Scheduled Caste Status Acquired by Birth Cannot Be Taken Away Mid-Career by a Later Parliamentary Amendment, Rules Gujarat High Court

A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court holds that a person born into a Scheduled Caste retains reservation benefits for life, even after Parliament narrows the caste's specification under Article 341.

The High Court of Gujarat has dismissed a writ petition filed by the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) seeking to reverse a promotion restored by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) in favour of one of its clerks. The Division Bench, led by Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda, held that Scheduled Caste status is conferred by birth and vests as a constitutional right for the person’s lifetime. A subsequent Parliamentary amendment that narrows or removes a caste from the list of Scheduled Castes under Article 341 operates only prospectively and cannot strip a person—already in service and already availing reservation benefits—of the right midway through his career. The judgment analyses the constitutional architecture of reservation and the historical trajectory of how the Mochi caste was included and then geographically restricted in Gujarat.

The Employee, the Promotion, and the Reversion

Ranjit Vasantlal Makwana was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk in the EPFO on 7 April 1995 under the Scheduled Caste reserved category. His appointment rested on the fact that the Mochi caste, to which he belongs, had been specified as a Scheduled Caste throughout the State of Gujarat by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976.

In 2002, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Orders (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, which re-imposed geographical restrictions on Mochis. From 17 December 2002, only Mochis from the Dang district and Umbergaon taluka of Valsad district in Gujarat retained their Scheduled Caste specification. Mochis from the rest of Gujarat were effectively excluded.

On 31 December 2003—after the 2002 amendment had come into force—Makwana was promoted to the post of Enforcement Officer/Accounts Officer on the basis that he belonged to the reserved category. The vacancy for that post had arisen in 2000, when all Mochis in Gujarat were still specified as Scheduled Castes.

Nine years later, on 29 November 2012, EPFO reverted Makwana to his substantive post of Upper Division Clerk. The employer’s position was that since the 2002 amendment was in force at the time of actual promotion in 2003, Makwana no longer qualified as a Scheduled Caste candidate and could not have been promoted under reservation.

Makwana challenged this reversion before the CAT in O.A. No. 498 of 2012. The Tribunal restored his promotion, reasoning that the relevant date was the date on which the vacancy arose—2000—when his caste was still specified. EPFO then filed the present Special Civil Application before the Gujarat High Court.

What the 2002 Amendment Did to the Mochi Specification in Gujarat

The judgment traces the complete legislative history before deciding the legal question. The Bench records that under the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, 1950, Mochis in the Gujarat division of the then State of Bombay were not specified as Scheduled Castes. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes List (Modification) Order, 1956 continued to impose geographical restrictions. When the State of Gujarat was carved out in 1960, only Mochis from the Dang district and Umbergaon taluka of Surat district were specified.

This changed on 18 September 1976, when Parliament removed all geographical restrictions. For the first time, Mochis across the entire State of Gujarat were specified as Scheduled Castes. This position held for 28 years, until the 2002 amendment restored geographical restrictions—limiting specification once again to Dang district and Umbergaon taluka of Valsad district.

The Bench notes that the 1976 extension implied Parliament was satisfied that all Mochis in Gujarat were still socially backward and needed reservation benefits. The 2002 restriction implied the reverse for Mochis outside the two specified areas.

The Core Legal Question: Does SC Status Endure Beyond a Parliamentary Amendment?

EPFO’s counsel, Mr. Rajesh K. Savjani, argued that the date of actual promotion is the only relevant date for determining reserved category status. Since Makwana was promoted in 2003, after the 2002 amendment, he was not a Scheduled Caste on that date. Counsel relied on Shree Surat Valsad Jilla KMG Parishad v. Union of India [(2007) 5 SCC 360], Union of India v. Krishna Kumar & Ors. [(2019) 4 SCC 319], Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Dharamdeo Das [(2024) SCC Online SC 1768], and K. Kirmala & Ors. v. Canara Bank & Anr. [(2024) SCC Online SC 2273].

The respondent’s counsel, Ms. Himanshi R. Balodi, countered on two fronts. First, she argued that promotion is always linked to the date on which the vacancy arose, which was 2000. Second, and more fundamentally, she argued that caste is conferred by birth, is involuntary and permanent, and that a person born into a caste specified as Scheduled Caste acquires a constitutional right that cannot be divested by any future amendment. The exclusion of a caste from the Presidential Order, she submitted, can only affect persons born after the exclusion.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Sanjay Gowda, writing for the Bench, anchored the analysis in the nature of caste itself. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s definition in Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India [1992 Supp(3) SCC 217], the Bench observed that a caste is a socially homogeneous, hereditary, occupational group into which membership is involuntary and acquired solely by birth. Exit is possible only through excommunication or conversion. The social boundaries of the caste “envelop that person” from the moment of birth.

The Bench then examined what Article 341 does. Clause (1) empowers the President, after consulting the Governor, to specify by public notification those castes deemed to be Scheduled Castes. Clause (2) confers on Parliament alone the power to include, modify, or exclude castes from that list. Critically, the Bench notes that Article 341(2) makes tinkering with the specification a matter of national concern, deliberately placed beyond the reach of State legislatures.

On the effect of exclusion, the Bench drew a distinction between prospective and retrospective operation. When Parliament excludes a caste, it signifies that the caste as a whole has advanced socially and no longer requires reservation. But an individual born into that caste when it was specified was, at the moment of birth, a person belonging to a socially oppressed group. That social reality attached to him at birth does not change because the caste collectively improved later.

The Bench held that such a person acquires a vested constitutional right at birth, which carries through his entire lifetime. A Parliamentary amendment cannot divest a vested constitutional right. To hold otherwise, the Bench reasoned, would mean that the State “seeks to abandon an individual midway and expect him to fend for himself.” The Bench described such an outcome as “constitutionally immoral.”

The practical consequence follows from this principle: a person born into a caste after it has been excluded from the list will not receive reservation benefits, even if his father did. The Bench acknowledged this could produce a situation where a father is treated as Scheduled Caste but his son is not. It accepted this outcome as the logical and harmonious result of Parliament’s constitutional power to modify the list prospectively.

On the EPFO’s reliance on Shree Surat Valsad Jilla KMG Parishad, the Bench drew a clear distinction. That case involved a dealership, where the appellant held only a letter of intent and sought to retain it after the 2002 amendment excluded his caste. The Bench held that a dealership carries no vested right and is not a permanent benefit. Employment in government service is fundamentally different. Once a candidate from a Scheduled Caste claims the benefit of reservation in employment, he acquires a vested right that endures throughout his career. The two situations cannot be equated.

The CAT’s Reasoning Affirmed on Different Grounds

The CAT had restored Makwana’s promotion on a narrower basis: it had held that the relevant date for considering reserved category status was the date the vacancy arose (2000), when Mochis were still specified. The Bench found it unnecessary to decide whether this was the correct approach, since on the broader view it had taken—that Makwana retains his SC status throughout his career—the question of which date governs became irrelevant.

The Bench answered the three questions it had framed for consideration. On Questions A and B (whether SC status vests at birth and whether it endures for life), the answer was yes. On Question C (whether the CAT was right to use the date of vacancy), the Bench said the question did not need to be decided since Makwana was entitled to reservation benefits throughout his service in any case.

Order

The Division Bench dismissed the Special Civil Application filed by the EPFO. The CAT’s order restoring Makwana’s promotion to the post of Enforcement Officer/Accounts Officer was affirmed. The reversion order of 29 November 2012 was held unsustainable. The judgment was pronounced on 17 July 2026, having been reserved on 21 April 2026.