Jharkhand HC Dismisses Writ Seeking Return of 1961 Land Acquired for Pathardih Coal Washery
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi dismissed a 2013 writ petition by heirs of displaced villagers, holding that the 1961 land acquisition was lawful, compensation was paid, and the land had not been transferred to any private company.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi has dismissed a writ petition filed in 2013 by legal heirs of villagers whose agricultural land in Mouzas Parasbania, Chandrabad, Parghabad, and Bhatdih in Dhanbad district was acquired in 1960–61 for the construction of the Pathardih Coal Washery. Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, sitting singly, found that the acquisition had followed the mandatory procedure under Sections 4 and 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that compensation was an admitted fact, and that the allegation of an illegal transfer of acquired land to a private company was unsupported by the record. The court concluded that no case for judicial interference was made out and dismissed the petition along with all pending interlocutory applications.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The petitioners—five individuals from Village Kultar, P.O. Pathardih Coal Washery, Dhanbad—are sons of those whose land was acquired in the early 1960s. Their writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution sought mandamus directing respondents to produce all acquisition records, show cause why the land was being handed over to a private entity, and either return the land or provide service and rehabilitation benefits.
The core grievance was threefold. First, that approximately 200 acres of ancestral agricultural land had been acquired in 1960–61 by Hindustan Steel Limited for the Pathardih Coal Washery by paying only meagre compensation and without any rehabilitation. Second, that after the washery was transferred successively from Hindustan Steel Limited to SAIL and then to Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL), BCCL entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with a private company, M/s Monet Ispat Power Energy Private Limited, to build, operate, and maintain the washery—which the petitioners argued amounted to an impermissible transfer of publicly acquired land to a private party. Third, that more than 75 acres of the acquired land remained vacant and unutilised, and equity required its return to the original raiyats or their heirs under Sections 36 and 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Mahesh Tewari, also argued that the petitioners belonged to backward classes and that their ancestral land was protected under Sections 49 and 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, which bar transfers of such land to persons outside the backward class community. He further submitted that in the absence of a valid award, the entire acquisition proceeding was vitiated.
The Legal Issues
Three distinct legal questions occupied the bench. The first was whether the acquisition had been made invoking the emergent powers under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, thereby bypassing the ordinary procedure, or whether Sections 4 and 5-A had been duly followed. The second was whether the arrangement with M/s Monet Ispat Power Energy Limited constituted a transfer of acquired land to a private company in violation of Section 44A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which bars such transfers. The third was whether rent receipts issued to the petitioners could support a claim of title or possession over the acquired land.
A subsidiary question arose from a coordinate bench order dated 05.08.2022 which had held that, in the absence of any award on record, the ground of delay and laches raised by the State would not defeat the writ petition on the merits. The State later filed a supplementary counter-affidavit dated 15.07.2026 annexing the award documents, and the petitioners disputed their validity without filing any formal amendment petition to challenge them.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Dwivedi began with what was admitted on the face of the writ petition itself. The petitioners had acknowledged that the land was acquired in 1960–61 and that compensation had been received, though they characterised the amount as meagre. The notification at Annexure-1 to the writ petition showed that Section 17(4) — the emergent acquisition provision — had been struck out from the printed form. A notification dated 29.08.1962 under Section 4 also appeared at page 39 of the writ petition, which itself called for objections under Section 5-A. The court held it was therefore “crystal clear that the land was not acquired invoking emergent section i.e. Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”
On the question of the award, the court noted that the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the State on 15.07.2026 annexed the award. The petitioners' counsel received a copy on that date but chose not to challenge the award by way of any amendment petition. The bench declined to accept the argument that no valid award existed. Even if the petitioners disputed its validity, the court pointed out, that dispute had not been raised by way of a properly constituted challenge within these proceedings.
The court further noted that the petitioners' own rejoinder to BCCL's counter-affidavit admitted in paragraph 14 that compensation had been taken, even while claiming that physical possession was never actually handed over to Hindustan Steel Limited, BCCL, or the Eastern Railway. This admission, the bench found, reinforced the conclusion that the acquisition was complete.
On the argument that Section 17 was invoked without an award, Justice Dwivedi referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Satendra Prasad Jain and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1993) 4 SCC 369. That decision explained that once land vests in the Government after possession is taken under Section 17(1), no provision in the Act allows it to revert to the original owner. However, the court emphasised that this principle was engaged only by way of contrast—the actual acquisition in this case had followed the ordinary route, not Section 17.
On rent receipts, the court accepted the Advocate General's reliance on the Division Bench decision of this very court in Saraswati Devi and another v. State of Jharkhand and others, 2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 2972, which held that rent receipts are fiscal documents and do not confer title or establish possession. Mere issuance of rent receipts, the bench held, was not a ground to declare any right, title, or interest in land that had already been acquired.
The Advocate General also relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal and others, (2020) 8 SCC 129. Paragraphs 366.3 and 366.9 of that judgment make clear that Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 does not revive stale and time-barred claims or reopen concluded acquisition proceedings. Since compensation had admittedly been paid, the court found no illegality.
On the Monet Ispat arrangement, BCCL's counsel Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah submitted that the company had not transferred any interest in the land to M/s Monet Ispat and Energy Limited. BCCL's 260th Board Meeting held on 30.08.2008 had approved a Build, Operate and Maintain (BOM) concept for six washeries including Pathardih. After an international competitive bid, M/s Monet Ispat and Energy Limited was selected, and an agreement was executed on 17.10.2012 for building, operating, and maintaining the washery—not for any transfer of land. Justice Dwivedi accepted this position, finding that the arrangement was a contract and not a transfer of land. SAIL and BCCL are Public Sector Undertakings of the Government of India, and accordingly the judgment in M/s Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. and another v. G. Jayarama Reddy and others, 2011 AIR SCW 6081, on which petitioners' counsel had relied to argue that acquired land cannot be handed to private parties, was held inapplicable on the facts.
On the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, the court held that while the Act exists to protect the rights of people of the Chotanagpur region, once land is acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act and compensation is provided under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, the restrictions under Sections 49 and 50 of the Act do not come in the way of such acquisition.
The court also addressed the petitioners' reliance on State of Kerala and others v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and another, (1997) 5 SCC 432, which holds that after a public purpose is achieved, remaining land can be used for another public purpose, and that if no such purpose exists, land should go to public auction rather than back to the erstwhile owner. This further foreclosed the petitioners' argument that vacant portions must revert to them.
The Acquisition Record
BCCL's counter-affidavit placed on record a chart showing the six land acquisition cases under which Hindustan Steel Limited acquired land for the Pathardih Washery. The total area acquired across Mouzas Chandrabad, Parghabad, Parasbania, and Bhatdih amounted to 315.81 acres. Possession across the different cases was taken on dates ranging from 28.03.1961 to 12.01.1962. The chart recorded the present status of each parcel: Mouza Chandrabad land under L.A. Case No.50/60-61 (112.93 acres) and No.55/60-61 (32.64 acres) is used for the old and new washery and allied works; Mouza Parasbania under L.A. Case No.48/60-61 (58.52 acres) is used for residential and allied works; and Mouza Bhatdih under L.A. Case No.47/60-61 (60.16 acres) is used for residential, railway siding, and allied works.
The compensation vouchers annexed by the State in its supplementary counter-affidavit showed that predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners—including Jogendra Nath Mahto, Kalachand Mahto, and Ashu Mahto—received compensation on 08.01.1963 for L.A. Case No.47/1963-64 and on 07.01.1963 for L.A. Case No.48/1960-61, in the presence of witnesses.
Outcome
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi dismissed W.P. (C) No. 6048 of 2013 on 21 July 2026, holding that the land was acquired in 1961 after following due procedure of law, that compensation had been admitted as received, and that no case for interference was made out. All pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.