Justice R. Kainthla Himachal Pradesh HC CONTEMPT Corruption charge against trialjudge triggers contempt
[ High Court of Himachal Pradesh ]

HP High Court Dismisses Forged Certificate Complaint, Refers Petitioner's Corruption Allegation Against Trial Judge for Contempt Action

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed a criminal complaint challenging a departmental dismissal, warning that reckless corruption allegations against a judicial officer may amount to criminal contempt.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh on 8 July 2026 dismissed a petition filed by Ashish Sharma, who had sought to revive a criminal complaint against Anupam, a teacher at Dayanand Public School, Shimla, alleging that she issued a forged experience certificate after a tainted departmental inquiry led to his removal from service. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, sitting singly, held that a departmental order of removal stands valid in law until set aside by a competent forum, and that a criminal court cannot re-examine findings recorded by an inquiry officer. The petition was dismissed with costs of &rupee;10,000. Beyond the dismissal, the court made a separate reference for potential contempt proceedings after finding that the petitioner had named the trial judge as an accused and alleged corruption against her without any foundation.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Ashish Sharma was employed at Dayanand Public School, The Mall, Shimla. He claimed that Anupam, another employee at the school, was involved in unfair recruitment to the post of PGT (IP) in 2018. When he reported the matter to higher authorities, he was suspended vide letter dated 7 December 2019 instead of any action being taken against Anupam.

A departmental inquiry followed. Sharma's central grievance was that one Ved Prakash was listed as witness No. 13 in the inquiry memorandum dated 2 January 2020, yet no document signed by him was placed on record and he was not cross-examined during the inquiry. Sharma contended this rendered the entire inquiry improper. He was ultimately removed from service on 7 December 2021.

After his removal, Anupam issued an experience certificate that stated his services were terminated “after holding a proper inquiry.” Sharma filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. V, Shimla, alleging that the certificate contained a false recital, amounting to forgery and defamation, and sought prosecution under Sections 406, 420, 463, 468, 471, 500 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code.

How the Courts Below Dealt With the Complaint

The learned Trial Court dismissed the complaint. It held that Sharma was aggrieved by an order of suspension passed following a domestic inquiry, that the record did not disclose any cognizable offence, and that the appropriate remedy was to approach the proper forum rather than file a criminal complaint. The Trial Court also found that the complaint appeared designed to create undue pressure on members of the Inquiry Committee.

Sharma filed a criminal revision before the Additional Sessions Judge (CBI Court), Shimla. The revisional court upheld the dismissal, observing that allegations concerning the validity of a disciplinary inquiry are for the authority examining that inquiry to adjudicate, and that a criminal court cannot sit in appeal over findings recorded in departmental proceedings.

Sharma then filed Cr. MMO No. 184 of 2026 before the High Court, appearing in person, reiterating that the non-examination of Ved Prakash rendered the inquiry void, and that the experience certificate therefore contained a demonstrably false statement about a “proper inquiry.”

The Legal Issue: Can a Criminal Court Treat a Departmental Order as Non-Existent?

The core question was whether, on the assumption that the departmental inquiry was flawed because a listed witness was not cross-examined, a criminal court could treat the experience certificate's reference to a “proper inquiry” as a forged or false document and take cognizance of IPC offences on that basis.

Sharma's position required the criminal court to first find the departmental order of removal to be a nullity, and then treat the description of that proceeding in the experience certificate as fraudulent. The High Court identified this as the fatal flaw in his case.

Reasoning: The Void-Order Doctrine and the Proper Forum

Justice Kainthla applied the principle settled by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, (1996) 1 SCC 435, that even a void or voidable order remains effective between parties until it is successfully challenged before a higher forum. The court quoted the Supreme Court's observation that such an order “will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum” and that the word ‘void’ carries a relative rather than absolute meaning.

This position was reiterated in Nagar Parishad, Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar, (2020) 7 SCC 275, where the Supreme Court held that no order can be ignored unless a court of competent jurisdiction records a finding of its invalidity. Until such a finding is made, the order remains effective and carries legal consequences.

Applying these principles, Justice Kainthla held that the removal order passed by the competent authority in Sharma's case was valid in law because it had not been set aside by any competent forum. The order bore no judicial declaration of invalidity. Sharma had not challenged the inquiry report or the removal order before an appropriate authority or tribunal.

Given that the removal order remained valid, the experience certificate's statement that removal followed a proper inquiry could not be characterised as a false or forged recital. The very basis of the criminal complaint — that the inquiry was fake because Ved Prakash was not cross-examined — was, in the court's assessment, legally incorrect. Without first obtaining a declaration that the inquiry was invalid, Sharma could not sustain an argument that the certificate falsely described those proceedings.

The court found no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the revisional court, and declined to exercise its extraordinary revisional jurisdiction.

Costs Imposed for Repeated Filings

Justice Kainthla recorded that this was not the first occasion on which the petitioner had approached the courts by filing petitions of this nature. The court considered it necessary to take steps to prevent the petitioner from consuming court time on unfounded proceedings. The petition was accordingly dismissed with costs of &rupee;10,000, to be deposited in the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund within four weeks. The court directed that failure to deposit the amount would lead to recovery proceedings under law.

Contempt Reference Over Allegation Against Trial Judge

A distinct and grave concern occupied the final part of the judgment. Justice Kainthla noted that in the proceedings before the revisional court, Sharma had arrayed the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. V, Shimla — the very judge who had dismissed his complaint — as a party, naming her as an accused. Further, in paragraph 4(d) of his revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, Sharma had alleged that “accused No. 1 (learned Trial Court) prepared a false report to protect accused No. 2 in an illegal way,” explicitly characterising this as corruption.

The court held that an allegation of corruption against a judicial officer, made recklessly and without any foundation, is prima facie an attempt to scandalise the judiciary and amounts to criminal contempt of court. Justice Kainthla directed that the matter be placed before the appropriate bench holding the relevant roster so that appropriate action could be taken if deemed proper. The court relied in this regard on Court on its Own Motion v. Virendra Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 145.

Outcome

Cr. MMO No. 184 of 2026 was dismissed with costs of &rupee;10,000 payable to the Chief Justice Disaster Relief Fund within four weeks of 8 July 2026. All pending applications in the petition were also disposed of. The Registry was directed to place the matter concerning the contempt reference before the appropriate bench for such action as may be deemed proper in light of the reckless and scandalous allegations made against the trial judge.