HP High Court Sets Aside Parole Rejection, Rules Nepali Origin No Bar When Family Is Settled in India

The Himachal Pradesh High Court overturned a parole denial for a life convict, holding that Nepalese nationality cannot ground rejection when the prisoner's family has lived in India for 30–35 years and no adverse material exists against him.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court, Shimla, on 12 August 2026 set aside an order dated 23 June 2026 that had rejected a life convict's application for parole solely on the ground that he was a permanent resident of Nepal and might abscond. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, sitting singly, allowed the writ petition filed by Vicky Rana and directed his release on parole for four weeks subject to furnishing bonds. The court held that the competent authority had ignored police and district administration reports confirming that the petitioner's family had been residing at Kaladhungi, Nainital for 30 to 35 years, owned property there, and had no adverse police record — rendering the abscondence apprehension baseless on the facts.

Conviction, Sentence, and the Rejected Parole Application

Vicky Rana was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, vide judgment dated 30 December 2021. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of &rupee;20,000 (with default rigorous imprisonment of six months) for offences under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, and a concurrent life sentence with an identical fine for the offence under Section 396 IPC. Both substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The conviction arose from FIR No. 10 of 2013, dated 1 November 2013, registered at Police Station Bagga, Himachal Pradesh. By 8 July 2026, the petitioner had undergone 12 years, 7 months and 11 days of imprisonment, excluding remission. The fine had not been deposited as of that date.

On 14 January 2022, Rana applied for parole under the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968, and the Rules framed thereunder. He had initially sought 42 days of parole to meet his family members. The application was forwarded to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Nainital. The District Magistrate, Nainital did not recommend release, and the competent authority rejected the application by order dated 23 June 2026, recording that the petitioner was a permanent resident of Nepal and that the possibility of his absconding to Nepal could not be ruled out.

Rana challenged that rejection by filing CWP No. 11238 of 2026 before the Himachal Pradesh High Court. He sought the order to be set aside and sought a direction for 28 days of parole.

The Statutory Framework and the Only Permissible Grounds for Refusal

The Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968, governs the temporary release of prisoners in the State. Rule 3(2) of the Prisoners Rules made under the Act directs that the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police shall give their opinion on whether temporary release should be opposed only on two grounds: that the prisoner is dangerous to the security of the State, or that his release would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

Section 6 of the Act similarly confines the grounds for refusal to these two categories. The court noted that the competent authority's rejection order did not rest on either of those statutory grounds. The sole reason recorded was the petitioner's Nepalese origin and the fear of abscondence — a ground the court found to be outside the statutory scheme and unsupported by the reports of the field authorities themselves.

Justice Kainthla drew on the Punjab and Haryana High Court's ruling in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 SCC OnLine P&H 638, which distinguished security of the State from law and order, holding that security of the State is endangered only by crimes of violence intended to overthrow the government — not by lesser breaches. Public order, in turn, is a narrower concept than law and order. An authority refusing parole must bring its reason within one of those two statutory grounds.

Why the Court Rejected the Abscondence Reasoning

The District Magistrate's own letter noted that the petitioner's family had been residing at Kaladhungi, Nainital for 30 to 35 years. The Superintendent of Police, Haldwani, confirmed that the petitioner's parents had constructed a house in Ward No. 2, Nagar Panchayat Kaladhungi, Nainital, that the father had purchased the property from one Umed Singh Negi, and that the parents had not met the petitioner for five to six years and wished to see him. No adverse entry was found against the petitioner in any police station.

The custody certificate placed before the court showed that the petitioner's conduct inside jail was satisfactory throughout his incarceration.

The court referred to its own Division Bench ruling in Arjun v. State of H.P. & Others, 2023:HHC:10621, which had held that parole cannot be denied to a convict on the sole ground that he is a citizen of Nepal when his family is residing within India. That precedent had specifically interpreted Section 6 of the Act to require cogent and convincing material that release would endanger State security or public order — material that was absent there as well. Justice Kainthla held the present case to be governed by the same principle: “the parole could not have been rejected on the ground that the petitioner is a citizen of Nepal when his family members are residing at Nainital for 30–35 years.”

The State had argued that the offence was heinous and that the petitioner, being a Nepalese national, would abscond. The court addressed both. On the nature of the offence, it relied on the Supreme Court's direction in Shor v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., MANU/SCOR/34434/2020, that parole cannot be rejected merely because the crime is heinous. It also cited Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 3599, in which the Himachal Pradesh High Court had held that when the prisoner's conduct shows a tendency to reform, the nature of the offence is not a standalone ground for refusal.

The Reformative Theory Applied to the Facts

Justice Kainthla placed the decision squarely within the reformative theory of sentencing as articulated by the Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55. That ruling had held that parole grants an opportunity to maintain links with society, that convicts must breathe fresh air for at least some time, and that parole should not be denied to a convict who maintains good conduct and shows a tendency to reform.

The court extracted passages from Asfaq at length, emphasising that amongst the grounds for parole, the most important is allowing a prisoner to maintain family and social ties. This objective is grounded in the reformative purpose of punishment — one of the four purposes the court identified alongside deterrence, prevention and retribution. Long-term incarceration without any social contact, the court observed, tends to brutalise the prisoner and may produce a worse outcome than the one at the point of entry into jail.

The court also drew on Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4 SCC 161, in which the Supreme Court had directed that where a prisoner's behaviour shows responsibility and trustworthiness, parole should be liberally though cautiously granted to maintain family ties and prevent the build-up of inner tensions.

Against these authorities, the petitioner's satisfactory jail conduct certificate and the uncontroverted police reports confirming settled family roots at Nainital left no material basis for the competent authority's rejection order to stand.

Order

Justice Rakesh Kainthla allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 23 June 2026 (Annexure P-4). The petitioner Vicky Rana was directed to be released on parole for four weeks, subject to the following conditions:

• Furnishing a personal bond of &rupee;1,00,000 and two surety bonds of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Superintendent of Jail.
• An undertaking to maintain good conduct during the parole period.
• An undertaking to surrender before the Superintendent of Jail on the expiry of the parole period.

The Probation Officer was directed to maintain a close watch on the petitioner's activities and to report any deviation from the court's directions. The Superintendent of Jail was given liberty to impose any other suitable conditions at the time of release. All pending miscellaneous applications in the matter were also disposed of.