCC OnLine Del 2386, which cautioned against treating the Delhi High Court as a “mini-pan-India superior court” merely because an apex body happens to be located in the national capital.

Forum Conveniens

Even assuming some remote or incidental cause of action with Delhi, the court invoked the doctrine of forum conveniens. Citing Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India: (2004) 6 SCC 254 and State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd.: (2023) 7 SCC 791, the court held that even a slender factual connection with a court's territory need not compel that court to exercise jurisdiction when the material and substantial facts of the dispute arise within another court's territory. The entire cause of action had arisen in Maharashtra, the actual noticees were residents of Maharashtra and had not challenged the notice themselves, and the courts of Maharashtra were the natural and convenient forum.

Outcome

The petition in W.P.(C) 12664/2026 was dismissed as non-maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The court additionally held that courts in Maharashtra were the more appropriate and convenient forum for the petitioner's grievances concerning the impugned notice, applying the doctrine of forum conveniens. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the challenge to the show cause notice. The pending application in CM APPL. 58858/2026 was disposed of as a consequence.