HP High Court Quashes FIR and Magistrate's Order for Failure to First Approach Police Station Under Section 154 CrPC
The Himachal Pradesh High Court quashed an FIR and a Section 156(3) CrPC order because the complainant approached the Director General of Police instead of the local Station House Officer first, bypassing the mandatory pre-condition for invoking Magistrate jurisdiction.
The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, on 3 June 2026 quashed FIR No. 97 of 2025 registered at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, and the order dated 10 June 2025 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, which had directed registration of that FIR. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, sitting singly, held that the complainant had not complied with Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. The complainant had emailed his grievance to the Director General of Police rather than first lodging information with the officer in charge of the concerned police station. That procedural failure, the court held, was fatal to the entire proceeding, following a binding Supreme Court ruling in Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory of Chandigarh.
The Land Dispute and the Complaint Before the Magistrate
The dispute arose from a transaction involving land measuring 232-14 bighas in Mohal Ogli, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmour. According to the complainant, Sanjeev Kumar Sharma, the accused — Abhay Bahadur Singh, Ajay Bahadur Singh, and others — had entered into an agreement to sell the land to him on 29 November 2004, attested by a Notary Public. Possession of the entire land was handed over, and the complainant paid a total sale consideration of ₹1,49,66,250. A sale deed for 126.16 bighas was eventually executed, but the accused allegedly refused to execute the sale deed for the remaining 103-09 bighas despite repeated requests.
In February 2024, accused No. 2 allegedly entered the land with several persons and threatened the complainant and his labourers to vacate. A civil suit was separately filed before the Civil Judge, Nahan, and remained pending. The complainant, apprehending that the accused — whom he described as belonging to the ruling party — would manage things in their favour, emailed his complaint to the Director General of Police. The DGP forwarded it to the Superintendent of Police, Sirmour, who conducted an enquiry but did not register a case. The complainant then filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, under Section 156(3) CrPC seeking a direction to Police Station Kala Amb to register an FIR.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, by order dated 10 June 2025, found that mere failure to execute a sale deed does not amount to cheating without an initial intention to defraud, and that no forgery allegation was made out. The Magistrate nonetheless found that the allegations disclosed offences under Section 329(3), 115(2), 351(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and directed the SHO to register an FIR and investigate. FIR No. 97 of 2025, dated 13 June 2025, was accordingly registered for offences under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
Three separate petitions were filed before the High Court: Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025 by Abhay Bahadur Singh and Ajay Bahadur Singh, Cr.MMO No. 1136 of 2025 by Sangram Singh, and Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026 by the complainant Sanjeev Kumar Sharma against the same order.
The Procedural Objection: Bypassing Section 154 CrPC
Counsel for the accused petitioners argued that before a complainant can invoke Section 156(3) CrPC before a Magistrate, he must first exhaust the remedies under Section 154(1) and Section 154(3) CrPC. Section 154(1) requires that information about a cognizable offence be furnished to the officer in charge of the concerned police station. Section 154(3) permits an aggrieved person to send the substance of the information to the Superintendent of Police only after the officer in charge refuses or neglects to register the FIR.
In the present case, the complainant had not approached the SHO of Police Station Kala Amb at all. He had instead emailed the Director General of Police. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1479, where the complainant had approached the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh, who forwarded the complaint to the Economic Offences Wing. The Supreme Court had held in that case that approaching any officer other than the officer in charge of the police station does not satisfy Section 154(1), and that Section 156(3) cannot be invoked without first exhausting the remedies under Section 154.
The State, through the Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the police had only registered the FIR and investigation was continuing, and that the court should not interfere at that stage. The complainant's senior counsel argued that the allegations of cheating, criminal intimidation, criminal trespass and causing hurt were specific and had to be taken as correct at the threshold, and that pendency of a civil suit is no bar to criminal proceedings.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Kainthla set out the governing principles on quashing of criminal proceedings from a line of Supreme Court decisions. The court extracted the seven categories identified in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, as reiterated in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, and Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185. These include situations where the FIR discloses no cognizable offence, where the allegations are inherently improbable, where there is an express legal bar to the proceedings, and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides.
The court then turned directly to the procedural defect. The complainant's own application before the Magistrate stated that he had approached the DGP because he feared the accused would use political influence. The court found this squarely covered by the ratio in Ranjit Singh Bath. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that “Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC are the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in motion.” Before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3), he must exhaust his remedies under Section 154(1) and 154(3), and must make those averments in the complaint supported by documents.
Since the complainant had not approached the SHO of Police Station Kala Amb and had not been refused registration there, the precondition for invoking Section 156(3) was not met. The Magistrate had therefore erred in entertaining the application and directing registration of the FIR. Justice Kainthla held that the order of the Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it were liable to be quashed on this ground alone, without it being necessary to examine the other arguments raised by the accused petitioners.
The court was careful to note that quashing on this technical ground does not foreclose the complainant's remedies. The complainant retains the option of approaching the Magistrate afresh after first complying with the requirements of Section 154 CrPC as laid down in Ranjit Singh Bath. The court expressly declined to adjudicate the other pleas — including whether the dispute was purely civil, whether the application was filed with inordinate delay, and whether the Magistrate was required to conduct an enquiry under Section 175(3) BNSS before passing the order — since the matter was being disposed of on the narrower procedural ground.
Outcome
Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025 and Cr.MMO No. 1136 of 2025, filed by the accused petitioners, were allowed. The order dated 10 June 2025 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, in Cr.MA No. 136 of 2025, and FIR No. 97 of 2025 dated 13 June 2025 for offences under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 IPC registered at Police Station Kala Amb, District Sirmour, were quashed.
Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026, filed by the complainant Sanjeev Kumar Sharma against the same Magistrate order, was dismissed as infructuous in consequence of the quashing. All pending applications were disposed of. The court directed that its observations shall remain confined to the disposal of these petitions and shall have no bearing on the merits of the case.