Husband Who Denied Paternity and Maintained Alleged Extra-Marital Ties Cannot Claim Wife Deserted Him, Holds Jharkhand High Court

A Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court upheld the Family Court's refusal of divorce, finding the husband had not proved cruelty or desertion under the Special Marriage Act and that the evidence pointed to misconduct on his side, not the wife's.

The Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi dismissed a first appeal by a husband challenging the Principal Judge, Family Court, Sahibganj's refusal to grant him a decree of dissolution of marriage. Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad, leading the Division Bench with Justice Sanjay Prasad, delivered the judgment on 20 July 2026. The court found that the husband had failed at trial to prove either cruelty or desertion as grounds for divorce under section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage Act, and that the impugned judgment of the Family Court did not suffer from perversity warranting interference. Far from establishing the wife's misconduct, the evidence disclosed that it was the husband who had levelled unchastity allegations against his wife and had allegedly maintained extra-marital relationships, giving the wife valid reason to leave the matrimonial home.

The Marriage and the Dispute Before the High Court

Manoj Kumar Hansda and Varsha Monigini Hembrom, both residents of Sahibganj district, solemnised their marriage on 25 June 2008 under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act. According to the wife's account, the couple had known each other before the wedding, the husband had established a physical relationship with her on an assurance of marriage, she had conceived before the marriage, and the child was born on 19 April 2008 at Barharwa. The marriage was eventually solemnised and registered after intervention by relatives.

The husband's version before the Family Court was different. He claimed that shortly after the marriage the wife filed a false criminal case against him on 10 November 2009 at Rajmahal, moved to her parental house, and refused all his requests to return. He had earlier filed Matrimonial Suit No. 62 of 2009 before the Family Court, Sahibganj, for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act; that suit was dismissed. The wife separately obtained a maintenance order of Rs 2,000 per month for herself and Rs 1,000 per month for the child.

In 2018 the husband filed Original Suit No. 284 of 2018 seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, citing approximately ten years of separation. The Family Court dismissed that suit on 23 February 2023. The husband's appeal, First Appeal No. 64 of 2023, challenged that dismissal as perverse and unsupported by the evidence.

Legal Issues: Cruelty and Desertion Under the Special Marriage Act

The divorce petition invoked section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage Act, which allow dissolution on grounds of desertion and cruelty respectively. The explanation to section 27 defines “desertion” as desertion of the petitioner by the other party without reasonable cause and without consent or against the wish of such party, including wilful neglect.

The Division Bench surveyed the Supreme Court's consistent position on both grounds. On cruelty, it drew on Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105, Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, and Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334. The court reiterated that conduct alleged as cruelty must be “grave and weighty” and that trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage do not qualify. Crucially, the bench noted the settled rule that levelling unchastity allegations against a spouse constitutes a grave assault on character and amounts to cruelty in law.

On desertion, the court relied on Debananda Tamuli v. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459, tracing the law back to Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40. It emphasised that two elements must coexist: factum of separation and animus deserendi—the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. The deserted spouse must also show absence of consent and that his or her own conduct did not provide the other party a reasonable cause to leave.

On perversity, the bench applied the standard from Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206: a finding is perverse only if it ignores relevant material, considers irrelevant material, or defies logic so as to be irrational. An appellate court cannot substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

What the Evidence Revealed at Trial

The husband examined three witnesses at trial. In cross-examination, the husband himself admitted the marriage according to Santhal customs and acknowledged a son from the wife. He could not explain the grounds on which his earlier restitution petition had been dismissed. He denied knowing a person named Mohit Marshal Hansda and denied that Mohit was his son, and he denied that his alleged relationship with his cousin Sohagini Hansda was the reason the wife refused to live with him.

PW-2, Md. Mahboob Alam, also admitted he had deposed in the earlier restitution suit but could not recall its number or the outcome. He denied that the husband had been living with another woman in an illicit relationship. PW-3, Marang Marandi, contradicted himself in cross-examination: he first acknowledged that Manoj had previously lived with Sohagini Hansda, then retracted and denied knowing her. He also denied that the husband was currently living with one Nuri Aasa Marandi at South Colony Quarter, Sahibganj.

The wife, examined as DW-1, stated she was still willing to live with her husband if he maintained her with dignity. She denied that the husband had ever gone to her house to take her back or made any genuine effort to reunite. She admitted living separately from 2009. She confirmed she had filed a case under section 498A of the IPC at Rajmahal, in which the husband was acquitted.

A prior Family Court judgment in the restitution suit (Exhibit A) had already recorded a finding that the husband appeared to have an extra-marital relationship with Sohagini Hansda and that the wife had valid grounds for not joining the husband's company. That judgment was never challenged in any appellate court and remained in force.

How the Division Bench Reasoned

The Division Bench found that the husband's evidence disclosed nothing substantial to establish cruelty inflicted by the wife. The witnesses either contradicted themselves or could not support the allegations beyond vague assertions. The conduct that emerged from the record — denial of paternity of the couple's son and allegations of unchastity against the wife — was the husband's own, not the wife's.

The bench applied the rule from Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate directly: levelling disgusting accusations of unchastity or extra-marital familiarity against a spouse constitutes the worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient in itself to substantiate cruelty in law. Exhibit A showed the husband had denied being the father of his wife's son, which the court treated as pleading and proving cruelty against himself, not against the wife.

On desertion, the bench found no evidence of any step by the husband to take the wife back. There was no notice, no specific date when he had gone to her parental home, and no letter or document evidencing genuine effort at reconciliation. The unchallenged family court record established that the husband had an extra-marital relationship with Sohagini Hansda and was alleged to be living with Nuri Aasa Marandi. Given that backdrop, the wife's departure to her parental home was found to be a consequence of the husband's conduct, not an independent act of wilful abandonment.

The court agreed with the Family Court's conclusion that it was not possible to hold that the wife had either the factum of separation or the animus deserendi required to constitute desertion. A spouse who leaves a matrimonial home because of the other's ill-treatment and extra-marital relationships cannot be characterised as the deserting party.

Having assessed all of this, the Division Bench found that the Family Court had consciously considered both oral and documentary evidence and had reached a reasoned conclusion. The judgment did not ignore relevant material, did not rest on irrelevant material, and did not defy logic. It therefore did not fall within the definition of perversity as elaborated in Arulvelu, and interference was not warranted.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed First Appeal No. 64 of 2023. The judgment dated 23 February 2023 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Sahibganj in Original Suit No. 284 of 2018 was affirmed and the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage under section 27(1)(b) and (d) of the Special Marriage Act was refused. All pending interlocutory applications were disposed of. The judgment was pronounced on 20 July 2026 and uploaded on 21 July 2026.