Gujarat HC Quashes FIR Under Ancient Monuments Act, Holds Emergency Repairs Are Not “Construction”

Gujarat High Court quashes an FIR registered under the AMASR Act, ruling that safety repairs mandated by a municipal notice cannot constitute criminal “construction” near a protected monument.

The High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad has quashed an FIR registered against a property owner for allegedly carrying out construction within 100 metres of Rani Chippri Masjid, a protected monument in the Khadiya area of Ahmedabad. Justice P. M. Raval, sitting singly, held on 7 September 2026 that the work undertaken—plastering, replacing wooden fittings, and brick masonry within the existing wall—constituted repair and renovation under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, not “construction” as defined in that statute. Because no essential ingredient of the offence under Section 30B of the Act was made out even on a plain reading of the FIR, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and set aside the FIR in its entirety.

The FIR and the Dispute Before the Court

FIR C.R. No. II-3055/2018 was registered on 20 April 2018 at Khadiya Police Station, District Ahmedabad, against the applicant Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia for an offence punishable under Section 30B of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 2010. The charge was that he had commenced construction of a house within 100 metres of Rani Chippri Masjid, a protected monument, without obtaining prior permission from the Archaeological Department—despite a specific embargo on construction within a 300-metre range of the monuments in the Khadiya area.

The applicant's case was different. He submitted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had served a notice on him under Section 264 of the GPMC Act, declaring the house dilapidated and unsafe and requiring immediate repairs to ensure structural safety. Acting on that notice, and with a view to getting the property re-enlisted in the AMC's heritage property list, the applicant carried out renovation, repairs, and reconstruction of existing structures. He maintained that no new construction was raised on the site.

When the Archaeological Department issued a notice dated 14 December 2016, the applicant replied on 17 January 2017, stating categorically that no fresh construction had been undertaken and that only renovation and repair work had been carried out. No further communication followed from the department. The FIR was registered directly thereafter, in April 2018.

Majithia filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 8473 of 2018 before the Gujarat High Court, praying that the FIR and all consequential proceedings be quashed and set aside under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The Legal Issue: Repair or Construction?

The central question was whether the work carried out by the applicant fell within the statutory definition of “construction” under Section 2(dc) of the AMASR Act, or whether it was “repair and renovation” as defined under Section 2(m).

Section 2(dc) defines “construction” as any erection of a structure or building, including additions or extensions, whether vertical or horizontal. The definition expressly excludes “any reconstruction, repair and renovation of an existing structure or building.” Section 2(m) defines “repair and renovation” as alterations to a pre-existing structure or building, but specifically excludes construction or re-construction.

The Archaeological Department, through learned advocate Ms. Archana U. Amin, opposed the application on two grounds. First, it argued that prior permission is required under the Act for any construction or repair work within the regulated area, and no such permission was obtained. Second, it contended that the applicant's reply dated 17 January 2017, stating no construction had been carried out, was a false statement amounting to a further breach. The Respondent-State, through learned APP Mr. K.M. Antani, supported these submissions and urged that a prima facie case was apparent on the face of the FIR, and that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Raval began by setting out the seven categories identified by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, as illustrations where inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 may be exercised to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The court reproduced paragraph 102 of that decision and then applied its framework to the facts.

Turning to the definitions, the court found that photographic evidence on record established that the applicant did not add any floor area, alter the building line, or raise the height of the building. The work—replacing worn-out wooden fittings, painting, applying brick masonry within the existing framework to stabilise a crumbling wall—was found to fall “squarely within the scope of permissible maintenance and restoration.”

The court rejected the department's argument that the applicant made a false statement in his reply. It held that the prosecution had proceeded on a basic misconstruction of statutory terms by equating “repair/renovation” with “construction.” The “before and after” photographs on record confirmed that the horizontal perimeter, structural boundary, and height of the premises remained completely unchanged. The applicant's reply to the department was therefore, in the court's assessment, “factually and legally truthful,” and no element of deception or mens rea was present.

On the question of prior permission under Section 20 of the AMASR Act, the court held that the statute uses the expression “may apply,” and that failing to obtain prior administrative sanction for emergency wall stabilisation carried out to avert an immediate structural collapse does not automatically convert a non-structural repair into a penal offence under Sections 30A or 30B. The contention that prior permission is an absolute, non-negotiable prerequisite even for non-structural emergency repairs was found unsustainable in the context of criminal prosecution.

The court also took note of the constitutional dimension. It observed that the AMC's notice had officially declared the premises dilapidated and unsafe. Prosecuting the applicant for executing basic safety repairs mandated by the local authority—under threat of public hazard—would be opposed to the constitutional guarantees under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The court added that the penal provisions of a regulatory statute cannot be read in isolation to compel a citizen into a state of structural peril.

On the question of domain competence, the court observed that vague assertions of “structural change” in an FIR, without technical foundation, cannot ground a criminal prosecution. The investigating agency had not verified whether any structural change occurred or conducted any technical assessment before invoking penal machinery. The court found the initiation of criminal proceedings to be arbitrary, premature, and an abuse of the process of law.

The court's final analytical conclusion was that the acts complained of were executed strictly pursuant to a statutory safety notice under the GPMC Act, requiring immediate abatement of a public hazard, and that action taken under statutory compulsion to avert an immediate threat to life and public safety cannot be attributed with criminal intent under Section 30B of the AMASR Act.

Outcome

Justice P. M. Raval allowed the application. FIR C.R. No. II-3055/2018 dated 20 April 2018, registered with Khadiya Police Station, District Ahmedabad, and all consequential proceedings arising from it, were quashed and set aside. The Rule was made absolute.