Jharkhand HC acquits in-laws convicted of dowry death: standing by and not rescuing is not Section 304B guilt

Nine years after a Dhanbad sessions court sentenced the brother of the husband and his wife to seven years, a division bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava found that every witness put the kerosene and the matchstick in the hands of the mother-in-law and the husband alone, that no dowry demand or cruelty was specifically alleged against the appellants, and that Section 34 IPC was never invoked.

Two members of a Dhanbad family who have lived under a dowry-death conviction since 2017 for doing nothing more, on the prosecution's own evidence, than stand by while a young woman was set alight have been acquitted by the Jharkhand High Court. A division bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava on 29 October 2026 allowed the appeal of Gautam Bauri and his wife Chinta Devi against their conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, holding that the witnesses attributed the pouring of kerosene and the striking of the match to the dead woman's mother-in-law and husband alone, that no dowry demand or cruelty was specifically alleged against the appellants, and that the trial court had never invoked Section 34 to make them jointly liable. It is well settled, the bench said, that “suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof”.

A fardbeyan recorded outside the Bokaro mortuary

Rinku Devi married Ratan Bauri of Gopinathpur village under Nirsa police station in 2010 and lived with his family. On 22 May 2012, at about 7 am, she suffered burns in her matrimonial home. Her in-laws took her to Bokaro General Hospital at about 10.30 am, and she died there during treatment. The next afternoon, at 3.30 pm, ASI Anjani Kumar Tiwary of Sector-IV police station, Bokaro, recorded the fardbeyan of her mother, Alta Devi, near the BGH mortuary. Alta Devi said her daughter had been tortured and assaulted over a demand for Rs 50,000 and a motorcycle that the family could not meet, and that on the morning of 22 May her mother-in-law Bijali Devi and husband Ratan Bauri, with the consent of the bhainsur, poured kerosene on her and set her alight with a matchstick; the in-laws brought her to hospital out of fear of society and legal action, admitted her and fled. Learning of the admission from villagers, Alta Devi went to BGH with her son Fatik Bauri, where, she said, Rinku Devi told her that her husband, mother-in-law, bhainsur Gautam Bauri, nanad Manju Devi and gotani Chinta Devi had all poured kerosene and set fire to her, and specifically that the mother-in-law poured the kerosene and the husband struck the match.

Nirsa PS Case No. 141 of 2012 was registered on 28 May 2012. Police charge-sheeted all the accused under Section 304B; Bijali Devi was shown as an absconder and her case was split off on 2 July 2015. Gautam Bauri and Chinta Devi pleaded not guilty. Their defence, in their statements under Section 313 CrPC, was that Rinku Devi caught fire accidentally while lighting a stove. The prosecution examined eight witnesses. The Additional Sessions Judge-V-cum-FTC, Dhanbad, found the charge proved in Sessions Trial No. 205 of 2014 on 13 September 2017 and on 15 September sentenced the two appellants to seven years' rigorous imprisonment; Ratan Bauri received ten years.

The husband's own appeal, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1876 of 2017, was heard alongside this one and disposed of as not pressed on 14 September 2026 because he had already served the full ten years. The appellants' appeal, Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 1790 of 2017 under Section 374(2) CrPC, was reserved for judgment the same day.

What eight witnesses actually said about the brother-in-law and his wife

Mr Pratiush Lala, for the appellants, argued that no independent witness supported the prosecution, that the appellants kept a separate mess and kitchen from the couple and had nothing to do with their lives, that there had never been any complaint of torture or dowry demand against them, that the dying woman had not told her mother of any specific role played by them, that the prosecution had produced no circumstantial material in the absence of direct evidence, and that the testimonies were riddled with contradictions. Mr Bishambhar Shastri, Additional Public Prosecutor, defended the conviction: the witnesses established the demand of Rs 50,000 and a motorcycle and a panchayati held over it; the deceased's upper neck, head and hair were not burnt and she was able to speak; even Ratan Bauri, in his Section 313 statement, had said his wife was speaking during treatment; and minor discrepancies could not wash away the prosecution case.

The bench went through the evidence witness by witness. PW1 Punam Devi spoke of torture after the marriage, a demand for a Hero Honda motorcycle and a panchayati over it, and of the brother going to pacify matters after information received on 31 July 2011; she reached the hospital only after the death and signed the inquest report (Ext. 1). PW2 Phatik Bauri, the brother, said the demand for Rs 50,000 and a motorcycle began three or four months after the wedding and that his sister was beaten over it; at BGH, he said, she told him that for want of the money all the accused sprinkled kerosene and set her alight. In cross-examination he said her bandages reached the neck, that her face, mouth and hair were unburnt, and that people had advised continuing treatment and informing the police the next day. PW3 Kajal Devi, a villager from the parental side, said the demand came from the husband, mother-in-law, bhainsur, gotani and nanad, but that the deceased told her at BGH that the mother-in-law poured kerosene, the husband lit it, and the rest did not save her. PW4 Ala Devi gave the same account of the pouring and lighting, adding that the jeth, jethani and nanad were also involved, and that the deceased was fully burnt but able to speak.

PW5 Alta Devi, the mother and informant, repeated that the mother-in-law poured the kerosene and the husband struck the match while the others were involved in the conspiracy, watched silently and did not save her daughter. In cross-examination she admitted that the nanad Manju Devi was married with children and lived at her matrimonial home in Lalpur, West Bengal, that no case had been lodged before the occurrence though a panchayati had been held, that she had given her daughter coconut water while she was lightly conscious, and that her daughter's head and hair were not burnt. PW6 Srimant Bauri reached BGH after the death; he deposed to an oral panchayati eight or nine months earlier, attended by his wife, a District Board member, at which the husband and mother-in-law had promised to keep Rinku Devi happily, and denied giving false evidence for political gain. PW7 Choudhary Mehra, the retired sub-inspector who investigated, said he smelt kerosene in the deceased's bedroom but admitted he had not noted that in the case diary, that he received no panchayati papers, and that he neither visited BGH nor recorded any doctor's statement. PW8 Dr Vikash Kumar, who conducted the post-mortem (Ext. 4), found 100 per cent burns over the scalp hair, face, neck, chest, abdomen and limbs, including the lips, and gave the cause of death as shock leading to cardio-respiratory failure from burn injuries; he agreed the injuries could be accidental or homicidal and that his report did not state the cause of the fire.

Section 304B, the meaning of soon before, and a presumption that needs a foundation

Three points arose for determination: whether the ingredients of Section 304B were established against these appellants, whether a dowry demand and cruelty or harassment soon before death were proved against them by reliable evidence, and whether they were entitled to the benefit of doubt. The bench set out the section and the five ingredients listed by the three-judge bench in Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201: a death by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative, for or in connection with a dowry demand, shown to have been meted out soon before the death. From Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1, Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129, and Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, it drew the settled meaning of “soon before”: not “immediately before”, but a proximate and live link between dowry-related cruelty and the death, judged on the facts of each case without any fixed time limit. Once those ingredients are shown, Section 113B of the Evidence Act obliges the court to presume that the person who subjected the woman to such cruelty caused the dowry death, and the onus shifts to the accused. The court also noted the summary in State of M.P. v. Jogendra, (2022) 5 SCC 401, restating Satbir Singh and Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, that Section 304B does not pigeonhole a death as homicidal, suicidal or accidental.

The admitted facts met the first two ingredients: the marriage was in 2010, the death in 2012, and the appellants were the husband's brother and his wife. The rest collapsed as against them. On the court's reading of the testimony no witness alleged any overt act by the appellants and no specific dowry demand was attributed to them; the accusation was vague and blanket. Taken at face value, the informant's own evidence confined the specific acts to the mother-in-law pouring kerosene and Ratan Bauri igniting it. The role given to the appellants was that they were present at the scene, witnessed the occurrence and failed to intervene or rescue the deceased. The imputation, the bench said, was essentially one of “passive presence rather than active participation in the alleged ghastly crime”.

Two legal gaps followed. First, the trial court had not invoked or applied Section 34 IPC, either when framing the charge or in the judgment, so constructive liability through common intention had never been fastened on the appellants and no statutory foundation existed to attribute to them the acts of the other accused. Second, it had never been the prosecution's specific case that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by these two before her death. The evidence disclosed no overt act or conduct on their part amounting to cruelty, and without a distinct and particularised charge of cruelty the head under which Section 304B operates was missing.

Roping in the whole family

The bench leaned on the Supreme Court's repeated warnings about spreading the net. In Monju Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2015) 13 SCC 693, drawing on Kans Raj, the court said the tendency to rope in all the in-laws in dowry-death cases, if not discouraged, is likely to weaken the case even against the real culprits; the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or harass the wife, and distant relations should not be summoned without tangible material. In Raja Lal Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 15 SCC 415, the court acquitted a husband's brother and his wife on the view that their names might have been introduced only to spread the net wide. Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 9 SCC 64, made the point that what Section 304B punishes is not a dowry demand but cruelty or harassment in connection with it, which the prosecution must prove before the Section 113B presumption can arise. Monju Roy also cautioned that allegations following an unnatural death cannot be weighed in golden scales, yet omnibus allegations against brothers, sisters and other relatives do not stand on the same footing as those against the husband and parents; the court must be satisfied that each named member actually caused harassment.

Even assuming the appellants had at some stage joined in a demand, the bench said, the prosecution had produced no cogent or reliable evidence that the demand was accompanied by harassment that directly resulted in the death. Normally it is the husband or his parents who benefit from dowry and are in a position to harass, though there is no hard and fast rule, and family members may keep a demand private in the hope that the relationship improves. Given the nature of their relationship to the deceased, the possibility that the appellants were named by way of exaggeration could not be ruled out.

On the complaint of contradictions, the court recalled Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, Bhargavan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 414, and Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, (2023) 19 SCC 672: the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India, courts must separate the grain from the chaff, and only material discrepancies, not normal ones born of lapse of time or shock, corrode a prosecution case. Re-reading the testimony through that lens, it found PW3, PW4 and PW5 substantially consistent on the specific roles of the mother-in-law and husband, and consistent too in attributing to the appellants nothing beyond presence and failure to rescue. The death by burns was proved by the doctor and the post-mortem report; the appellants' part in it was not.

Benefit of doubt, not abundant caution

The bench closed with the standard of proof. It cited Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 3 SCC 454, that a criminal court cannot deprive the accused of liberty without at least a reasonable level of certainty that they were the real culprits; Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 13 SCC 98, on the presumption of innocence and on contradictions that go to the root of the matter; State of Haryana v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96, that benefit of doubt is the reasonable doubt a conscientious judicial mind entertains on the whole evidence at the end of the trial, not a dose administered at every segment; and Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57, and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, that where two views are possible the one favouring the accused must be adopted.

Without clear, cogent and specific evidence of active participation in setting the deceased ablaze, the court held, a conviction could not be sustained merely on alleged presence at the place of occurrence or failure to rescue. The prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt either the direct involvement or the shared common intention of the appellants, and the trial court, without adverting to the absence of specific evidence against them, had erroneously concluded that the charge was proved.

Order

Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 1790 of 2017 was allowed. Gautam Bauri and Chinta Devi, convicted under Section 304B IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge-V-cum-FTC, Dhanbad, in Sessions Trial No. 205 of 2014 by judgment of 13 September 2017 and sentenced on 15 September 2017 to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, were acquitted. Both were on bail and were discharged from the liability of their bail bonds. Pending interlocutory applications were disposed of, and the lower court records were directed to be sent back forthwith with a copy of the judgment. The appeal was reserved on 14 September 2026 and pronounced on 29 October 2026; the judgment was authored by Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad, with Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava concurring. It is marked AFR and carries the neutral citation 2026:JHHC:31680-DB.