FIR Quashed for Bypassing Station House Officer: HP High Court on Section 154 CrPC Compliance

The Himachal Pradesh High Court quashed an FIR and a Magistrate's Section 156(3) order because the complainant approached the Director General of Police instead of the local Station House Officer first, making the entire criminal proceeding procedurally unsustainable.

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, has quashed FIR No. 97 of 2025 registered at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, and the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, that directed its registration — on the sole ground that the complainant failed to first approach the officer in charge of the concerned police station as required under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, sitting singly, decided three connected petitions together on 3 June 2026, holding that a complainant cannot invoke Section 156(3) CrPC before exhausting the remedies under Section 154(1) and 154(3). The ruling follows a binding Supreme Court precedent and leaves the complainant free to restart the process correctly.

The Land Deal and the Complaint

The dispute centres on a large tract of land — 232-14 bighas — in Mohal Ogli, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmour. According to the complainant, Sanjeev Kumar Sharma, the accused persons entered into an agreement to sell the land to him on 29 November 2004, attested by a Notary Public. Possession of the entire land was handed over, and a sale deed for 126.16 bighas out of the total 230-05 bighas was eventually executed in his favour. The accused, however, did not execute the sale deed for the remaining 103-09 bighas despite repeated requests.

The complainant alleged that in February 2024, accused No. 2 entered the land with several persons and threatened him and his labourers to vacate. He had already paid a total sale consideration of ₹1,49,66,250/- and had spent additional money on development. A civil suit was also filed before the Civil Judge, Nahan, which remained pending.

Rather than approaching the Station House Officer of Police Station Kala Amb directly, the complainant emailed his complaint to the Director General of Police. He stated in his application that the accused belonged to the ruling party and he feared they would manage things in their favour. The DGP forwarded the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Sirmour, and an enquiry was conducted, but no FIR was registered. The complainant then filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, under Section 156(3) CrPC seeking a direction to the police to register an FIR.

The Magistrate's Order and the FIR

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, by order dated 10 June 2025, forwarded the application to the SHO for registration of an FIR and proper investigation. The Magistrate held that mere pendency of a civil suit is no bar to criminal proceedings, but also found that mere failure to execute a sale deed does not amount to cheating unless there was an intention to defraud from the beginning, and that no allegation of document forgery had been made. The Magistrate identified offences under Section 329(3), 115(2), 351(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

FIR No. 97 of 2025, dated 13 June 2025, was accordingly registered at Police Station Kala Amb for offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

Three separate petitions were filed before the High Court challenging both the Magistrate's order and the FIR: Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025 by accused Abhay Bahadur Singh and Ajay Bahadur Singh, Cr.MMO No. 1136 of 2025 by accused Sangram Singh, and Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026 filed by the complainant Sanjeev Kumar Sharma against the same order.

Arguments Before the High Court

Ms Ashima Mandla, appearing for Abhay Bahadur Singh and Ajay Bahadur Singh, raised a threshold procedural objection: the complainant had not approached the officer in charge of Police Station Kala Amb before filing the Section 156(3) application. She argued that approaching the DGP does not satisfy the requirement of Section 154(1) CrPC, which mandates that information regarding a cognizable offence be furnished to the officer in charge of the police station. She also submitted that the Magistrate was required under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to hear the police and conduct an enquiry before passing any order, which was not done. Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, for Sangram Singh, adopted these submissions and added that the civil court was already seized of the matter.

Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the State, submitted that the police had only registered the FIR and investigation was continuing, and that the court should not interfere at that stage.

Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior Advocate for the complainant, argued that the allegations of cheating, forgery, criminal intimidation, criminal trespass and causing hurt were to be taken as correct at the threshold stage. He contended that an FIR cannot be quashed unless no case is made out or a legal bar exists, and that the Magistrate had passed a detailed order. He also submitted that the Magistrate had erred in holding that no offence of cheating or forgery was made out.

The Binding Precedent on Section 154 CrPC

Justice Kainthla identified the Section 154 compliance issue as decisive and resolved the petitions on that ground alone, without examining the other arguments.

The court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1479, which had addressed a materially similar situation where a complainant approached the Inspector General of Police rather than the officer in charge of the police station. The Supreme Court had held in that case that Section 154(1) requires information to be furnished to the officer in charge of the police station, and that Section 154(3) — which allows a complainant to approach a superior officer if the SHO refuses to register an FIR — is triggered only after the SHO has been approached and has refused or neglected to act. A complainant who bypasses the SHO entirely cannot then invoke Section 156(3) before a Magistrate.

The Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh Bath had further held that before filing a Section 156(3) application, the complainant must have exhausted the remedies under Section 154(1) and 154(3), and must make those averments in the complaint and produce supporting documents. In that case, the Supreme Court had quashed both the Magistrate's order and all further steps taken on its basis.

Justice Kainthla held that this judgment was binding on the High Court. In the present case, the complainant had admittedly not approached the SHO of Police Station Kala Amb. He had instead emailed the DGP. That did not constitute compliance with Section 154(1). The Magistrate's order directing registration of the FIR, and the FIR itself, were therefore liable to be quashed on this short ground.

The court also noted the broader principles on quashing of criminal proceedings, drawing from the Supreme Court's decisions in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, and Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, all of which reiterate the Bhajan Lal categories under which criminal proceedings may be quashed. These include situations where the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence, where the complaint is filed with mala fides, or where there is an express legal bar to the proceedings. The court, however, did not apply these categories to the merits, having already found the Section 154 non-compliance to be sufficient.

Liberty to Approach Magistrate Afresh

Because the quashing was on a technical procedural ground and not on the merits of the allegations, Justice Kainthla expressly noted that the complainant retains the option of approaching the Magistrate again after complying with the requirements of Section 154 CrPC as laid down in Ranjit Singh Bath. The court made clear that its observations were confined to the disposal of these petitions and would have no bearing on the merits of the case.

The complainant's own petition, Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026, which had been filed against the same Magistrate's order, was rendered infructuous once that order was quashed, and was dismissed on that basis. A pending application for condonation of delay filed along with that petition also stood disposed.

Outcome

Cr.MMO Nos. 823 of 2025 and 1136 of 2025 were allowed. The order dated 10 June 2025 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, in Cr.MA No. 136 of 2025, and FIR No. 97 of 2025 dated 13 June 2025 for offences under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 IPC registered at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, were quashed. Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026 was dismissed as infructuous. All pending applications stood disposed.