Gujarat HC Dismisses 35-Year-Old Appeals, Upholds Yavteshwar Mahadev Temple's Title to Disputed Vadodara Land

Justice J.C. Doshi dismissed five first appeals challenging concurrent findings that Survey Nos. 9 and 10 in Vadodara belong to Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Trust, not the erstwhile Maharaja of Baroda or his purchasers.

The High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad has dismissed a group of five first appeals that had been pending since 1991, confirming three layers of concurrent findings that disputed land in Vadodara — Survey Nos. 9 and 10 of Nagarwada — belongs to Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Trust and must be entered in the Public Trust Register accordingly. Justice J.C. Doshi, sitting singly, pronounced the judgment on 17 June 2026 after reserving it on 1 May 2026. The appeals were filed under Section 72(4) of the Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950 against a common order of the 3rd Joint District Judge, Vadodara, dated 21 August 1991, which had itself confirmed orders of the Joint Charity Commissioner (26 August 1985) and the Assistant Charity Commissioner (25 June 1979). The court also held, following settled authority, that an appeal under Section 72(4) is in substance a second appeal governed by the limitations of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The Dispute Before the Court

The Collector of Vadodara, acting as ex officio Administrator and Trustee of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Trust (Registration No. A-1701-Baroda), filed Change Application No. 550 of 1971 before the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 22A read with Section 79(1) of the Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950. The application sought a declaration that Survey No. 9 (admeasuring 29 vigas and 3 vasa) and Survey No. 10 (admeasuring 3 vigas and 69 vasa), forming part of City Survey No. 8/2, Survey No. 1/A admeasuring 707 acres 32 gunthas, are properties of the Trust.

The Trust had been registered in 1952 pursuant to Application No. 11823 of 1952, with the temple and its management under the direct control of the Government through the Collector. The Collector's case was that until 1956, the name of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Temple appeared as occupant in the City Survey record. In 1956, the City Survey authority mutated the entire 707-acre tract, including the disputed land, into the name of His Highness the Maharaja F.P. Gaekwad, acting on a letter from the Executive Engineer, R&B, Vadodara, without issuing notice under Section 135D of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code and without affording any hearing to the Trust.

His Highness the Maharaja of Baroda, the principal appellant in First Appeal No. 1517 of 1991, contended that the disputed land forms part of the Laxmi Vilas Palace complex and was retained as his private property under the Accession Agreement executed at the time of the merger of the erstwhile State of Baroda with the Union of India in 1948. The remaining appellants — in First Appeal Nos. 1611 to 1614 of 1991 — claimed to be bona fide purchasers who had bought plots from the Maharaja after verifying the mutation entry in the revenue record.

Procedural Route Through Three Forums

The Assistant Charity Commissioner conducted a full inquiry, examined oral and documentary evidence, and by order dated 25 June 1979 held that Survey Nos. 9 and 10 belong to Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Temple Trust, directing their entry in the Public Trust Register.

Three separate appeals were filed before the Joint Charity Commissioner, Baroda Division: Appeal No. 40 of 1979 by the Maharaja, and Appeal Nos. 42 and 46 of 1979 by persons claiming to be bona fide purchasers. The Joint Charity Commissioner re-assessed the evidence and dismissed all three appeals by common order dated 26 August 1985.

Five civil miscellaneous applications were then filed before the Joint District Judge, Vadodara, under Section 72(2) of the Act — Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 31 of 1986 by the Maharaja and Nos. 32, 33, 34, and 36 of 1986 by the purchasers. The Joint District Judge re-appraised the evidence and dismissed all five applications with costs by common order dated 21 August 1991, confirming the findings of both charity commissioners. The present first appeals before the High Court followed.

Whether the Appeal Is a First Appeal or a Second Appeal

Before addressing the merits, Justice Doshi resolved a threshold question: whether an appeal under Section 72(4) of the Act to the High Court is a first appeal or a second appeal. The court followed the judgment of a coordinate bench of the Gujarat High Court in R. Tanikaselvam v. K. Shanmugam (First Appeal No. 3268 of 2018, Neutral Citation: 2018 GUJHC 32254), decided by Justice J.B. Pardiwala (as His Lordship then was), which had exhaustively examined the issue.

That judgment traced the line of authority from Chief Justice Chagla's observations in D.R. Pradhan v. The Bombay State Federation of Goshalas and Panjarapoles (1956) through the Supreme Court's ruling in Ramchandra Govind Pandit v. Charity Commissioner, State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1598, and its reiteration in Nanabhai Dayabhai Patel v. Suleman Isubji Dadabhai, AIR 1996 SC 1184. The Supreme Court had held that the District Court, while deciding an application under Section 72(1), exercises plenary appellate jurisdiction — it can confirm, revoke, or modify the Charity Commissioner's order — and that the single Judge of the High Court hearing an appeal from that order therefore exercises second appellate jurisdiction.

A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shivprasad Shankarlal Pardeshi v. Leelabai Badrinarayan Kalwar, AIR 1998 Bom 131, and a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Parvez Rustamji Bharda v. Navrojji Sorabji Tamboly, AIR 2001 Gujarat 160, had reached the same conclusion. Justice Doshi accepted this settled position: the present appeals are in the nature of second appeals, and the court's jurisdiction is confined to substantial questions of law or fact as prescribed under Section 100 CPC.

Arguments of the Appellants

Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta, assisted by Advocates Mr. Ninad Shah and Mr. Hemang Shah, appeared for the bona fide purchaser appellants. Advocate Mr. Bharat T. Rao appeared for the Maharaja and also filed written submissions.

The appellants raised several grounds. On jurisdiction, they argued that the Assistant Charity Commissioner had exceeded his jurisdiction by also declaring Survey No. 9 as Trust property when the Collector's application had only sought a declaration in respect of Survey No. 10. They further argued that the Assistant Charity Commissioner had no authority to grant possession of the disputed land to the Trust, and that recovery of possession from a third party could only be sought under Section 50 of the Act before the District Court.

On limitation, the appellants contended that the change application filed in 1971 was hopelessly time-barred. The Trust was registered in 1952; the mutation in the Maharaja's name occurred in 1956; yet the Collector waited until 1971 to file the application — nearly nineteen years after registration and fifteen years after the disputed mutation. The appellants relied on B.S. Sheshagiri Setty v. State of Karnataka, (2016) 2 SCC 123, for the proposition that even where no express limitation period is prescribed, an application must be filed within a reasonable time, which they argued should be three years.

The Maharaja's written submissions additionally challenged the evidentiary findings: that Exhs. 60 and 61 (certified copies of the patwari records of Survey Nos. 9 and 10 of 1890) had been wrongly construed; that the agreements at Exhs. 55 and 56 between the Government of India and the Maharaja established that the disputed land was his private property; that the document at Exh. 49 (a letter from the Assistant Secretary, Government of Bombay) had been ignored; that the Collector's own communication at Exh. 112 dated 13 September 1960 acknowledged the Maharaja's title; and that the Government had paid compensation to the Maharaja for land acquired from Survey Nos. 9 and 10. The Maharaja also argued that the temple compound was his private property and only the temple structure itself was Trust property, pointing to a document dated 6 March 1898 showing that the village of Kapurai was given for the temple's maintenance.

The bona fide purchasers separately argued that they had purchased plots after verifying the revenue record and paying full consideration, and that their defence as bona fide purchasers for value without notice could only be adjudicated in a civil suit, not in charity proceedings.

Submissions of the State

Learned AGP Ms. Dhwani Tripathi, appearing for the respondent State, submitted that it was undisputed that the Maharaja had given the land as inam for the construction of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Temple, and that until 1956 the disputed land was recorded in the name of the temple. The core document that triggered the 1956 mutation — Exh. 147/1, a letter of the Executive Engineer — did not even remotely state that the disputed land belonged to the Maharaja; the City Survey Officer had misread it entirely.

On limitation, the AGP pointed out that the City Survey property card showed the disputed land in the name of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Temple as late as 1954, so there was no reason for the Collector to have included it separately in the 1952 registration application. After the 1956 mutation, the Collector had repeatedly written to the City Survey Officer and had initiated proceedings under Section 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code in 1963; those proceedings reached the Secretary level, where an order was passed in 1971 directing the parties to seek remedy from the competent court. The 1971 application before the Assistant Charity Commissioner followed directly from that direction.

The AGP further submitted that proceedings under Section 22 of the Act do not attract the law of limitation because they give a fresh cause of action whenever an inquiry is needed to determine whether property is private or Trust property. She also submitted that the Maharaja could not claim the Trust and its attached properties fell within the merger agreement's property list in the absence of any specific mention of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev Trust in that list, and that no competent authority had ever ordered the abolition of the Trust or the conversion of the disputed land to private ownership.

The Court's Reasoning

Justice Doshi examined the history of the temple as recorded in the Marathi-language history at Mark 43/1 (with its Gujarati translation at page 147 of the record). According to that history, the ling of Shri Yavteshwar Mahadev was brought to Baroda city at the instance of Diwan Raoji Appaji, and His Highness Maharaja Govindrao Gaekwad agreed to bear all expenses for constructing and running the temple. Land admeasuring approximately 12 kumbha and 18 vigha was given in Samvat year 1853 in mauje Nagarwada, and a Sanad was issued in the name of Diwan Sitaram Chimnaji. The temple was thus built and established in Samvat 1853 (approximately 1797 AD). The history also recorded that on 6 March 1898, the then Maharaja had considered merging the temple and its surrounding land with the Laxmi Vilas Palace compound, but this idea was never executed and was dropped.

The court noted the findings of the Assistant Charity Commissioner, who had inspected the site and examined the documentary evidence including Exhs. 60 and 61 (certified copies of patwari records of Survey Nos. 9 and 10 of 1890), Exh. 62 (certified copy of the Fesal Patrak of 1874), Exh. 63 (certified copy of the Pahani Patrak of 1874), and Exh. 43/4 (the map of Nagarwada of Survey Nos. 8, 9, and 10 prepared from the field work of the Survey Department). The Assistant Charity Commissioner had observed that the map, Fesal Patrak, and Pahani Patrak prepared by the Survey Department of the Baroda Government corroborated the temple history and were binding on the Maharaja. The Assistant Charity Commissioner had also noted the physical impossibility of the Maharaja's claim that only the temple structure was Trust property while the surrounding land was private: “temple without land and there is no passage to go to the temple” was not possible under any circumstances.

The court found that the concurrent findings of the Assistant Charity Commissioner, the Joint Charity Commissioner, and the Joint District Judge were consistent and supported by the evidence. The disputed revenue entry of 1956 had been made without notice to the Trust and in violation of Section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the principle of audi alteram partem. A mutation entry, the court affirmed, is solely for fiscal purposes and does not determine ownership or title.

On the Maharaja's reliance on the Collector's own letter at Exh. 112 (dated 13 September 1960, acknowledging the Maharaja's title), the court accepted the State's submission that this letter was itself based on the disputed 1956 revenue entry, which was the very subject matter of the inquiry. The Collector had no authority to confer title by writing a letter.

On the bona fide purchaser defence, the court examined the requirements under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the three-factor test from Ram Niwas v. Bano, (2000) 6 SCC 685: purchase for value, payment in good faith, and absence of notice of the prior right. The court also considered the definitions of “good faith” under Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 2(11) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the principle of constructive notice as articulated in Jones v. Smith (1841) 1 Hare 43. The purchasers had bought plots from the Maharaja whose name appeared in the revenue record only by virtue of the illegal 1956 mutation; the inquiry before the Assistant Charity Commissioner had been initiated in 1971, well before the purchasers could claim to have perfected any title. The court found that the purchasers had not discharged the burden of establishing bona fide purchase without notice.

On limitation, the court accepted that the Collector had not been idle: after the 1956 mutation, he had written repeatedly to the City Survey Officer, initiated Section 37(2) proceedings in 1963, and pursued those proceedings to the Secretary level before being directed in 1971 to approach the competent court. The 1971 application followed that direction. The court also accepted the State's submission that proceedings under Section 22 of the Act do not attract a fixed limitation period in the same manner as ordinary civil suits.

Justice Doshi observed that the present appeals were a “glaring example of unscrupulous desire of litigant to put a case in endless litigation” and that the deity Yavteshwar Mahadev had been kept in limitless litigation since 1991, straining judicial resources and consuming the court's time. The judgments relied upon by the appellants were found to be factually distinguishable.

Outcome

All five first appeals — R/First Appeal Nos. 1517, 1611, 1612, 1613, and 1614 of 1991 — were dismissed. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier was vacated forthwith. The connected civil applications (Civil Application for Direction No. 1 of 2023 and Civil Application for Production of Additional Evidence No. 2 of 2023, both in First Appeal No. 1517 of 1991) were disposed of as a consequence. The record and proceedings were directed to be sent to the concerned court immediately.

After pronouncement, Advocate Mr. Ninad Shah sought a stay of execution