Spilled surma, two dying declarations: Delhi HC upholds life term for mother-in-law, drops 498A

A Division Bench upheld the murder conviction of a woman accused of setting her daughter-in-law on fire in a Delhi jhuggi in 2000, relying on two consistent dying declarations, but set aside the cruelty convictions of her and her son.

Shahzadi, a mother of two, told two officials from her hospital bed that her mother-in-law had poured kerosene over her and set her alight, after surma ground by the older woman fell off the tawa. She died of her burns.

On 4 November 2026, more than 22 years after the trial court convicted the mother-in-law, the Delhi High Court upheld her life sentence.

A Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Arun Bhardwaj dismissed the stove-accident theory, believed the dying declarations and rejected every attack on the investigation. It also set aside the cruelty convictions of the mother-in-law, Shakila, and her son Hashmat, Shahzadi’s husband. Justice Bhardwaj wrote the judgment.

The evening of 2 November 2000

Shahzadi lived in a jhuggi at Devi Nagar, Nangla Machi, near Pragati Maidan. Shakila is the real sister of Shahzadi’s father, Nathu Hassan, and the jhuggis of the two families stood next to each other.

Shahzadi had been married for about six years. She had two small children, a girl of two or three and a boy of three or four months.

The prosecution case was that at about 7.30 or 7.45 pm on 2 November 2000 Shakila came in while Shahzadi was resting and poured kerosene on her. In front of her daughter Rukhsana, Shakila asked for a matchbox and set her on fire.

FIR 548/2000 was registered at Police Station Tilak Marg under Sections 307, 498A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Shahzadi was taken to the hospital by her mother. She later died of her burns.

Two statements, two fitness certificates

ASI D.D. Meena (PW7) reached the hospital after a daily diary entry about her admission. The doctor, Dr Pankaj Kumar Singh, declared her fit to make a statement, and the ASI recorded it with her thumb impression. The doctor endorsed that it was taken in his presence at 9.10 pm.

She said that on 1 November her mother-in-law abused and beat her after the surma fell, and tutored her husband against her. On 2 November, she said, her husband said he would kill her because her father had not given a motorcycle. That evening her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze with a matchstick brought by Rukhsana.

The SDM, T.S. Mutti (PW14), recorded a second statement in question-and-answer form at the same hospital, between 10.45 pm and 12.45 am, after the doctor again certified her fit. It ran to four pages and carried her thumb impressions. It repeated the same account.

In it she also said that her husband had threatened to kill her over a wish for kheer, and that three or four months before she had been asked to bring a motorcycle. She added that earlier quarrels used to settle down, and that this incident arose only over the surma.

A hostile family and a stove theory

The Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, convicted Shakila under Sections 302 and 498A on 6 April 2004, and sentenced her on 8 April 2004 to life imprisonment and Rs 5,000 for murder, and two years and Rs 5,000 for cruelty. Hashmat got two years and Rs 5,000 under Section 498A.

Shahzadi’s father, mother and brother, examined as PW4, PW5 and PW6, did not support the prosecution and denied any dowry demand. Shakila’s brother Abdul Razzaq, convicted under Sections 109 and 302, died during the appeal, which abated. Rukhsana was tried as a juvenile.

Ms Geeta Oberoi, appearing through the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee, argued for both appellants. The State was represented by Mr Aman Usman, APP.

The trial defence was an alibi: Shakila and Hashmat said they were selling vegetables. In the appeal, the argument was that Shahzadi died in an accident when a stove burst. The court noted that this was raised for the first time in final arguments.

Why the accident theory failed

The investigating officer had found a plastic can with some kerosene, a stove, a burnt chunni smelling of kerosene and a matchbox with 15 to 20 wet matchsticks smelling of kerosene. The court found no evidence that the stove was damaged or that its tank had burst, and photographs showed it undamaged.

Someone burning by accident, it reasoned, would have run outside, rolled on the floor or wrapped something around herself. The record showed no such attempt. Burns of 72 to 80 per cent all over the body, it held, were incompatible with a bursting stove.

It concluded that the evidence proved “a homicidal death and not an accidental death” (para 41).

The court answers the investigation attacks

The defence listed many faults. The FIR was registered the same night, before any complaint by Shahzadi’s family, and the ASI had not told the SDM he had already recorded her. The court saw no anomaly: once a doctor had certified her fit, no family complaint was needed, and her two statements were consistent, so nothing prejudiced the appellants.

The hospital clerk, not the doctor who examined her, had proved the MLC. The court said nothing turned on it, since the endorsement of fitness was what mattered, and the defence itself had called Dr Singh as DW5.

No neighbour was examined by the prosecution. The court said it is for the prosecutor to choose witnesses, citing Banti alias Guddu v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, and that the defence had called the neighbours itself.

That 10 of the 17 prosecution witnesses were police officials, it said, in no way goes against the prosecution. Recording the statement without her relatives present was, if anything, the safer course, because the defence would otherwise have said she was tutored.

What the trial judge asked her

The IO had first said that Shahzadi’s parents and brother told him she was alone when she burned. Asked by the trial judge, he said Shakila and Rukhsana were in the house and had burnt her, and that he had misunderstood the earlier question.

The defence called this a court-driven correction. The Bench held that a trial court is not a mute spectator and rightly put the question. It added that the prosecutor could have sought leave to put it anyway.

It cited Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, on questioning a witness at any stage under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, and Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, on the scope of re-examination.

Fitness to speak and the thumb marks

The court accepted that Shahzadi was in severe pain and asked for water, and that the SDM took two hours. It therefore had to be satisfied that she could speak. Dr Singh, called by the defence, rejected the suggestion that he had endorsed her fitness at the police inspector’s behest.

On the thumb impressions, the court noted that nobody asked Dr Singh in the witness box whether she could have made them. There is no prescribed form for a dying declaration, it said, and thumb marks are a precaution, not a necessity.

Running away, and two discredited witnesses

DW1 said the husband, mother-in-law, mother and father took Shahzadi to hospital. DW2 said Shakila went to the jhuggi. The court noted that the MLC records only her mother, Bilkis, bringing her in, and disbelieved both.

Shakila and Rukhsana were declared proclaimed offenders and were arrested only on 15 October 2001. Hashmat was arrested on 21 November 2000.

The court recalled that absconding alone does not prove guilt, citing Sk. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal and Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. On these facts, though, Shakila’s flight gave rise to a hypothesis of guilt.

It also called the defence contradictory. The appellants had argued both that they rushed to the hospital and that, since they were not there, they were nowhere near the house.

What the Supreme Court says on dying declarations

The defence relied on Kundla Bala Subrahmanyan, State of Rajasthan v. Ganwara, State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and Kali Ram v. State of HP. The Bench held that the first states a cardinal principle, and that the others do not help, since the two declarations here were consistent.

Its own anchor was Kalawati v. State of Maharashtra, which sums up the rules from Paniben: a true and voluntary declaration can support a conviction without corroboration, but the court must rule out tutoring, prompting and imagination. It also cited Ramilaben Hasmukhbhai Khristi v. State of Gujarat.

Both statements, the Bench held, were recorded after a fitness certificate and were signed by the doctor, and the SDM was a senior state functionary with no sign of unfairness. They agreed in material particulars and inspired confidence.

It found it telling that Shahzadi was fair enough to say earlier quarrels used to settle, and that this incident arose from the surma. That fairness, it said, made her account of the kerosene and the matchbox more believable.

Why the cruelty convictions fell

The family’s own evidence gave no support on dowry. That left Shahzadi’s statements, which spoke of a motorcycle demand, the husband’s failure to pay her expenses and medicines, and quarrels.

The court held that the SDM should not have asked her whether there was a dowry demand. A leading question to a woman in acute pain, between life and death, risks an embellished answer, and her mention of a motorcycle was a single instance.

She had also said quarrels settled. On that the court held:

“Small quarrels are general wear and tear in matrimonial life.” (para 106)

Relying on Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, it held that petty quarrels are not cruelty under Section 498A. The 19-day gap before Hashmat’s arrest did not need further discussion, because the motorcycle was not the cause of death. By Shahzadi’s own account the trigger was the surma.

Order

Shakila’s conviction under Section 498A is set aside and her conviction under Section 302 is upheld. She must surrender before the prison authorities within two weeks to serve the rest of her life sentence, failing which the police are to arrest her.

Hashmat’s conviction under Section 498A is set aside. His appeal is allowed, and his bail bonds stand discharged after eight weeks. Shakila’s appeal is partly allowed.

A copy of the judgment goes to the trial court and the Jail Superintendent. The judgment was reserved on 29 September 2026 and pronounced on 4 November 2026.