Delhi HC Orders Release of Two Life Convicts After SRB Rejected Their Pleas on Gravity of Offence Alone

Justice A. J. Bhambhani held that the Sentence Review Board's repeated, copy-paste rejections relying solely on offence gravity violated Article 21 and the Delhi remission policy, and directed immediate release of both petitioners.

The High Court of Delhi on 10 August 2026 directed the forthwith release of two life convicts — Ramesh s/o Jaswant and Tasleem s/o Islamuddin — after finding that the Sentence Review Board (SRB) had rejected their pleas for premature release through repetitive, stereotype-driven orders that ignored mandatory considerations under the 2004 Guidelines issued by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Chapter XX of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018. Justice A. J. Bhambhani, sitting singly, ruled that the SRB's reliance on the gravity and heinousness of the original offences as the sole or dominant ground for rejection was impermissible in law, amounted to manifest arbitrariness, and violated the petitioners' right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court declined to remand the matters for fresh consideration, holding that such a course would be futile given the pattern of unreasoned rejections across multiple SRB meetings spanning years.

The Convictions and Custody Periods

Ramesh was convicted under sections 304-II, 376, 377, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) in a case registered at P.S. Anand Parbat, Delhi (FIR No. 198/1992). As of 3 January 2026, he had undergone more than 31 years of actual imprisonment, exclusive of remission. Including earned remission, his total period of custody exceeded 40 years.

Tasleem was convicted under section 376(2)(g) IPC in a case registered at P.S. Kalyanpuri, Delhi (FIR No. 571/1997). As of 6 October 2025, he had undergone over 15 years of actual imprisonment, with total custody including remission exceeding 19 years. He was approximately 28 years old at the time of the offence and around 53 at the time of the judgment.

Both petitioners challenged the SRB's rejection of their premature release pleas at its meetings dated 30 August 2024 and 18 September 2024, and the consequent order dated 4 December 2024 of the Government of NCT of Delhi, Home (General) Department, bearing No. F.18/102/2003/2024-II/HG/3026-27.

By order dated 22 January 2026, the court appointed Ms. Rebecca M. John, senior counsel, as Amicus Curiae to assist in determining the correct interpretation and application of Delhi's premature release policy in light of judicial precedent.

The Legal Framework: Section 432 CrPC, the 2004 Guidelines, and Delhi Prison Rules

The Amicus drew the court's attention to section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — corresponding to section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — which empowers the “appropriate Government” to suspend or remit, wholly or in part, the sentence of a convicted person. Section 433A CrPC places a restriction: where a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed for an offence for which death is also a prescribed punishment, no release can occur unless the convict has served at least 14 years of actual imprisonment.

The administrative instruments governing premature release in Delhi are: the 2004 Guidelines (Order No. F-18/5/94/Home (Genl) dated 16 July 2004), which establish the SRB's composition, eligibility criteria, and procedure; and Chapter XX of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018. Both instruments set out a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to premature release consideration, including whether the convict has lost the propensity to commit crime, the possibility of rehabilitation as a useful member of society, and the socio-economic condition of the convict's family.

The 2004 Guidelines prescribe eligibility for consideration upon completion of 14 years' actual imprisonment for those covered by section 433A CrPC. For certain heinous offences, a convict is eligible for consideration only after 20 years including remission, and the total period of incarceration including remission ordinarily should not exceed 25 years. Clause 5(iii) of the 2004 Guidelines and Rule 1257(c) of the Delhi Prison Rules expressly state that the SRB “shall not ordinarily decline a premature release of a prisoner merely on the ground that the police have not recommended his release.”

Rule 1244 of the Delhi Prison Rules identifies the primary objective of premature release as the reformation of offenders and their rehabilitation into society. Rule 1257(d) mandates that decisions rejecting premature release must be through speaking orders in writing, and that reconsideration must occur every six months.

The Principles Governing Premature Release

Drawing on a series of Supreme Court decisions, the Amicus placed before the court the following principles, which the court accepted as governing the exercise of power under section 432 CrPC.

In Laxman Naskar v. Union of India [(2000) 2 SCC 595], the Supreme Court held that the government must consider the convict's conduct in jail, whether the convict has lost the potentiality to commit crime, whether there is any fruitful purpose in continued confinement, and the socio-economic conditions of the convict's family. In Satish alias Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2021) 14 SCC 580], a three-Judge Bench held that the length of sentence or gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis for refusing premature release, and that any assessment of propensity to commit crime upon release must rest on antecedents and jail conduct — not on speculative apprehensions or police opposition alone.

The court noted that in State of Haryana v. Mahender Singh [(2007) 13 SCC 606], the Supreme Court recognised that while no convict has a fundamental right to remission, a convict has a legal right to be considered for remission in accordance with law, keeping in view constitutional safeguards under Articles 20 and 21.

In Joseph v. State of Kerala [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1211], the Supreme Court cautioned against inflexible guidelines that effectively bar consideration of premature release solely on account of the nature of the offence, describing such an approach as “crush[ing] the life force” out of individuals convicted as young persons who may have substantially reformed.

The court also considered the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Walus v. Minister of Justice and Correctional Services [[2022] ZACC 39] and the European Court of Human Rights in Vinter & Ors. v. the United Kingdom [[2013] ECHR 645], noting that both courts emphasised that for a life sentence to remain lawful, there must exist both a prospect of release and a meaningful possibility of review anchored in rehabilitation.

The Pattern of Defective SRB Decision-Making

Justice Bhambhani found, on the basis of the material before the court — including the minutes of SRB meetings — that the SRB had engaged in a systemic pattern of arbitrary and unreasoned rejection. The court drew on several decisions of Co-ordinate Benches of the Delhi High Court, including Vijay Kumar Shukla v. State NCT of Delhi [2024 SCC OnLine Del 7805], Santosh Kumar Singh v. State (Govt. of the NCT) of Delhi [2025 SCC OnLine Del 10585], Harpreet Singh v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC OnLine Del 397], Asif v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC OnLine Del 899], and Rajab Ali v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC OnLine Del 1498].

The court found that across these cases, the SRB's rejection orders were “pithily drafted, cursorily articulated proforma paragraphs” that copy-pasted earlier rejections, relying repetitively on the nature, gravity, and heinousness of the original offence while systematically excluding favourable institutional reports from their conclusions. The court noted that the SRB had, in at least two of the rejection orders under scrutiny, made the observation that “the conduct of the convict in jail is not necessarily a barometer of what he may do if outside the prison” — a proposition that directly contradicts Rule 1244 of the Delhi Prison Rules and settled Supreme Court doctrine.

The Amicus also highlighted to the court that the SRB's invocation of gravity as a rejection ground was itself applied inconsistently: in cases of comparable or greater gravity — including murders by pouring acid or kerosene, or rape and murder of minor children — the SRB had recommended release in some instances and denied it in others, often in nearly identical language, without any discernible distinction.

The State contended that the SRB had duly considered all relevant factors and that each case must be evaluated on its own facts. It argued that even if the SRB's order was found deficient, the appropriate relief was remand to the SRB for fresh consideration, not a direct order of release — relying on Ram Chander v. State of Chhatisgarh [(2022) 12 SCC 52] and State of Haryana v. Daya Nanda. The court acknowledged this position but held that where repeated reconsideration had produced no change, remand would merely prolong unlawful deprivation of liberty.

Application to Ramesh

The court found that Ramesh had become eligible for premature release upon completing 10 years' actual imprisonment and 14 years including remission, yet his plea had been rejected on 18 occasions on substantially identical and repetitive grounds.

By an earlier order dated 2 April 2024 in W.P.(CRL.) No. 1041/2024, the Delhi High Court had set aside the SRB's decision dated 30 June 2023 and directed reconsideration in terms of the parameters laid down in Ram Chander. Despite this, the SRB once again rejected Ramesh's case on substantially the same grounds at its meetings of 30 August 2024 and 18 September 2024.

Further, the court noted that after Ramesh's last consideration in August 2024, seven SRB meetings were held on 10 December 2024, 2 April 2025, 24 April 2025, 30 July 2025, 16 October 2025, 23 December 2025, and 14 January 2026, yet his case was not placed before any of them — in direct violation of Rule 1257(d) of the Delhi Prison Rules, which mandates consideration every six months.

The court characterised the SRB's approach as involving: mis-characterisation of Ramesh's conviction; failure to engage with post-conviction conduct and socio-economic factors; use of vague societal considerations such as “desperation crime” and societal confidence without criteria-based assessment; and acceptance of opposition from senior officials that contradicted the consistent, reasoned recommendations of the Probation Officer and Social Welfare Officer who had directly supervised Ramesh. The court held that Ramesh's continued confinement after more than 31 years' actual imprisonment and over 40 years including remission “serves no legitimate penological purpose.”

Application to Tasleem

For Tasleem, the court found that he satisfied the eligibility criteria, having undergone more than 15 years' actual imprisonment with total custody including remission exceeding 19 years. The reports of the Social Welfare Department and Prison Authorities positively recommended his release. The police authorities had neither recommended nor opposed his release, and there was no adverse report from his native police station.

The court noted that Tasleem had been released on interim bail, parole, emergency parole, and furlough on multiple occasions without a single adverse report or complaint of wrongdoing during those periods. The SRB itself had acknowledged his consistent good conduct and satisfactory overall jail conduct in the very orders that rejected his release — while simultaneously asserting that jail conduct was not a reliable indicator of post-release behaviour, without providing any alternative objective basis for this conclusion.

The SRB's stated grounds for rejection — the nature, gravity, heinousness, and presumed brutality of the original offence; the age of the victim; a conjectural possibility of re-offending; and concern for “faith of general public in the legal system” — were found by the court to be precisely the categories of considerations that are legally impermissible when deciding a case for premature release. The court also noted that the victim, a Nepali national, could not be traced during trial, and that there was no material to substantiate any apprehension that Tasleem's release would threaten the victim or society.

The petitioner's plea had been rejected on four earlier occasions between 2021 and the pendency of the current petition, each time on substantially identical grounds. The court found that the SRB had recycled stereotyped reasoning, disregarded mandatory considerations including favourable institutional reports and the absence of any police opposition, and relied on factors explicitly excluded from the governing framework.

On the Question of Direct Release Versus Remand

The court addressed squarely the question of whether it could direct release or was confined to remanding the matter to the SRB. It held that while the power to grant remission ordinarily vests in the executive and constitutional courts are not to exercise that executive power themselves, there is a well-recognised category of cases in which a constitutional court may intervene directly under Article 226.

These are cases where the SRB's decision suffers from manifest arbitrariness, failure to discharge statutory obligations, or violation of Article 21; where a convict has served the maximum period contemplated by State policy; and where remand would merely prolong an unlawful deprivation of liberty without any realistic prospect of a different outcome from the SRB. In such circumstances, the court acts in exercise of its judicial power under Article 226, and not in exercise of the executive power of remission under sections 432 or 433 CrPC.

The court drew support from the Supreme Court's observations in Satish alias Sabbe that where authorities fail to discharge statutory obligations despite judicial directions, a constitutional court may issue a writ of mandamus directing compliance rather than consigning the prisoner to an endless cycle of reconsiderations. It also relied on Homy Secretary (Prison) & Ors. v. H. Nilofer Nisha [(2020) 14 SCC 161], which recognised the court's power to direct release where it concludes that a rejection order is not a proper order.

Order

The court set aside the impugned minutes of the SRB meetings dated 30 August 2024 and 18 September 2024, and the consequent order dated 4 December 2024 of the Government of NCT of Delhi, Home (General) Department, rejecting the petitioners' pleas for premature release.

It directed that Ramesh s/o Jaswant and Tasleem s/o Islamuddin be released from custody forthwith. A copy of the judgment was directed to be forwarded to the concerned jail superintendent forthwith. Both writ petitions and all pending applications were disposed of in the above terms.